|
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
Cite as United Church of Christ v. Hamo,
4 FSM Intrm. 95 (App. 1989)
[4 FSM Intrm. 95]
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST,
Appellant,
vs.
ACHUO HAMO, on behalf of the Wito Clan,
Appellee.
APPEAL NO. T2-1988
[From United Church of Christ v. Hamo,
3 FSM Intrm. 445 (Truk 1988), Benson, J.]
OPINION
Argued: December 15, 1988
Decided: July 10, 1989
Before:
Hon. Edward C. King, Chief Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Jose Dela Cruz, Temporary Justice, FSM Supreme Court*
Hon. Arthur Ngiraklsong, Temporary Justice, FSM Supreme Court**
*Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
**Associate Justice, Republic of Palau Supreme Court
APPEARANCES: For
the Appellant:
R. Barrie Michelsen Attorney
at Law Ramp
& Michelsen Kolonia,
Pohnpei 96941
For the
Appellee: Camillo Noket Attorney
at Law Micronesian
Legal Services Corporation Moen,
Truk 96942
* * * * [4 FSM Intrm. 96]
HEADNOTES
Transition of
Authority As a
matter of constitutional law, the authority to exercise executive,
legislative and judicial powers came to the Federated States of Micronesia
under the FSM Constitution, by operation of law, not through delegation of
Trust Territory functions. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm.
95, 103 (App. 1989).
Transition of
Authority The
Constitution of the FSM has been the supreme law of the Federated States
of Micronesia since May 10, 1979 and from that time on, nonconstitutional
officials could be authorized to exercise powers assigned to the national
government by the Constitution only through authorization by
constitutional officials or pursuant to some other power rooted in the
Constitution. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 104 (App.
1989).
Transition of Authority In specifically authorizing
the President to act pursuant to Secretarial Order 3039 in
accepting executive functions from the Trust Territory, the FSM Congress
implicitly adopted those provisions of Secretarial Order 3039 concerning
transfer of executive functions as law of the Federated States of
Micronesia. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 104 (App.
1989).
Constitutional Law -
Judicial Powers; Courts; Transition of Authority The FSM Constitution
provides no authority for any courts to act within the Federated States of
Micronesia, other than the FSM Supreme Court, inferior courts to be
established by statute, and state or local courts. United Church of Christ
v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 105 (App. 1989).
Courts; Transition of
Authority The
transitional actions of the FSM Congress, intended to adopt as law of the
Federated States of Micronesia those portions of Secretarial Order 3039
relating to judicial functions within the FSM and permitting the Trust
Territory courts to continue functioning within the FSM pending
establishment of constitutional courts, were a necessary and proper
exercise of Congress' power under the Constitution to provide for a smooth
and orderly transition. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95,
105 (App. 1989).
Courts; Jurisdiction The provisions of
the FSM Constitution spelling out jurisdiction and vesting the entire
judicial power of the national government in the FSM Supreme Court are
self-executing, and the judicial power of the FSM Supreme Court is not
dependent upon congressional action. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4
FSM Intrm. 95, 105-06 (App. 1989).
Courts; Separation of Powers; Transition of Authority
To the extent
that Secretarial Order 3039
can be read as permitting the Trust Territory High Court to continue,
after the FSM Supreme Court had begun functioning, to control cases
assigned by the FSM Constitution to the FSM
[4 FSM Intrm. 97]
Supreme Court, that exercise by Congress of the
transitional power under the Constitution could run counter to other
specific provisions of the Constitution, especially the judiciary article,
and to fundamental principles of the separation of powers; any extension
by the Trust Territory High Court of the powers assigned to it under
Secretarial Order 3039 would violate those same constitutional provisions
and principles. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 106
(App. 1989).
