THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
Cite as Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III),
6 FSM Intrm. 508 (Pohnpei
1994)
THE ISO NAHNKEN OF NETT,
SALVADOR IRIARTE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
on its own and standing in the place
of
THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC
ISLANDS,
THE POHNPEI PUBLIC LANDS BOARD OF
TRUSTEES,
THE ETSCHEITS and JOHN DOES
1-49,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1993-026
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Andon L. Amaraich
Associate Justice
Hearing: June 30, 1994
Decided: September 26, 1994
APPEARANCES:
For the
Plaintiff: Mary Berman, Esq.
P.O. Box 163
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendant: Douglas Parkinson, Esq.
(United
States) Law Offices of R. Barrie Michelsen
P.O. Box 1450
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendant: Richard L. Counts, Esq.
(Public Lands Board) Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Pohnpei Attorney General
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendants: Daniel J. Berman, Esq.
(Robert Etscheit, Jr.) Rush, Moore, Craven, Sutton, Morry & Beh
(Camille Etscheit) 2000 Hawaii Tower
745 Fort Street
Honolulu, HI 96813-3862
For the
Defendants: Fredrick L. Ramp, Esq.
(Adams and Varner) P.O. Box 1480
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
* * * *
HEADNOTES
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
A plaintiff who has previously litigated and lost his claim to a legal interest in a certain property is collaterally estopped from claiming damages as a result of loss of ownership or possession of the land because under the principle of collateral estoppel, a cause of action which could have been litigated in the course of the original case between the same parties is treated as litigated and decided with the former cause of action. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 516 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; Civil Procedure ) Joinder
In some cases failure to join an indispensable party may subject a judgment to collateral attack, but failure to join a necessary party will not. A necessary party is one who has an identifiable interest in the action and should normally be made a party to the lawsuit, but whose interests are separable from the rest of the parties or whose presence cannot be obtained; whereas an indispensable party is one to whom any judgment, if effective, would necessarily affect his interest, or would, if his interest is eliminated, constitute unreasonable, inequitable, or impractical relief. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 517 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure )
Joinder
The burden of joining absent parties rests with the party asserting their indispensability. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 518 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
Where land is not public land and where the Land Commission and TT High Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate land claims even over public lands because the authorized adjudicatory body for public lands had not yet been created the TT High Court's land adjudication will have res judicata effect. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 518 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
Only truly exceptional cases warrant an exception to the normal presumption of res judicata, and such exceptions are to be confined within narrow limits. Where there is no evidence a TT High Court judgment was obtained unfairly or worked a serious injustice an FSM court cannot grant relief from it. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 519 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
FSM courts are not bound to follow the precedents or reasoning of the TT High Court in deciding cases, but must respect the resolution or outcome of a case as between the parties and
subject matter of the particular action adjudicated absent constitutional defect or obvious injustice such as a plain usurpation of power. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 519-20 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
Where a party had imputed and actual notice of the dimensions of the land in dispute in a previous litigation the same party cannot later attack the judgment for either vagueness of description or lack of notice. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 520 (Pon. 1994).
Civil Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
A party who has litigated an action in his personal capacity cannot escape the application of collateral estoppel and relitigate the action simply by claiming to act in a different capacity. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 520 (Pon. 1994).
Equity ) Laches, Estoppel and
Waiver
The basic elements of the doctrine of laches are 1) inexcusable delay or lack of diligence by the plaintiff in bringing suit, and 2) injury or prejudice to the defendant from plaintiff's delay. Delay is inexcusable when the plaintiff knew or had notice of defendant's conduct giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action, and had prior opportunity to bring suit. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 522 (Pon. 1994).
Equity ) Laches, Estoppel and
Waiver
Where the plaintiff did know or should have known of defendants' claims for at least a decade, defendants should not have to be hauled into court to relitigate issues decided over ten years before because it is prejudicial to the defendants who had a reasonable right to assume that the TT High Court appellate decision had closed the matter in 1982. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 523 (Pon. 1994).
Equity ) Laches, Estoppel and
Waiver
Although the doctrine of laches cannot be asserted against government land, where suit is prosecuted in the name of a government by a private individual laches may apply as a bar. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 523 (Pon. 1994).
Property; Trusteeship
Agreement
A U.S. statute requiring aliens to dispose of
landholdings within ten years of acquisition never applied in the Trust
Territory because the Trust Territory never had the status of a U.S.
territory and the U.S. Congress never specifically extended its
application to the Trust Territory. Nahnken of Nett v. United States
(III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 524-25 (Pon. 1994). Trusteeship
Agreement
The Trusteeship Agreement does not provide individuals
with a private cause of action for damages for alleged breach of any of
its provisions. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm.
508, 526 (Pon. 1994). Compact of Free
Association
Although the Compact of Free Association waives U.S.
sovereign immunity it does not create new causes of action or remedies
beyond what was available to private litigants before the Compact.
Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 526 (Pon.
1994). Torts ) Government
Liability
Since by statute the Trust Territory government would be
liable to private litigants only under circumstances where a private
person would be liable to the claimant for similar acts and because
declaring title to the property could only be accomplished by an
administering governmental authority there is no tort for loss of property
for declaring title because private persons have no authority to declare
title. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 527
(Pon. 1994). Transition of
Authority
The United States could not assume responsibility for,
or be held liable for, the absence of separate adjudicatory body for
public land disputes when the exclusive authority to establish such a body
had been transferred to the Ponape district legislature. Nahnken of
Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 508, 528 (Pon.
1994). Torts ) Government
Liability
Any action of the Land Commission in excess of its
statutory authority would be actionable only against the Commission
itself, not the United States since it was not an agency of the U.S.
government. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM Intrm.
508, 528 (Pon. 1994). Civil
Procedure ) Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel
Courts stand ready to assist litigants with claims that
are well-grounded in law and diligently brought. At the same time
the courts must strive to ensure that the final judgments fairly rendered
are upheld, so that all interested parties may know when an issue has been
justly concluded. Parties are entitled to rely on the conclusiveness
of prior decisions. Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM
Intrm. 508, 529 (Pon. 1994). *
* *
* COURT'S OPINION
ANDON L.
AMARAICH, Associate Justice:
This purpose of this memorandum of decision is to
discuss the reasoning of the order granting defendants' motions for
summary judgment and motion to dismiss entered this day. Parties
The plaintiff in this action is the Iso Nahnken of
Nett,1 Salvador Iriarte. He brings suit
against all defendants for loss of possession and use of approximately
1,362 acres in Nett Municipality currently owned by the Etscheit family,
and seeks relief in the form of monetary damages in the amount of
$50,000,000.
The defendant United States is sued in its capacity as
former administering authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands ("TTPI"). Plaintiff alleges the United States government
breached its duty under the Trusteeship Agreement and laws of the Trust
Territory to protect plaintiff as an indigenous person against loss of
property by allowing title to the lands at issue to pass to the
Etscheits.
The defendant Pohnpei Public Lands Authority ("PLA"),
which includes the Public Lands Board of Trustees, is a division of the
Pohnpei State Department of Land, established under the Pohnpei Public
Land Trust Act, S.L. 1L-155-87 (Pohnpei State Legis., 4th Reg. Sess.
1987).2 PLA is sued for allegedly
breaching its duty to hold and administer the property in this action as
public lands in trust for the indigenous people of Pohnpei, and
specifically, in failing to return the land at issue to the plaintiff as
customary and traditional owner of the land.
Defendants Etscheits are sued collectively as claiming
title to the lands at issue. Factual
Background
The subject matter of this lawsuit concerns
approximately 1,250 acres known as "Mpomp," currently held under
certificate of title by the Etscheit family, and another approximately 112
acres situated in Sapwetik and Taketik islands, also owned by the
Etscheits.