Civil Procedure - Res Judicata A fundamental principle of
the common law, traditionally referred to in common law jurisdictions as
res judicata, is that once judgment has been issued and the appeal period
has expired or the decision is affirmed on appeal, the parties are
precluded from challenging that judgment or from litigating any issues
that were or could have been raised in that action. United Church of
Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 106 (App. 1989).
Civil Procedure - Res Judicata; Transition of
Authority The
FSM Supreme Court normally will refuse to review the correctness of an
earlier Trust Territory High Court judgment, which has become final
through affirmance on appeal or through lack of a timely appeal, and
claims that the earlier judgment is ill-reasoned, unfair or even beyond
the jurisdiction of the High Court typically will not be sufficient to
escape the doctrine of res judicata. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4
FSM Intrm. 95, 107 (App. 1989).
Civil Procedure - Res
Judicata; Jurisdiction The determination of
jurisdiction itself normally qualifies for protection under the common law
principle of res judicata, requiring a second court to presume that the
court which issued the judgment did properly exercise its own
jurisdiction, but plain usurpation of power by a court which wrongfully
extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority, is outside of
the doctrine and does not qualify for res judicata protection. United
Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 107-08 (App. 1989).
Civil Procedure - Res Judicata; Jurisdiction;
Transition of Authority In light of the Trust
Territory High Court's insistence on maintaining control over cases within
the Federated States of Micronesia in disregard of Secretarial Order 3039
and to the exclusion of the new constitutional courts, its
characterizations of Joint Rule No.1 as "simply a memorandum" and of the
words "active trial" in Secretarial Order 3039 as
merely "administrative guidance," its acceptance of appeals after it was
precluded from doing so by Secretarial Order 3039,
its decision of appeals after Secretarial Order 3039 was terminated and
its continued remand of cases to the High Court trial division for further
action even after November 3, 1986, there can be no doubt that for
purposes of res judicata analysis, the High Court was a court lacking
capacity to make an adequately informed determination of a question
concerning its own jurisdiction United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM
Intrm. 95, 118 (App. 1989).
[4 FSM Intrm. 98]
Civil Procedure - Res
Judicata; Equity - Laches and Estoppel; Jurisdiction; Transition of
Authority
Although final judgment in a case has been entered by the Trust Territory
High Court, because any effort by a party to have the High Court consider
its own jurisdiction would have been futile, it is procedurally fair to
later afford the party an opportunity to question that jurisdiction.
United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 118-19 (App. 1989).
Jurisdiction; Transition of Authority Where the Trust Territory
High Court improperly retained a case for four years after the FSM Supreme
Court was certified, and continued to hold the case more than a year after
the Truk State Court was established, issuing a judgment based upon filed
papers, without there ever having been a trial, let alone an active trial,
in the case, by the time judgment was issued the subject matter of the
litigation was so plainly beyond the High Court's jurisdiction that its
entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority. United Church
of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 119 (App. 1989). Civil Procedure - Res
Judicata; Jurisdiction; Transition of Authority Where the Trust Territory
High Court's exercise of jurisdiction was a manifest abuse of authority,
allowing the judgment of the High Court to stand would undermine the
decisionmaking guidelines and policies reflected in the judicial guidance
clauses of the national and state constitutions and would thwart the
efforts of the framers of the Constitution to reallocate court
jurisdiction within the Federated States of Micronesia by giving local
decisionmakers control over disputes concerning ownership of land. United
Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 119 (App. 1989).
Civil Procedure - Res Judicata; Equity - Laches and
Estoppel; Transition of Authority Decisions regarding res
judicata and the transitional activities of the Trust Territory High Court
typically should be made on the basis of larger policy considerations
rather than the equities lying with or against a particular party. United
Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 120 (App. 1989).
Civil Procedure - Res
Judicata; Equity - Laches and Estoppel; Jurisdiction; Transition of
Authority
Actions of the Trust Territory High Court
taken after the establishment of functioning constitutional courts in the
Federated States of Micronesia, and without a good faith determination
after a full and fair hearing as to whether the "active trial" exception
permitted retention of the cases, were null and void, even though the
parties failed to object, because the High Court was without jurisdiction
to act and its conduct constituted usurpation of power. United Church of
Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM Intrm. 95, 122 (App. 1989).
* * * *
COURT'S OPINION
EDWARD C. KING, Chief
Justice:
[4 FSM Intrm. 99]
In this case, we are required
to consider whether the Court should grant an injunction to prevent
enforcement of a judgment issued by the Trust Territory High Court in a
case arising out of a dispute concerning ownership of land in Truk. The
High Court judgment was issued on August 19, 1985, long after
establishment of the Truk State Court and the Federated States of
Micronesia Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution of the Federated
States of Micronesia, and therefore was in clear violation of United
States Department of Interior Secretarial Order
3039,1 which was the only source of
High Court authority to act on cases within the Federated States of
Micronesia after constitutional courts began functioning.
The principal issue is
whether the FSM Supreme Court should employ the normal presumptions in
favor of judgments issued by other courts thus giving the High Court
judgment res judicata effect.
I. The Trust Territory High
Court litigation involved a dispute over ownership of the site of the
former Mizpah School, which had been operated by the United Church of
Christ in Mwan Village on Moen Island, Truk until 1971.2
The Church traced its ownership of the land to a deed, executed on October
1, 1884 by persons who apparently were ancestors of the Wito Clan (the
"Clan"). The deed recited that the land was being given to the American
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission, Boston, Massachusetts
"forever, to be used for the purposes for which said board is organized."
The Clan contended that their ancestors' grant of the land to the American
Board was a limited one, effective only so long as the land continued to
be used for Church purposes. The Trust Territory High Court ultimately
accepted that argument, deciding that title reverted back to the Clan in
1973, when the United Church Board of World Ministries, the successor to
the American Board, granted a 60-year lease of the land to the government
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for which the Trust
Territory paid the United Church Board of World Ministries some $300,060.
A. The Mizpah litigation itself
traces back to 1972, when Achuo Hamo, on behalf of the Clan, and the
United Church Board of World Ministries each filed claims of ownership
with the Land Commission. On December 28, 1975 the
[4 FSM Intrm. 100]
Land
Commission referred the case to the Trust Territory High Court where, as
civil action No. 1-76, it proceeded in desultory fashion until a March 18,
1985 pretrial conference.3
Throughout the first eight
years of the litigation the principal activities consisted of various
shifts in the identities of the parties and transfer of the case from one
judge to another. The Trust Territory Government, as lessee under the
60-year lease, filed a complaint in intervention in 1978. Then, having
assigned its leasehold rights to Truk State, the Trust Territory was
replaced as a party by Truk State on February 19, 1982. On March 15, 1984,
the United Church of Christ of Moen (the Church) was substituted as a
party in the place of the United Church Board of World
Ministries.
The case was also moving from
judge to judge. Chief Justice Harold Burnett accepted the reference from
the Land Commission on January 2, 1976 but took no other action in the
case. The record indicates that control over the case passed to Justice
E.F. Gianotti (Apr. 1978-Jan. 1979), then to Acting Chief Justice Richard
I. Miyamoto (June to August, 1982), and finally to Chief Justice Alex R.
Munson in 1983.
When the pretrial hearing
finally was held in Trust Territory civil action No. 1-76, on March 18,
1985, the High Court trial judge on his own initiative raised the question
of whether the Clan should receive a monetary damage award if it should
prevail. At the request of counsel for the Church, the pretrial conference
was adjourned for three days, until March 21, 1985, when it was agreed
that the High Court would decide the case based upon the papers already in
the court file.