The lengthy and complex history of the transactions
concerning the land involved in this action has been described in several
other decided and pending cases. See, e.g., In re Etscheit Property,
Civil Action No. 142-78 (Trust Territory High Court, 1980); Etscheit v.
Adams, 6 FSM Intrm. 365 (Pon. 1994) (the partition case). Briefly,
the property known as Mpomp was leased to one Stanislaus Kubary in 1895.
In 1903, after Kubary's death, the land was auctioned by the German
administering government and purchased by Domenikus Etscheit, ancestor of
the present Etscheit defendants. The property was confiscated by the
Japanese following World War I, and returned to the Etscheits in 1927.
The Japanese government regained the land through forced sale in
1940-41. After the Second World War ended, the Etscheit family
retook possession of the land. In 1956 the Trust Territory
government entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with
Florentine Etscheit recognizing the Etscheit family as rightful owner of
Mpomp, Sapwetik and Taketik, and quitclaim deeds were issued accordingly
in 1957 in exchange for a payment of money by Florentine Etscheit and
transfer of certain other property. In 1978
the Etscheits filed a trespass action in the Trust Territory High Court
("TT High Court") against the Nanmwarki and Nahnken of Nett regarding
Mpomp, which became by consent of the parties a quiet title action.3
The trial division of the TT High Court ruled in favor of the
Etscheits as owners of Mpomp. The defendants, including the present
plaintiff Iso Nahnken, appealed. The appellate division of the TT
High Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Nanmwarki,
Naniken of Nett v. Etscheit Family, 8 TTR 287 (App. 1982). Pursuant
to the decision of the TT High Court appellate division, the Pohnpei Land
Commission issued certificates of title to Mpomp to the Etscheits in
1983.
Sapwetik and Taketik were not part of the TT High Court
litigation. Both were named in the 1903 notice of sale to Domenikus
Etscheit, and both were part of the 1957 conveyance from the Trust
Territory to his widow, Florentine Etscheit. A Determination of
Ownership regarding Sapwetik was made in favor of the Etscheits by the
Pohnpei Land Commission in 1984; however, a certificate of title has not
been issued apparently because of state court litigation between members
of the Etscheit family as to the proper title holder. I. PLAINTIFF'S THEORY
OF THE CASE
Plaintiff asserts that as the Iso Nahnken he is the
rightful owner and administrator of the land at issue in this case.
The theory behind his claims is summarized as follows.
Pohnpeian custom and an 1895 ruling by a Spanish official held that
the "Chief of Nett" was the owner of the lands known as Mpomp. According
to the Spanish-era documents submitted by plaintiff, the Chief of Nett
(the Nanmwarki at the time) entered into a lease of the property to
Stanislaus Kubary. The lease was for life to Kubary, and then to his
wife and descendants upon his death. The subsequent 1903 estate sale
by German officials to Domenikus Etscheit violated the terms of the 1895
agreement between the Nanmwarki and Kubary, and therefore the sale was
void.
Even
assuming the sale was valid and interest in the land passed to the
Etscheit family, during World War II the Japanese bought the property from
the Etscheits. Plaintiff contends that this meant after the war
title to the land became vested in a Trust Territory official known as the
"Alien Property Custodian," a predecessor of the current PLA.
Therefore, the lands formerly possessed by the Etscheits became
public land by virtue of the Japanese purchase, because under Trust
Territory laws and policy the Trust Territory government succeeded to
title of all such land to administer in trust on behalf of the indigenous
inhabitants. The chain of title thus went from the Japanese to the Alien
Property Custodian to the present PLA. The effect of this chain of
title is that the formal deed of the land from the TTPI government to
Florentine Etscheit in 1957 was void, because the Alien Property Custodian
and the TTPI government were prohibited by existing laws and regulations
from issuing deeds to such property to non-indigenous persons. Thus,
the land was never legally transferred to the Etscheits and is still held
by the PLA. The PLA had a legal duty under Trust Territory laws and
Secretarial Order 2969 to hold public land in trust for the indigenous
people of Pohnpei, and breached that duty by failing to return the
Etscheit lands to the plaintiff as traditional administrator of Nett
lands. The acts of all three groups of defendants caused plaintiff
to suffer loss and damages in the amount of fifty million
dollars.
Defendants PLA and the Etscheits have moved for summary
judgment and plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment. As a
preliminary matter, the Court must determine pursuant to FSM Civil Rule 56 whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact. At the hearing on June 30th
plaintiff suggested that there is an issue of fact whether plaintiff had
notice of the certificate of title to Mpomp issued by the Land Commission
to the Etscheits. For the reasons which are discussed below, the
Court does not find that a genuine issue exists with regard to this
question. The other question raised by plaintiff at the hearing was
whether the Land Commission followed customs and traditions, and existing
district law, when it issued the certificates of title. This is a
legal question, not a factual one. The
only potentially material fact over which the parties fundamentally
disagree and have posited opposing authorities is the question whether the
Iso Nahnken of Nett traditionally had authority to own and administer
lands in Nett for the benefit of the people. Defendants refute such
authority, citing sources which mention only the Nanmwarki in discussing
customary distribution of land in Pohnpei. Plaintiff has submitted
an affidavit from the former Nanmwarki of Nett, the late Frederick Iriarte, stating that
the Iso Nahnken holds joint authority with the Nanmwarki over land
distribution. The Court need not resolve this issue. Even
assuming that plaintiff's position is correct, and that as a general
matter he has standing to bring suit for damages for loss of land
traditionally under his control, the Court does not find this fact
material to the summary judgment arguments before it concerning the
property and other facts of this case. Therefore, this case is ripe
for summary judgment as a matter of law under FSM Civil Rule 56. Bank of Guam v. Island Hardware, 2
FSM Intrm. 281, 284 (Pon. 1986); FSM Dev. Bank
v. Rodriguez Corp., 2 FSM Intrm. 86, 87 (Truk 1985). II. DEFENDANTS'
ARGUMENTS
Defendants PLA and the Etscheits originally filed
separate motions for summary judgment, but by cross-stipulation have
concurred with each other's presentations. The Etscheits also join
in the United States' motion to dismiss. Most of the arguments of the
United States in support of dismissing the action coincide with those of
the other defendants. In addition, the United States argues
sovereign immunity and lack of actionable conduct as grounds for dismissal
of plaintiff's suit. The
defendants attack all of the public land statutes cited by plaintiff as
irrelevant to this case, since the property at issue is private property.
None of the public land laws give authority to the PLA to take over
private property, nor do the statutes give authority to third parties such
as the plaintiff to bring suit based on the PLA's failure to assert
control over such land. D.L. 4L-153-78 states that the PLA is bound
by all existing leases entered into by the TTPI. Defendant PLA takes
this position with respect to the Etscheit lands. The TTPI
government itself considered the land to be private land, and the property
has never been conveyed by any act of government to the
PLA.
Defendants reject plaintiff's argument that the TTPI
government or the PLA had any duty to turn over public lands in Nett to
plaintiff for distribution, even assuming that the property in this case
were to be classified as public land. There is no provision in any of the
public land laws stating such a requirement, nor is there any provision
providing a private cause of action for money damages against the TTPI or
PLA for failure to transfer public lands to a third party such as the
Nahnken of Nett. The
defendants assert that this action is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. The plaintiff first asserted his rights over the land beginning
in 1978, which caused the Etscheits to bring Civil Action No. 142-78 in
the TT High Court. That court held in favor of the Etscheits.
The Nahnken and Nanmwarki of Nett appealed and lost, and the
appellate division of the TT High Court ruled that plaintiff had no legal
interest in Mpomp. Therefore, defendants argue, the present case is
simply another attempt by the plaintiff to relitigate the earlier quiet
title action.