On August 19, 1985, the High
Court issued its judgment, declaring the Clan owner of the land and
ordering the Church to pay the Clan "$300,060 plus 9% interest compounded
annually, on the unpaid balance from June 29, 1973 until fully
paid."4
[4 FSM Intrm. 101]
The Church wanted to appeal
but counsel failed to forward the $5.00 appeal fee with the notice of
appeal. Although the Trust Territory High Court appellate division in
Saipan apparently received the notice of appeal in time, it was returned
because not accompanied by the $5.00 fee. When counsel sent the notice of
appeal with the fee, the court rejected both as too late.5
Subsequently, the Church moved the High Court for relief from the August
19, 1985 judgment. That motion was denied by the High Court on January 20,
1987.
B. While all this was taking
place, constitutional self-government was being established within the
Federated States of Micronesia and the constitutional national and state
judiciaries began functioning. The FSM Supreme Court was certified on May
5, 1981 and the Truk State Court on April 20, 1984. In anticipation of
those developments, and to provide for the new nations the "maximum
permissible amount of self-government" pending termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement, S.O. 3039 was adopted on
April 25, 1979.6
The High Court's judgment of
August 19, 1985, gave the Church one year to remove any structures from
the land. In 1986, just before the one year period ended, the Church filed
civil action no. 1986-1026 with the trial division of this Court
challenging enforcement of the Trust Territory judgment. In that
litigation a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction
were issued preventing enforcement of the High Court judgment pending the
outcome of this litigation. Thus, apparently no payments have been made or
actions taken in reliance on the High Court judgment.
[4 FSM Intrm. 102]
The trial division of the FSM
Supreme Court held that S.O.
3039 required the Trust Territory High Court to transfer civil action
no. 1-76 to the new constitutional courts as they began functioning. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 3
FSM Intrm. 445, 451 (Truk 1988). Specifically, the trial division held
that S.O. 3039 required transfer of the case to the FSM Supreme Court when
it was certified as functioning on May 5, 1981 and also to the Truk State
Court on April 20, 1984.
That conclusion obviously is
correct, for section 5 of S.O.
3039 says that "all cases . . . currently pending but not in active
trial . . . shall be transferred" once a determination has been made that
a constitutional court is functioning. The case plainly was not in "active
trial" in any normal sense when this Court, and the Truk State Court, were
certified. The record reveals that virtually nothing had taken place in
High Court civil action no. 1-76 before April 20, 1984. There is no
indication that any Trust Territory judge had even become acquainted with
the case prior to 1985. Indeed, after this court was certified the case
was transferred twice, each time to an entirely new Trust Territory judge,
neither of whom was even in the Federated States of Micronesia or was yet
a Trust Territory judge on May 5, 1981.
In truth, there never was a
trial or evidentiary hearing of any kind in the High Court litigation. The
eventual High Court decision, rendered on August 19, 1985, was based upon
papers filed in the case. The trial division of the FSM Supreme Court
observed that, "To say that the case was in 'active trial' in those
circumstances is to deprive the term of any meaning at all." 3 FSM Intrm. at 451. We
agree.7
Despite concluding that High
Court retention of the litigation and issuance of the judgment were beyond
the transitional powers allotted to the Trust Territory High Court by S.O. 3039, the FSM
Supreme Court trial division declined to enjoin enforcement of the
judgment. That decision was based upon the trial division's view that: (1)
the doctrine of res judicata prevents collateral attack on the judgment,
and (2) the Church's failure in the High Court litigation to insist upon
transfer of the case should now bar the Church's effort to set aside the
judgment.
II. The fact that the Trust
Territory High Court was permitted to carry out judicial functions within
the Federated States of Micronesia after inception
[4 FSM Intrm. 103]
of
constitutional government is itself extraordinary, with profound
constitutional implications, which must be taken into consideration in
formulating a rule concerning judgments issued by the High Court after the
FSM Constitution became
effective. Accordingly, we shall first consider the transitional scheme
created by S.O. 3039 and any
responsibility of this Court to assure that S.O. 3039 is interpreted
and implemented in a way that does not violate the Constitution of the Federated
States of Micronesia.