Defendants also urge the Court to apply the same basis
of decision as applied by the TT High Court, the doctrine of laches or
stale demand. Plaintiff cannot now argue the validity of the
original 1903 sale of the property to Domenikus Etscheit. They
contend that plaintiff had knowledge and opportunity to bring his claims
for lost use compensation at least as early as 1978 if not
before. In
addition, this case should be barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendants contend that the case is not one concerning an interest in
property such that the 20-year statute of limitations would apply.
Instead, defendants argue that the six-year statute of limitation
applies, and as a result the plaintiff's action is clearly precluded since
the cause of action would have arisen at the latest in 1983-84 with
the Land Commission's actions regarding title to Mpomp and determination
of ownership of Sapwetik. III. RES
JUDICATA
Plaintiff cites a number of Trust Territory statutes and
regulations, Pohnpei district and state laws, and Secretarial Order 2969
in support of his claim that the land in this case reverted at some point
in time to the Pohnpei PLA. These laws would be relevant if the land
at issue was indeed public land. The Court concludes that it is
not. In
Civil Action No. 142-78, In re Etscheits' Property (Dec. 24, 1980), the
trial division of the TT High Court declared the Etscheit family to be the
owners of Mpomp. One of the findings of the trial court was that
during World War II, "the land in question was forcibly confiscated by the
Japanese government and members of the Etscheit family were interned on
Ponape by the Japanese." Opinion at 2. The 1956 Memorandum of
Understanding stated the same conclusion, that the 1940-41 transfer of
Mpomp to the Japanese was a forced sale made under duress, and therefore
void. The appellate division of the TT High Court in reviewing the
trial court decision did not reverse this finding. Plaintiff in this
action has not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption of
validity of the finding. The legal conclusion from this fact is that
title to Mpomp never passed to the Japanese government during World War
II. M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Ratification of Contract Voidable for
Duress 77 A.L.R.2d 426 (1961); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 234 (1991).
Title would have had to have effectively passed to the Japanese for
plaintiff to prevail on his argument that the land is public land and not
private property. All of the definitions of "alien property" or
"public lands" in the laws plaintiff cites refer to Japanese owned land.4 It
follows that if the Japanese never owned the land, none of the public land
laws apply. This Court has already concurred in previous published
opinions with the TT High Court's finding that the 1940-41 sale was
forced. See Etscheit v. Adams, 6 FSM Intrm. 365,
370 (Pon. 1994). I therefore conclude that the property in question
was never owned by the Japanese government. As such it did not
revert in title to the Alien Property Custodian and its successor entity,
the PLA.5
[6 FSM
Intrm. 516] The conclusion that this
property was not alien property or public land is implicit in the TT High
Court's decision, affirmed on appeal in Nanmwarki, Nahnken of Nett v.
Etscheit Family, 8 TTR 287 (App. 1982). The ruling of the TT High
Court that the Nahnken of Nett does not own Mpomp is res judicata.
It follows that the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from claiming
damages as a result of loss of ownership or possession of the land.
Under the principle of collateral estoppel, a cause of action which
could have been litigated in the course of the original case between the
same parties is treated as litigated and decided with the former cause of
action. Berman v. FSM Supreme Court, 6 FSM Intrm.
109, 112 (Pon. 1993); Ittu v.
Charley, 3 FSM Intrm. 188, 190 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1987); 46 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 417 (1969). Plaintiff's claims for damages in this
lawsuit for deprivation of use of the Etscheit property is directly
dependent upon establishing a legal interest in the property, the very
issue plaintiff litigated and lost earlier in the TT High Court.
Plaintiff cannot thus disassociate his claims in this lawsuit from
the prior conclusive judicial determination that he has no interest in
Mpomp. See Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1977)
(fact that remedy sought in second action differs from that sought in
first action does not suffice to differentiate underlying claim to defeat
application of res judicata). This
Court has recently reiterated, as plaintiff admits,6 the
validity and conclusiveness of the TT High Court rulings concerning this
property. See Ponape Enterprises Co. v. Soumwei, 6 FSM
Intrm. 341, 344 (Pon. 1994); In re Parcel No.
046-A-01, 6 FSM Intrm. 149, 159 (Pon. 1993). Plaintiff argues
nonetheless that the TT High Court decisions should not be given res
judicata effect for the following reasons: (1)
The TT High Court lacked jurisdiction because it failed to join the
PLA as an indispensable party. (2)
The TT High Court lacked jurisdiction because it did not possess
jurisdiction over the property at issue. (3)
Section 176 of the Compact
of Free Association, which states that "final judgments in
civil cases rendered by any
court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands shall continue in full
force and effect," is qualified by the clause "subject to the
constitutional power of the courts of . . . the Federated States of
Micronesia to grant relief from judgments in appropriate cases," and U.S.
case law holds that courts may refuse to apply the doctrine of res
judicata to avoid manifest injustice. (4)
The FSM Supreme Court is not bound to abide by the decisions of the
TT High Court, as held by the Court in United Church
of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95 (App. 1989); FSM v. Oliver, 3 FSM Intrm.
469 (Pon. 1988). (5)
The TT High Court judgment should not be given res judicata effect
for all the land called Mpomp now at issue, since that court did not
specify the size and boundaries of Mpomp in its decision. (6)
The TT High Court cases involved the plaintiff as a party only in
his personal capacity, and therefore the decisions should not bind
plaintiff in the current lawsuit since he is acting as representative of
the people of Nett. Each of
these arguments will be addressed in turn. (1)
Plaintiff argues that the PLA should have been joined as an
indispensable party in the TT High Court civil action, and that failure to
do so renders the judgment void and subject to collateral attack. He
cites several authorities for the principle that failure to join an
indispensable party may render the judgment void. Most of the sources
cited state only the well-established principle that in order for a
judgment to be valid the issuing court must have had jurisdiction over the
subject matter, 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1064 (1969); 50 C.J.S.
Judgments § 617 (1947), and that a party that originally consented to the
jurisdiction of the court may later raise a claim that the same court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because jurisdiction does not originate
from consent of the parties. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1081 (1969); Grubb
v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475, 50 S. Ct. 374, 377,
74 L. Ed. 972, 977 (1930).
Relevant to plaintiff's argument are two cases, Stevens
v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1964) and Bank of California v. Superior
Court of San Francisco, 106 P.2d 879 (Cal. 1940). These cases indeed
hold that in some cases failure to join an indispensable party may subject
the judgment to collateral attack. Both cases, however, make a
distinction between "indispensable" and "necessary" parties. A
necessary party is one who has an identifiable interest in the action and
should normally be made a party to the lawsuit, but whose interests are
separable from the rest of the parties or whose presence cannot be
obtained. Bank of California, 106 P.2d at 884. Failure to join
necessary parties does not defeat jurisdiction. Id. In the
Bank of California case, concerning distribution of a decedent's estate,
some of the named defendants moved for an order to join other absent
legatees as indispensable parties. The trial court denied the motion
and petitioners applied for a writ of prohibition against the trial court.
The appellate court ruled that the absent parties were necessary but
not indispensable parties because their interests were separable and
capable of independent adjudication. Id. at 885. An
indispensable party is "one to whom any judgment, if effective, would
necessarily affect his interest, or would, if his interest is eliminated,
constitute unreasonable, inequitable, or impractical relief . . . ."
Stevens, 334 F.2d at 777. In the
instant case the most that could be said is that PLA was a necessary party
at the time the TT High Court action
was brought. The PLA could, if it chose to, have intervened and
asserted an independent right to the property in question based on the
public land laws. It could still have brought such a claim after the
decision against the Nanmwarki and the Nahnken was rendered. It is
significant, however, that PLA did not make any effort on its own to
assert such a claim at the time, nor did the Nahnken, as a party to the TT
court action, make any motion under T.T.P.I. Civ. Pro. R. 19 to join PLA
as a co-defendant. The Nahnken did not raise the issue of PLA's
joinder until 11 years after the litigation had been completed. The burden
of joining absent parties rests with the party asserting their
indispensability. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (D. Cal.
1985). Plaintiff in this case has not met this
burden. (2)
Plaintiff's argument that the TT High Court lacked jurisdiction over
the property in this matter is grounded in the belief that the land was
public land and therefore subject only to PLA adjudication pursuant to Secretarial Order 2969.
As discussed above, this premise is incorrect. Nothing in the FSM
Constitution or the Trust Territory statutes prevented the TT High Court
from exercising jurisdiction over land disputes, be it private or public
land.
Plaintiff misinterprets Secretarial Order 2969,
section 3(b) to mean that since the effective date of that order, December
28, 1974, the Trust Territory courts and Ponape District Land Commission
had no authority to adjudicate claims involving public lands.
Section 3 authorized the district legislature to "establish an
adjudicatory body to resolve claims disputes as to titles or rights in
land transferred to the district legal entity [PLA]." No such
adjudicatory body was in existence at the time the Etscheits brought their
civil action in 1978. Plaintiff, however, would interpret section 3
to mean that even in the absence of such an adjudicatory body, the TT High
Court and Land Commission had no continuing jurisdiction over claims
involving public lands. There is no language in the Secretarial
Order to support such a view. Section
3 states further that "no such body [created by the district legislature]
shall have the authority to redetermine any claim or dispute as to right
or title to land between parties or their successors or assigns where such
claim or dispute has already been finally determined or is in the process
of being determined either by a Land Title Officer, by a Land Commission
or a court of competent jurisdiction, and all final determinations arising
therefrom shall be res judicata." (emphasis added). Plaintiff would
have the underlined portion of this provision mean that only claims
resolved as of the effective date of the Secretarial Order are to be given
res judicata effect. The Order should not be interpreted to leave a
void in authority to adjudicate land claims, however, which would be the
result if plaintiff's argument is accepted. The underlined portion
can only logically refer to the effective date of establishment of the new
adjudicatory body by the district legislature. Therefore, in 1978,
the Land Commission and TT High Court had proper jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of S.O.
2969 over the property known as Mpomp, even if one were to accept
plaintiff's characterization of the property as public
land. (3)
Section 176 of the Compact
of Free Association directs that final judgments of the TT High Court
remain in effect after the effective date of the Compact. The courts
of the FSM are given the authority, consistent with the Constitution, to
grant relief from prior judgments of the TT High Court "in appropriate
cases." This is consistent with the Transition Clause, FSM Const.
art. XV, which also directs that judgments of the TT courts continue
unaffected except as modified in accordance with constitutional
provisions.
Plaintiff suggests that based on this authority of the
FSM Supreme Court to grant relief from prior judgments, the decisions of
the TT High Court in this instance should not be given res judicata
effect. Plaintiff has not shown, however, that the judgments were
afflicted with some constitutional infirmity.
The argument that the TT High Court lacked jurisdiction fails as
discussed above.
Plaintiff's other contention in this regard is that U.S.
cases have not applied res judicata or collateral estoppel to previous
judgments when doing so would result in manifest injustice or override
important public policy. The rule, however, is that only truly
exceptional cases warrant an exception to the normal presumption of res
judicata, and that such exceptions are to be confined within narrow
limits. 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4426, at 268 (1981). The
principal case on which plaintiff relies, Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 548 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1977), involved a class action
challenging the apportionment of a school board. The suit was
dismissed for failure to state a claim. The same plaintiffs then
brought a second action two years later challenging the same
apportionment. This suit was dismissed on res judicata grounds,
citing the first decision. The Fifth Circuit held that a fundamental
change in applicable law after the first decision was rendered made
application of estoppel in the second action inappropriate. The
change in law, regarding the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court's opinions on
the main issue presented in the case, would have yielded a different
result on plaintiff's claims. I do not find the Moch case in any way
analogous to the case at bar. There has been no fundamental change
in the law at a constitutional level regarding the claims of plaintiff
between 1978 and today. Other
cases cited by plaintiff do not help his argument. In United States
v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1977), res judicata was not applied to
an earlier judgment where the result would be to allow defendant to
benefit from extortion at the expense of the government; the appellate
court viewed this as contrary to public policy against solicitation of
bribes for avoiding or circumventing federal securities regulations.
The Court does not find that the TT High Court judgments rendered in
1980 and 1982 concerning the property in this case produced a result
violative of any recognized public policy at the time or since.
Likewise, other cases cited by plaintiff do not fit the
circumstances of this case, such as a change of legal status of
petitioner, Title v. INS, 322 F.2d 21, 25 (9th Cir. 1963); existence or
likelihood of fraud in obtaining the initial judgment, United States v.
Pueblo of Taos, 515 F.2d 1404, 1407 (Ct. Cl. 1975); or total lack of
opportunity of petitioner to participate in first action affecting his
legal interests through deficient notice, Smith v. United States, 403 F.2d
448, 450 (7th Cir. 1968). The Court finds no evidence from the
record to indicate that the TT High Court decisions were obtained unfairly
or worked a serious injustice, and no grounds to grant relief from them on
such basis. (4)
Plaintiff misinterprets the Hamo and Oliver cases to mean that the
FSM Supreme Court has no obligation to uphold prior verdicts of the Trust
Territory courts. In FSM v.
Oliver, 3 FSM Intrm. 469, 478 (Pon. 1988), the Court observed that the
Judicial Guidance Clause,
FSM Const. art. XI, § 11, assures that the Court "will not simply
accept decisions of the Trust Territory High Court without independent
analysis." The intent of this observation is that the FSM Supreme
Court will not blindly apply the legal rulings of the TT High Court in
deciding future cases. The Court in Oliver analyzed and accepted as
sound an interpretation of 23 F.S.M.C. 105(3) rendered by the TT High
Court in a 1971 case. Had the Court rejected the TT High Court's
interpretation of the statute, the decision of the TT High Court in the
earlier case as between those parties involved would not have been
affected. In United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4
FSM Intrm. 95 (App. 1989), the Court did reject a previous TT High
Court decision in the same case involving the same parties because the TT
Court
[6 FSM
Intrm. 520] lacked jurisdiction over the
matter. The appellate division found that the High Court had
improperly exercised jurisdiction of the case for four years after the FSM
Supreme Court was certified, in violation of Secretarial Order 3039,
which required the transfer of all cases pending at the time of
certification of a national constitutional court, excluding cases in
active trial. The circumstances of the Hamo case do not apply to the
present case, where it has been established that the TT High Court
possessed jurisdiction. The
Hamo court noted that this
Court normally will refuse to review the correctness of an earlier Trust
Territory High Court judgment, which has become final through affirmance
on appeal or through lack of timely appeal. Claims that the earlier
judgment is ill-reasoned, unfair, or even beyond the jurisdiction of the
High Court typically will not be sufficient to escape the doctrine of res
judicata. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. at 107.
Hamo was a rare case, indeed the only one in the history of this
Court, where the normal presumption that the original court issuing the
judgment acted within its jurisdiction was overcome by evidence of "plain
usurpation of power" outside the pale of the law. Id. at 108.
The case at bar presents no such evidence of improper extension of
jurisdiction. Taken
together, the Oliver and Hamo cases reinforce rather than undercut the
principle that TT court judgments are to be given res judicata effect
barring extreme circumstances such as fraud or complete lack of
jurisdiction. The cases also hold that this Court is not bound to
follow precedents or reasoning of TT High Court cases in deciding disputes
before it. Plaintiff confuses the fundamental difference between
following a decision as setting a precedent for future cases, and
recognizing the resolution or outcome of a case as between the parties and
subject matter of the particular action adjudicated. The former is
rendered optional in the discretion of the court by the Judicial Guidance
Clause and the holdings of Hamo and Oliver; the latter is required absent
constitutional defect or obvious injustice by the FSM Constitution, article
XV and section 176 of the
Compact, as well as Hamo. (5)
The TT High Court was not bound to set out the precise dimensions of
the property in its opinions. The appellate division of this Court
has held that boundaries need not be determined prior to declaring
ownership of a parcel of land referenced by name or general description.