A. When constitutional
self-government began, neither the states nor the national government were
sufficiently organized and developed to accept in "one gulp" all
governmental functions theretofore handled by the Trust Territory
Government. Manahane v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm.
161, 168 n.3 (Pon. 1982). Instead, a "transfer and transition"
approach was adopted. Id.
The key document relied upon
for implementing the transition was S.O.
3039, which provided for "delegation" of executive, legislative and
judicial functions of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to the
newly emerging constitutional governments of the Federated States of
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. S.O. 3039, § 2.8
As a matter of constitutional law of course, the authority to exercise
executive, legislative and judicial powers came to Federated States of
Micronesia governmental officials under the FSM Constitution, by
operation of law, not through delegation of Trust Territory functions.
Still, S.O. 3039 did directly
govern Trust Territory officials, divesting them of certain powers they
had previously exercised within the geographical area of the Federated
States of Micronesia, and in that respect was a legally effective tool of
transition.
What is most remarkable about
S.O. 3039 however is not
the superfluous "delegation" of authority or the order's practical utility
for transition purposes, but the continuing role provided for Trust
Territory officials after the Constitution of the Federated States of
Micronesia became effective. In 1982, the trial division of this Court
said:
Although it is being
displaced by the new constitutional governments, the Trust Territory
Government retains
[4 FSM Intrm. 104]
critical
governmental functions throughout the Trust Territory. The High
Commissioner continues to play a major role in the budget, auditing and
accounting, and grant-in-aid programs, Secretarial Order 3039,
Section 3, and retains power to suspend legislation enacted by the
President. Id., Section 4. As already stated, section 5(b) of Secretarial Order 3039
authorizes the Appellate Division of the High Court to entertain appeals
from the courts of last resort of the constitutional governments. Thus the
Trust Territory Government has the power to overrule and set aside
decisions and actions of the heads of each of the three branches of the
constitutional government of the Federated States of Micronesia. These
awesome powers are calculated to allow the Trust Territory Government to
control or override virtually every action of any constitutional
government within the Trust Territory.
Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM
Intrm. 53, 73 (Kos. 1982).
Yet, the fact remains that
the Constitution of the FSM
has been the supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia since May
10, 1979. FSM Const. art. II, §
1. From that time on, nonconstitutional officials could be authorized
to exercise powers assigned to the national government by the Constitution
only through authorization by constitutional officials or pursuant to some
other power rooted in the Constitution. Obviously then, adoption of S.O. 3039 by the United
States Secretary of the Interior was not sufficient to permit Trust
Territory officials to retain and exercise powers or hold positions
specified in the FSM Constitution. Some type of action pursuant to the
Constitution was essential to give legal effect to the transitional
activities of these nonconstitutional officials.
The
necessary constitutional imprimatur for S.O. 3039 was supplied by
the FSM Congress, acting under article XV, section 5 of
the Constitution, which says, "The Congress may provide for a smooth
and orderly transition to government under this Constitution."
1.
Executive Transition. The Congress enacted
legislation providing for the transfer of executive functions from Trust
Territory officials to the executive branch of the Federated States of
Micronesia national government as the latter became prepared to assume
those functions. 8
F.S.M.C. 201-06. That legislation was implemented by President Tosiwo
Nakayama and other executive branch officials through a series of
agreements with Trust Territory and state government officials. See
generally Manahane, 1 FSM Intrm. at
167-73. We find that in specifically authorizing the President to act
"pursuant to" S.O. 3039 in accepting
executive functions from the Trust Territory, 8 F.S.M.C. 202, the
Congress implicitly adopted those provisions of S.O. 3039 concerning
transfer of executive functions as law of the Federated States of
Micronesia.