Wito Clan v. United Church of Christ, 6
FSM Intrm. 129, 133 (App. 1993). The Court takes judicial notice
of an order issued by the trial judge in Civil Action 142-78 on August 26,
1980, which states that by stipulation the matter to be tried was
"ownership of the land confined within the boundaries of Land Commission
Sketch 166-1." The Order designates Land Commission Sketch 166-1 as
an official court exhibit. The Respondents' (Nanmwarki and Nahnken
of Nett) Trial Brief in Civil Action 142-78, at 5 (Dec. 12, 1980),7 states
that in a pretrial conference on October 31, 1980, "the parties agreed
that the petitioners will amend their pleadings, and this case will be a
quiet title action as to all the land contained in Sketch No. 166-1."
Judicial notice is also taken that the area of the land confined within
the boundaries of Sketch 166-1 totals approximately 5,019,432 square
meters, or slightly more than 1,250 acres. Therefore, plaintiff must
be charged with at least imputed notice, if not actual notice, that the
property designated "Mpomp" by the trial court included all of the acreage
shown on Sketch 166-1.8 Whether or not this accorded
with the historical definition of the area of Mpomp is immaterial, since
the plaintiff had notice of what was being litigated and consented.9
Therefore, the TT High Court trial court judgment,
affirmed on appeal, can not be attacked for either vagueness of property
description or lack of notice to the Nahnken. (6)
The plaintiff in his amended complaint requests damages for his loss
of use of the property in question. He does not claim damages for or
on behalf of the people of Nett. He has not brought the present case
as a class action. He comes before this Court, therefore, in the
same posture as an individual party that he assumed in the TT High Court
litigation, and is bound by the judgment rendered. Even if
the Court were to construe the plaintiff to be acting as representative
for the people of Nett in the present action, plaintiff can not escape
application of collateral estoppel to his present claims based on the same
set of facts regarding Mpomp simply by claiming to act in a different
capacity. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 756 (1947); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 538, 539 (1967). IV.
LACHES
Because
plaintiff's entire claim is based on characterizing the land at issue as
public land, and in the foregoing analysis the Court rejects this premise,
I need not discuss other issues raised by the parties. However, I
note that even if the Court were to accept plaintiff's argument that the
land in question was and is public land, independent grounds exist for
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissing the
action. The
Court finds that plaintiff's claim for damages from loss of use of Mpomp
is foreclosed by the doctrine of laches. With regard to plaintiff's
renewed challenge to the validity of the land transfers concerning this
property dating from 1895 to the time of the TT High Court litigation,
this Court concurs with the ruling of the TT High Court appellate
division: "It is our position that the trial court was correct in
finding that the appellants [Nanmwarki and Nahnken of Nett] are barred by
the equitable doctrine of laches or stale demand from asserting any right
or title to the land known as `Mpomp.'" Nanmwarki, 8 TTR at 291.
It is far too late in the day to reallege the various flaws
that might have occurred in the
transfers of this property from the Lepen Nett to Kubary to Domenikus
Etscheit, and continuing through the Japanese and Trust Territory
administrations. The
basic elements of the doctrine of laches are (1) inexcusable delay or lack
of diligence by the plaintiff in bringing suit, and (2) injury or
prejudice to the defendant from plaintiff's delay. Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S. Ct. 534, 543, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551, 562
(1961). Delay is inexcusable when the plaintiff knew or had notice
of defendant's conduct giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action, and had
prior opportunity to bring suit. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 162 (1966);
Whitney v. Fox, 166 U.S. 637, 17 S. Ct. 713, 41 L. Ed. 1145 (1897) (laches
should apply where the delay in assertion of rights is not adequately
explained and such circumstances have intervened in the condition of the
opposing party as to render it unjust to him that plaintiff's cause of
action should succeed). The principle has been previously applied in
this Court when a party has failed to assert its rights for a lengthy
period and the opposing party has relied on the first party's nonassertion
of those rights. NIH Corp. v. FSM, 5 FSM Intrm.
411, 414 (Pon. 1992); KCCA v.
Tuuth, 5 FSM Intrm. 118 (Pon. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 5 FSM Intrm. 375 (App.
1992). The
basic factors supporting application of laches are present in this case.
The defendants' claims were apparent in the first instance in 1957 when
the TTPI government quitclaim deeds to the property were issued to the
Etscheits; in the second instance when the Etscheits brought their civil
action in 1978 against the present plaintiff; and in the third instance in
1983 when the Land Commission issued a certificate of ownership to Mpomp
to the Etscheit family. Even if
one were to assume the date of notice most favorable to plaintiff's
position, 1983, the result is that it took ten years for the plaintiff to
bring the present lawsuit. Plaintiff offers no excuse for this delay
of a decade, except to allege that he had no notice of the issuance of
certificates of title to the Etscheits by the Land Commission until
1992-93. This assertion is undercut in at least two ways.
Plaintiff by his own admission states that he was aware of final
denial of his claims by the Land Commission in 1983 ) at page 1 of his
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, he responds to defendant PLA's charge
that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit
by stating, "No further steps need to be taken to finally deny the Iso
Nahnken's claim. Issuance of title to the Etscheits is the most
final possible denial in writing of the Iso Nahnken's claim to those
lands." Second, knowledge of the relevant law regarding issuance of
certificates of title following court determinations of ownership must be
imputed to plaintiff, the losing party in TT High Court case.
Section 108(5) of Title 67 of the Trust Territory Code
states: If a
claim has been referred by a commission to the trial division of the high
court without any determination by the commission, the trial division of
the high court shall, after the time for appeal from its decision has
expired without any notice of appeal having been filed or after an appeal
duly taken has been determined, certify its decision, as modified by the
appellate division if that has happened, to the land commission involved.
The land commission shall then issue a certificate of title based on
a determination of the commission as provided in section 117 of this
chapter. Section
117 of Title 67 states that the Land Commission shall issue a certificate
of title which "shall be conclusive upon all persons who have had notice
of the proceedings and all those claiming under them and shall be prima
facie evidence of ownership as therein stated against the world . . . ."
It is not unreasonable to hold plaintiff, who was represented by
competent counsel at trial and on appeal, responsible for the knowledge
that once a court made a determination of ownership the Land Commission
was required to issue a certificate of title pursuant to the court's
ruling. There was no need for, and indeed the
Land Commission was not authorized to conduct, separate additional
proceedings requiring public notice on the issue of ownership of Mpomp
prior to issuing certificates of title to the Etscheits. See 67 TTC
112. The
Court concludes that plaintiff did know or should have known since 1983 of
the Etscheits' title to the 1,250 acres of Mpomp. Yet plaintiff did
not raise his claim for money damages for loss of the property until 1993.
A change of attorneys years after the fact and discovery of new
legal arguments does not overcome the application of laches to bar claims
that could have been made at least ten years earlier. Prejudice to
the defendant in permitting such claims to go forward is readily apparent
in this case, since all parties opposing this action had a reasonable
right to assume that litigation over the property was closed in 1982 with
the TT High Court appellate decision. Defendants should not have to
be hauled into court again to relitigate issues decided ten or more years
ago.
Plaintiff has suggested that laches may not be asserted
against government lands. As discussed above, the land at issue is
not government land. Even if it were, plaintiff has not cited
relevant supporting authority for his view. In suits brought by the
U.S. government it has been held that laches cannot be asserted as a
defense against claims founded on sovereign right or exercise of a
governmental function. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §156 (1966).
However, this exemption is personal to the sovereign and does not
pass to another litigant. Id. Specifically, where a suit is
prosecuted in the name of the government but on behalf of an individual,
laches may apply as a bar. Id. Thus in this case if the land
in question were government land, the inapplicability of laches would be
only with respect to the government as the party bringing the later claim,
not a third party private individual charging breach of duty by the
government. In other words, the Nahnken can not stand in the place
of either the Trust Territory government or a branch of the former
district or state government of Pohnpei, such as PLA, in invoking a
sovereign rights exemption from laches as a bar to suit. This is
especially true in light of the fact that all of the governmental entities
involved in this lawsuit concur that the land at issue has been lawfully
owned by the Etscheits for the entire relevant time
period.
Plaintiff's claims to Sapwetik and Taketik are barred by
laches for similar reasons. Although not part of the TT High Court
actions concerning ownership of Mpomp, both areas were included in the
1956 MOU and 1957 quitclaim deeds. For the reasons discussed above, see
supra note 7, the Nahnken must be charged with notice of the Etscheits
claim to these areas at least as early as December 1978. He has not
asserted any claim to them in court until 1993. Sapwetik was the subject
of Land Commission proceedings in 1984, and the Land Commission issued a
Determination of Ownership in favor of the Etscheits on October 22, 1984.
The plaintiff claims that he cannot be bound by this determination
because he had no notice of the proceedings. The record indicates,
however, that plaintiff was present at the Land Commission proceedings
representing Nett municipality's claim to the property. See
Transcript of Testimonies of Hearing to Land T-75119 and T-75120
(Sapw[i]tik Island), attached as Exhibit "A" to Etscheit Defendants'
Motion to Supplement Summary Judgment Memorandum (July 4, 1994).10
The record also shows that plaintiff was served with notice of formal
hearings regarding this matter on at least one occasion.11
The Land Commission decision, stating Determination of Ownership of
Sapwetik was found in favor of the Etscheits, was issued as a public
notice. See Ex. "E" to Etscheits' Motion to Supplement.
Therefore, plaintiff knew or should have known that the Etscheits
were the publicly declared owners of Sapwetik at least as of October 22,
1984.12 With
regard to Taketik there apparently has been no Land Commission
determination of ownership. However, plaintiff has had notice and
opportunity to raise a claim for loss of use of Taketik at least since
1978, when he had cause to be aware of the 1956 MOU and 1957 deeds
including Taketik. Plaintiff alleges that he has only recently
become aware that the Etscheits acquired a few acres in Taketik, but
provides no evidence to rebut the documents submitted by defendants dating
from the outset of the TT High Court litigation indicating that plaintiff
was made aware of the contents of the 1956 MOU and 1957
deeds. V. APPLICATION OF 48
U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.
Plaintiff argues that 48 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and §
1503 in particular, required the Etscheits as aliens to dispose of any
landholdings in the Trust Territory within ten years of acquisition.
As a result, the 1957 quitclaim deed to the Etscheits by the Trust
Territory government was illegal and void. 48
U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1887 and amended
in 1897. Plaintiff has cited no authority for extending this
particular statute to the TTPI, created in 1947 by the United Nations
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands
("Trusteeship Agreement," entered into force July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 397,
T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189). Plaintiff suggests that the TTPI
was akin to an organized U.S. territory and included by inference within
the purview of the U.S. Code provision since the U.S. Congress never
stated at any time after the creation of the TTPI that this particular
statute did not apply.
Plaintiff misunderstands the legal status of the TTPI.
Article 1 of the
Trusteeship Agreement states that the TTPI is designated as a
"strategic area and placed under the trusteeship system established in the
Charter of the United
Nations." The trusteeship system is described and defined
at arts. 75-91 of the United Nations
Charter. Article 77 of the U.N. Charter states
that U.N. trust territories include territories then held under League of
Nations mandate, or which were detached from enemy states as a result of
World War Two. Article 83 states that the Security Council must
approve the terms of any trusteeship agreement relating to strategic
areas, as well as any amendments of terms. Article 87 provides that
the U.N. General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council (composed of
Security Council members) shall monitor on a continuing basis the
administration of the trust territories. Under article 2 of the Trusteeship
Agreement, the U.S. is designated the administering authority of the
TTPI. Therefore, the status of the TTPI was that of a strategic trust
under the general jurisdiction of the Security Council and General
Assembly of the U.N., administered by the U.S. government. This is
not the same legal status as a U.S. territory, either incorporated or
unincorporated, obtained by formal cession from another sovereign or
acquired through military conquest.13 This
fact was the basis of decision in Gale v. Andrus, 643 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir.
1980), a case construing whether the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551, applied to the TTPI. The court in Gale concluded that
"[u]ltimate review of the Trust Territory remained in the hands of the
United Nations Trusteeship Council and Security Council." Gale, 643
F.2d at 829. With regard to what U.S. laws applied to the TTPI,
article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement provided that the United States
"may apply to the trust territory, subject to any modifications which the
administering authority may consider desirable such of the laws of the
United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and
requirements." Trusteeship Agreement art. 3. In accordance with the
Trusteeship Agreement, therefore, the Gale court concluded that "[t]he
laws of the United States do not automatically apply to the Territory
unless they are specifically made applicable by Congress." Gale, 643
F.2d at 830 (emphasis in text). Article 3 has been interpreted to
mean that for any particular U.S. statute to apply to the TTPI, Congress
must have specifically manifested such an intent either in the language of
the statute itself or in the legislative history. Id. at 834; People
of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 815 (D. Haw. 1973). There is
no such intent shown with respect to 48 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and the
statute has never been amended to include the TTPI. Therefore I
conclude that the statute does not apply to the TTPI. VI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
OF THE UNITED STATES
The
plaintiff contends that the United States breached its duty to ensure that
all Trust Territory laws and regulations were enforced, and is liable to
plaintiff for damages as a result. The U.S. duty was breached in two
principal ways: (1) by allowing the Alien Property Custodian to quitclaim
Mpomp in 1957, and by allowing the Land Commission to issue certificates
of title to Mpomp in 1983 and a Determination of Ownership to Sapwetik in
1984. The
actions of the Trust Territory government and the Alien Property Custodian
in 1956-57, and the Pohnpei Land Commission in 1983-84, are not actionable
by plaintiff as against the United States for recovery of damages for the
reasons discussed above regarding laches and res judicata. Aside
from these grounds and taking as correct plaintiff's assertion of the
property in this case as being public land, plaintiff
cannot maintain this action against the U.S. for reasons of sovereign
immunity and lack of actionable conduct.14 The
first breach by the U.S., according to plaintiff, concerns the actions of
the Trust Territory government in transferring the property to the
Etscheits in 1956-57. This violated article 6(2) of the Trusteeship
Agreement by failing to protect the TTPI inhabitants from loss of
lands. The Trusteeship
Agreement does not provide individuals with a private cause of action
for damages for alleged breach of any of its provisions. Alep v. United States, 6 FSM Intrm.
214, 217 (Chk. 1993); Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, 881 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore plaintiff
cannot maintain his action on these grounds.
Plaintiff relies further on Secretarial Order 3039,
section 3(a), which mandated that the High Commissioner of the Trust
Territory continue "to exercise all authority necessary to carry out the
obligations and responsibilities of the United States under the 1947
Trusteeship Agreement, in order to ensure that no action (sic) are taken
that would be inconsistent with the provisions of such Trusteeship
Agreement, this Order, and with existing treaties, laws, regulations, and
agreements generally applicable in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands." No authority has been found for interpreting this Order as
providing a private right of action for money damages against the U.S.
government based on alleged breach by the High
Commissioner.