[4 FSM Intrm. 105]
2. Judiciary Transition. The practical need for
gradual transition and transfer of judicial functions was even more
compelling than for executive functions. When the Constitution of the
Federated States of Micronesia went into effect on May 10, 1979, the only
judiciaries authorized by it to function within the Federated States of
Micronesia were the FSM Supreme Court, "inferior" national courts to be
established by statute, FSM
Const. art. XI, § 1, and "state or local courts." Id. art. XI, §§ 7, 8,
9(d) and 10. The Constitution provides no authority for other courts to
act within the Federated States of Micronesia.
Yet, there were no national,
state or local courts of the type contemplated by the Constitution. In
fact, no judicial officials were confirmed for any new constitutional
courts until October, 1980 and no constitutional court became functional
until May 5, 1981, when the FSM Supreme Court was certified pursuant to 4 F.S.M.C. 206(2) and
207.
No transition legislation
comparable to that of 8
F.S.M.C. 201 et seq. was enacted for judicial functions. However, the
Judiciary Act of 1979 designated the Trust Territory Chief Justice to
certify when the FSM Supreme Court "is prepared to hear matters." 4 F.S.M.C. 206(2). The
Trust Territory Chief Justice was also authorized to "transmit copies of
his certification to the President and the Congress and to the State or
District courts." 4
F.S.M.C. 207. These statutory certification procedures paralleled and
built upon those of S.O.
3039. Moreover, in later codifying FSM statutory law Congress
republished the Trust Territory Judiciary Act. 5 F.S.M.C. 101 to
813. Those provisions and others were republished in apparent
recognition and acceptance of the fact that Trust Territory courts were to
remain active pending their replacement by courts established under
constitutional self-government. In re Raitoun,
1 FSM Intrm. 561, 564 (App. 1984). See also Pub. L. No. 2-48,
reprinted at volume 1, page v of the FSM Code.
This
Court finds that these transitional actions were intended by Congress to
adopt, as law of the Federated States of Micronesia, those portions of S.O. 3039 relating to
judicial functions within the Federated States of Micronesia. Plainly,
this authorization permitting the Trust Territory courts to continue
functioning within the Federated States of Micronesia pending
establishment of constitutional courts was a necessary and proper exercise
of Congress' power under article XV, section 5
of the Constitution to provide for a "smooth and orderly transition."
B. A considerably more difficult
question is whether article XV, section 5
gave Congress sufficient power to permit Trust Territory courts to
continue to exercise jurisdiction over cases within jurisdiction of the
constitutional courts after those constitutional courts had become
functional.
The Constitution spells out
jurisdiction, FSM
Const. art. XI, §§ 6-8, and by its own terms vests the entire judicial
power of the national
[4 FSM Intrm. 106]
government in
the FSM Supreme Court. FSM
Const. art. XI, § 1. This provision is self-executing and the judicial
power of this Court is not dependent on congressional action.
To
the extent S.O. 3039 itself can be
read as permitting the Trust Territory High Court to continue, after the
FSM Supreme Court had begun functioning, to control cases assigned by the
Constitution to the FSM Supreme Court, that exercise by Congress of the
transitional power under article XV, section 5
of the Constitution could run counter to other specific provisions of the
Constitution, especially the judiciary article, and to fundamental
principles of separation of powers. Similarly, any extension by the Trust
Territory High Court of the powers assigned to it under S.O. 3039 would violate
those same constitutional provisions and principles.
These
factors in turn require this Court to exercise its own constitutional
responsibilities to assure compliance with the Constitution. Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 FSM Intrm.
339, 350 (Pon. 1983); In re Iriarte
(II), 1 FSM Intrm. 255, 268 (Pon. 1983).
C. We now are asked to determine
whether effect should be given to a judgment issued by the Trust Territory
High Court within the Federated States of Micronesia well after the courts
of constitutional self-government had begun functioning.
This
is not just a routine procedural matter involving sister courts operating
within the same governmental system. The question presented touches on
matters basic and critical to constitutional self-government. This Court,
the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning, may not defer to decisions
of the Trust Territory High Court as to the amount of power available to
the High Court under section 5 of S.O.