Plaintiff has cited section 174(d) of the
Compact of Free Association as a basis for suing the U.S.
Section 174(d) waives the sovereign immunity of the U.S. in the
courts of the FSM for certain types of claims, among them tort cases "in
which damages are sought for . . . damage to or loss of property occurring
where the action is brought." Since
this case is one "in which damages are sought for . . . loss of property
occurring where the action is brought," section 174(d) would appear to
allow plaintiff's action on its face. Section 174(d) is a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity. It must be read in conjunction with
section 174(c), which allows for courts of the FSM to adjudicate claims
against the Trust Territory government, or the United States in its place.
Section 174(c) does not create new causes of action or remedies
beyond what was available to private litigants before the Compact.
See Alep, 6 FSM Intrm. at 219. What
was available to private plaintiffs in tort actions against the Trust
Territory can be found at 6 TTC 251(1)(c), which permitted
[c]ivil
actions against the government of the Trust Territory on claims for money
damages, accruing on or after September 23, 1967, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
government of the Trust Territory, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 6 TTC 251(1)(c).
Therefore, as applied to the facts of this case, plaintiff cannot
rely on section 174(c) and (d), or 6 TTC 251(1)(c), to maintain a lawsuit
against the United States for any actions of government employees
resulting in loss of property to plaintiff prior to September 23,
1967. In
regard to alleged tortious actions of Trust Territory (or the United
States standing in its place) after September 23, 1967, the government is
subject to liability for loss of property only under circumstances where a
private person would be liable to claimant for similar acts. See
Ikosia v. Trust Territory, 7 TTR 275, 277 (Yap 1975). Under the
facts as alleged by plaintiff, there is no tortious action in depriving
plaintiff of the use of the property in question for which a private
person could be held liable because the acts complained of, i.e. declaring
title to the property in the Etscheits, could only be accomplished by the
administering governmental authority.15 If a
private person attempted to transfer title to public lands to the
Etscheits it would not constitute a tort resulting in loss of property
because the entire act would be void from inception. The Court
concludes therefore that plaintiff's suit is not of a class to which the
United States government has waived its
immunity. With
regard to the actions of the Pohnpei Land Commission concerning this
property, the Court does not find any actionable conduct attributable to
the United States. Secretarial Order 2969,
section 3 gave the district legislature "exclusive authority" to create a
legal entity with exclusive responsibility and supervision of public
lands. This grant of authority provided for the creation of the PLA.
Section 3 of S.O.
2969 also gave the district legislature the authority to create a new
adjudicatory body to resolve disputes relating to public lands transferred
to PLA. As has been discussed supra, the Ponape district legislature had
not created this new adjudicatory body as of 1983-84, when the Land
Commission acted with respect to the property in this case. The
United States could not assume responsibility for the absence of another
adjudicatory body for public land disputes as authorized by section 3(b)
of S.O. 2969, since the
exclusive authority to establish such a body had been transferred to the
Ponape district legislature. No legal authority has been found for the
proposition that the United States could have and should have forced the
Pohnpei district legislature to act in establishing a public lands
adjudicatory body. Section
4 of S.O. 2969 gave the High
Commissioner authority to convey all right, title and interest of the TTPI
government in public lands to the district legal entity created under
section 3. The High Commissioner exercised this authority with
respect to Pohnpei by execution of a quitclaim deed to all public lands
defined by Secretarial Order 2969,
section 2(c) to the PLA on February 15, 1979.16
Therefore, after February 15, 1979, the United States no longer
retained any interest in or administrative responsibility for public land
in Pohnpei.
Similarly, even accepting as correct plaintiff's
contention that the Land Commission possessed no authority to decide
ownership or issue certificates of title to the property in this case,
such action cannot be construed to create liability of the United States
government. The Land Commission was established by 67 TTC 101, 102
under the administrative authority of the Trust Territory chief of
lands and survey. This fact did not make the Land Commission an
agency of the United States government. See McComish v.
Commissioner, 580 F.2d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978); Porter v. United
States, 496 F.2d 583, 589 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding that the Trust Territory
government was not a U.S. federal agency). Therefore any action of the
Land Commission in excess of its statutory authority would be actionable
only against the Commission itself, not the United States. For all
of the above reasons, the plaintiff's action against the United States is
dismissed. CONCLUSION
As
against defendants Pohnpei Public Lands Authority and the Etscheits,
plaintiff may not recover on his claims as a matter of law on grounds of
res judicata. Regardless of the veracity of his allegations, his
claims are barred by laches. As against the United States, the
action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, FSM Civ. R. 12(b)(6), on grounds
of sovereign immunity and lack of a showing of actionable conduct by the
U.S. With
regard to the property known as Mpomp, the Court notes that the plaintiff
had his day in court long ago and was not deprived in any way of a full
and fair opportunity to litigate all of his [6 FSM
Intrm. 529] claims based on ownership of the
land at that time. With regard to Sapwetik and Taketik, the Court
finds that plaintiff must be held at minimum with a responsibility and
reasonable opportunity to have discovered and challenged the Etscheits'
claim of ownership and any damages to plaintiff resulting thereof at least
ten years ago. This is not a case in which public information was
purposely concealed or made unavailable absent extraordinary effort.
The Court stands ready to assist litigants with claims that are
well-grounded in law and diligently brought. At the same time the
Court must strive to ensure that the final judgments fairly rendered are
upheld, so that all interested parties may know when an issue has been
justly concluded. In the case at bar, all of the defendants were
entitled to rely on the conclusiveness of prior decisions recognizing
ownership of the property in the Etscheit family. To allow plaintiff
to question this conclusiveness after passage of a decade in the form of a
request for damages would ill serve the interests of justice and the
judicial system of this young nation. * * *
*
Footnotes:
1. "Iso
Nahnken" refers to the traditional title of the plaintiff as one of the
two paramount chiefs of Nett Municipality.
2. S.L.
1L-155-87 superseded D.L. No. 4L-69-76 (Ponape Dist. Legis., 3rd Reg.
Sess. 1976). D.L. No. 4L-69-76 created the Ponape District Public
Lands Authority as the entity to receive and hold title to public lands in
trust for the people of the district, § 10(2)), and to administer and
manage use of public lands in trust, § 10(3)). S.L. 1L-155-87
formally designated the Pohnpei Public Lands Board of Trustees as the
entity entrusted with all rights, title and interest to public lands in
Pohnpei.
3. The
plaintiff in the present case was the same Iso Nahnken who was a defendant
in the TT High Court action.
4. See
Trust Territory Interim Regulation 6-48, art. II (alien property defined
as "property situated in the Trust Territory, formerly owned by private
Japanese nationals, private Japanese organizations, or by the Japanese
Government . . . "); 27 TTC 1 (same definition); Secretarial Order 2969, §
2(c)(1) (defines public lands by reference to 67 TTC 1, which states that
public lands are "those lands situated within the Trust Territory which
were owned or maintained by the Japanese government as government or
public lands . . . "); id. § 2(c)(2) (reference to 27 TTC 1); Pohnpei
Public Lands Act of 1976, D.L. 4L-69-76, § 3(7) (refers to the definition
in Secretarial Order 2969).
There is no evidence in the record that the Etscheit land was
"maintained by the Japanese government as government or public lands,"
such that plaintiff could find support in this part of 67 TTC
1.
5.
Plaintiff suggests that the fact that the Trust Territory entered
into an agreement in 1956 with the Etscheits in which the Etscheits paid a
sum of money and exchanged other land parcels for deeds to Mpomp, Sapwetik
and Taketik indicates that title had passed to the Trust Territory
government as the successor to the Japanese government. This fails
to take into account the stated land policy of the TTPI government, as
described in Trust Territory Land Policy Letter P-1 (Dec. 1947), which
plaintiff attaches as Exhibit "C" to his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(May 31, 1993). Paragraph 6 of the Policy Letter declared that transfer of
title of lands previously declared in rulings by the German and Japanese
administrations to be public domain, by virtue of not being used
continuously by native people, would not be considered valid if transfer
was made to non-natives. The definition of "native" in the same Policy
Letter at paragraph 19 reads: "a person who does not owe allegiance to a
government other than that of the Trust Territory and who was either born
in the Trust Territory [or] had established residence therein prior to
December 7, 1941, and has resided therein since September 1, 1946."
Florentine Etscheit would arguably have met this definition.
Although still a Belgian citizen in 1956, she had resided in the
Trust Territory for over fifty years. Furthermore, there has never
been a ruling by the German or Japanese administrations declaring the
lands at issue in this case to be public domain. Paragraph 13 of the
Policy Letter stated that land transfers from non-Japanese private owners
to the Japanese government after 1935 would not be considered valid if the
former owner established that the sale was not made of free will. In
such cases, title would be returned to the former owner by the Trust
Territory upon payment to the TTPI government of the amount received by
him from the Japanese. This appears to be precisely the transaction
that took place between the Etscheits and the TTPI government through the
1956 MOU. While Land Policy Letter P-1 does not have force of law,
it is persuasive in indicating the intent behind the TTPI government
actions with regard to the property in this case.
7.
Submitted as Exhibit A to the Etscheit Defendants' Notice of Joinder
in Co-Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss (July 27,
1994).
8. The
Court notes that Sketch 166-1 is consistent with the area described as
Mpomp in the 1956 MOU and 1957 deeds issued by the TTPI government to
Florentine Etscheit.
9.
Although it has not been adequately demonstrated to the Court at
what exact time plaintiff had actual notice of the 1956 MOU and the
Etscheits' claim to Mpomp as being approximately 1,250 acres, it is
evident from the record that plaintiff can be assigned imputed knowledge
of the extent of the Etscheits' claim at least as of early December 1978.
See, e.g., Letter of F. Castro, Senior Land Commissioner (Dec. 1,
1978) (attached as Exhibit "H" to Etscheit Defendants' Notice of Joinder
(July 27, 1994)), in which Mr. Castro states that he informed the Nahnken
verbally on November 30, 1978 at the Land Commission office that the Trust
Territory recognized the Etscheits' ownership of Mpomp based on what was
said in the 1956 MOU; Order of the Trust Territory High Court in Civil
Action No. 142-78, para. 5 (Dec. 8, 1978) (attached as Exhibit "D" to
Etscheit Defendants' Notice of Joinder), in which the court ordered that
"a copy of any and all papers, records, or documents, including the
various surveys and the translated German records [concerning the property
in dispute], shall be furnished to the Naniken, Nett Municipality . . .
."
10.
Plaintiff challenges the authenticity of this transcript on grounds
that it is not accompanied by a written certification from a document
custodian. Plaintiff fails to adduce, however, any other evidence
casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the transcript copy. The
Court notes that the transcript copy is used in this instance not for what
it states was said at the hearings, but only as one of several indications
that plaintiff was aware of the Land Commission
proceedings.
11. See
Notice of Formal Hearing No. 133, by the Land Commission and Land
Registration Team (Feb. 7, 1984); Notice of Service for Formal Hearing No.
133 (bearing the Iso Nahnken's signature) (dated the same day).
Plaintiff suggests that the number "133" may have been handwritten
in the blank on the notice of service at a later time, but presents no
evidence supporting this accusation. The signatures on the notice are
those of persons claiming interest or representing those with interests in
Sapwetik at the time. Plaintiff's counsel raises rhetorically the
question whether the signature is that of the Iso Nahnken, suggesting that
it is not similar to any of plaintiff's other signatures on file.
The Nahnken himself has not filed an affidavit disclaiming the
signature as his own, however. In the absence of any credible
evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that the notice of formal
hearing No. 133 concerning Sapwetik was served on
plaintiff.
12.
Plaintiff claims that he was not served with personal notice of the
determination of ownership pursuant to 67 TTC 114. Even assuming
this to be so, plaintiff should have been aware of the outcome by means of
the public notice issued. Particularly as an interested party with
notice that discussions concerning Sapwetik were being held, plaintiff
should have, as a reasonable person would under the circumstances, made an
effort to follow up on what the Land Commission
decided.
13.
Justice White in the case Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 311-12,
21 S. Ct. 770, 796, 45 L. Ed. 1088, 1115-16 (1901) (White, J., concurring)
noted a distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories.
The former (e.g., Louisiana and Florida before statehood) were from the
outset of acquisition treated as an integral part of the United States in
all respects. The latter (e.g., Puerto Rico) were not recognized at
the time of acquisition as an integral part of the United States and all
U.S. laws did not automatically apply to them.
14. For
purposes of ruling on the defendant United States' motion to dismiss, the
material factual allegations of the complaint are to be regarded as
true.
15. With
respect to claims arising out of the acts or omissions of government
employees in the execution of laws and regulations, 6 TTC 252(2) states
that the court shall have no jurisdiction over such claims where the
employees acted with due care. Accordingly, the Trust Territory High
Court held that an action against the High Commissioner could be
maintained where the complaint alleged the Commissioner acted without due
care in violation of existing law. Guerrero v. Johnston, 6 TTR 124
(Mrns. 1972). In such instance the exception to jurisdiction found
at 6 TTC 252(2) would not apply because the individual government official
would be acting outside the scope of his statutory authority and his
actions could not be attributed to the sovereign. "The primary
inquiry must be whether the employee of the government was acting within
the scope of his statutory powers; if he was, and the only challenge is as
to the manner in which he executed those powers or exercised the
discretion confided in him by law, then his acts would be those of the
government and the cited exception would bar this court from taking
jurisdiction." Guerrero, 6 TTR at 126-27.
Analyzing plaintiff's claims in this regard admits of
two possibilities. First, taking plaintiff's argument at its face,
the High Commissioner and Alien Property Custodian acted beyond the scope
of their authority in issuing deeds to the property to the Etscheits in
1957. Thus, 6 TTC 252(2) would not apply to bar plaintiff's claims.
However, the suit would then not be against the United States but
against the officials in their individual capacity, and the acts of those
officials would not be attributable to the U.S. The
second possibility is that the Trust Territory officials at the time were
acting within their designated authority, but made the wrong decisions in
exercising discretionary duties charged to them. The Court notes in
this regard 27 TTC 2(1), which instructs that the Alien Property Custodian
"is empowered to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell or otherwise deal
with alien property in the interest and for the benefit of the indigenous
inhabitants of the Trust Territory, in accordance with the terms of the
trusteeship agreement . . . ." This provision, which plaintiff
charges has been violated in this case, accords the Trust Territory
official with a broad grant of discretionary authority in the
administration of public lands. There is no definition in Title 27
of "indigenous inhabitants," nor is there one to be found in the
Trusteeship Agreement, Secretarial Order 2969 or Interim Regulations 4-48
and 6-48, all of which plaintiff cites in conjunction with the duties of
the Trust Territory regarding the property in this case. Therefore
it cannot be said that the transfer of the property to the Etscheits was
not, in the Alien Property Custodian and Trust Territory government's
view, a discharge of the property "for the benefit of the indigenous
inhabitants."
Moreover, plaintiff has not shown beyond the general
contention that as Nahnken of Nett he possessed traditional authority to
distribute land, that 27 TTC 2(1) and the other provisions cited
translated into a statutory duty of the Trust Territory government to
transfer public lands to him. Plaintiff attempts to bootstrap provisions
of the Pohnpei and FSM Constitutions regarding respect for the roles of
traditional leaders on to the TTPI laws regarding public land disposition.
This exercise, however, cannot create a mandatory legal duty on the
part of another sovereign government where none exists.
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