3039.
With these principles in
mind, we move to the remaining questions presented by this appeal.
III. A.
A fundamental principle of
the common law is that once a judgment has been issued and the appeal
period has expired or the decision is affirmed on appeal, the parties are
precluded from challenging that judgment or from litigating any issues
that were or could have been raised in that action. Allan v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 414, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308, 313 (1980). This
principle is traditionally referred to in common law jurisdictions by the
Latin phrase "res judicata," which, literally translated, means, "a thing
judicially decided, or adjudged." H. Black, Black's Law Dictionary 1174
(5th ed. 1979). The underlying purpose is to achieve finality of
litigation, a goal which this Court has recognized as desirable:
[4 FSM Intrm. 107]
There are several reasons why
courts see this interest in preserving the final effect of judgments as
important. First, the final resolution of a legal conflict should be
useful in ending festering and troublesome disputes and restoring order
between the disputants and those around them. Second, the final
determination of rights frees the prevailing party to exercise the rights
which were at issue and allows any contested resource to be used
efficiently. Third, finality is intended to prevent both the parties and
governmental institutions from devoting still more resources to the
dispute itself.
While the paramount goal is
to provide a full and fair opportunity for the parties to be heard and to
reach an enlightened result understandable to all of the parties, an
important subsidiary goal is to end the litigation itself and to reach a
final decision.
Jonas v. Mobil Oil Micronesia,
Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 164, 166 (App. 1986).
The reasons for the doctrine
of res judicata, then, apply in this new nation. Indeed, the doctrine
properly has been invoked by new constitutional courts to uphold and
protect judgments of the Trust Territory High Court. Ittu v. Charley, 3 FSM Intrm. 188
(Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1987). This Court too is fully prepared to apply the
doctrine to Trust Territory High Court judgments, and to enforce those
judgments, under appropriate circumstances. FSM Dev. Bank v. Rodriquez Corp.,
2 FSM Intrm. 128 (Pon. 1985).
Thus, this Court normally
will refuse to review the correctness of an earlier Trust Territory High
Court judgment, which has become final through affirmance on appeal or
through lack of timely appeal. Claims that the earlier judgment is
ill-reasoned, unfair, or even beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court
typically will not be sufficient to escape the doctrine of res judicata.
1. Exceptions As with practically all broad
principles of the law however, the common law principle of res judicata
admits of some exceptions. There are rare circumstances in which judgments
will not be protected against attack. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 597, 68 S. Ct. 715, 719, 92 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1984)("The judgment puts
an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or
some other factor invalidating the judgment.") (emphasis added).
The
ground relied upon by the Church for this attack on the High Court's
judgment is that the High Court did not have jurisdiction over the case.
The determination of jurisdiction itself normally qualifies for
protection, requiring a second court to presume that the court which
issued the judgment
[4 FSM Intrm. 108]
did properly
exercise its own jurisdiction. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156, 166, 53 S. Ct. 98, 101, 77 L. Ed. 232 (1932)("[T]he principles of res
judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues.").
Other courts therefore normally decline to review or question the first
court's determination that it has jurisdiction. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165, 172, 59 S. Ct. 134, 137, 83 L. Ed. 104 (1938)("After a party has
his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of
the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there
rendered merely retries the issue previously determined. There is no
reason to expect the second decision will be more satisfactory than the
first.").
Yet, the common law rule
remains that "plain usurpation of power," a judgment issued by a court
which "wrongfully extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its
authority," is outside the doctrine and does not qualify for res judicata
protection. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624
F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1980). See also 7 J. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice ¶ 60.25(2) (2d ed. 1985).
The task then is to
distinguish "plain usurpation of power" and "total want of jurisdiction,"
which will render the judgment void, from "mere error" in the exercise of
jurisdiction, which is insufficient to avoid application of the res
judicata doctrine. Various standards have been erected to guide courts in
making this distinction. The United States federal courts have said that a
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, even as to questions of
jurisdiction, when the second court's inquiry discloses that the litigants
in the court which rendered the original judgment had a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate those questions in the original court. Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308, 313
(1980); see also Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L.
Ed. 2d 186, 191 (1963); Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life
& Accident, 455 U.S. 691, 706-07. 102 S. Ct. 1357, 1367, 71 L. Ed. 2d
558, 571-72 (1982).
The compilers of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments have enunciated standards for measuring
contentions that a previous judgment of another tribunal should be
regarded as void because that tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case:
When a court has rendered a
judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from
litigating the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction in
subsequent litigation except if:
(1) The subject matter
of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its
entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to
stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or
agency of government; or
[4 FSM Intrm. 109]
(3) The judgment was rendered
by a court lacking capacity to make an adequately informed determination
of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of
procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have
opportunity belatedly to attack the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 12 (1982).
2. Importance of the
Nature of the Tribunals Applications of the tests
outlined above may differ depending on the nature of the tribunal whose
judgment is at issue and of the court from which enforcement is sought.
United States federal courts would "almost never" find a judgment of
another federal court to be void for want of subject matter jurisdiction,
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d at 825
n.5, but treat non-federal court judgments with somewhat less deference,
especially when the state judgment may impinge upon national
constitutional principles. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 343, 60 S. Ct.
343, 84 L. Ed. 370 (1940).
The Restatement standards
explicitly require examination of the nature of the court whose judgment
is at issue, to determine whether that court has "capacity to make an
adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own
jurisdiction." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12(3).
In
addition, the tests referred to above are intended for use by courts
within the United States in considering judgments of other domestic courts
within that nation. The tests themselves are shaped by an assumption that
judgments of the issuing court are constitutionally entitled to full faith
and credit under the Constitution of the United States. U.S. Const. art.
IV, § 1.
The judgments of courts
foreign to the United States do not qualify for constitutional full faith
and credit protection and traditionally have been subjected to different
standards when brought before courts in the United States for enforcement.
C. Peterson, Res Judicata And Foreign Court Judgments, 24 Ohio St. L.J.
291, 292 (1963)("Almost none of the states could be induced to accord to
foreign judgments that same degree of conclusiveness required by the
American Constitution for sister state judgments."). See also A. Vestal,
Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Geo. L.J. 857,
860-61 (1966)("When a court is faced with an assertion that there is issue
preclusion, it must...consider the adjudicating bodies - the one which
handed down the earlier decision and the one before which the instant
action is pending.")(emphasis in original).
B. We must therefore examine the
nature and actions of the Trust Territory High Court within the Federated
States of Micronesia after the Constitution came into effect.
[4 FSM Intrm. 110]
1. Not Contemplated By The
Constitution. The most important
consideration of course is that the Trust Territory courts were not
constitutional courts.
[T]he High Court is an
anomalous entity operating on an interim basis within, or adjacent to, a
constitutional framework. It does not derive its existence from the
Constitution or the people of the Federated States of Micronesia. Instead,
the High Court is the creation of an administrative agency, the United
States Department of Interior. Personnel of the High Court are selected by
the United States Department of the Interior without election, or any of
the standard advice and consent procedures necessary for judges of the
United States and the Federated States of Micronesia. They are selected by
Interior officials unilaterally without prior consultation with government
officials of the Federated States of Micronesia. Paid in amounts, and
acting under the terms and conditions established for administrative
officials within Interior, High Court appointees enjoy few if any of the
protections normally established for judges as a matter of course pursuant
to the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.
In re Iriarte (II), 1 FSM Intrm.
255, 267 (Pon. 1983).
The United States Federal
District Court for the Northern Marianas Islands made similar
observations:
[The Trust Territory High
Court] is not established by the Constitution or laws of the Commonwealth
of the Northern Marianas Islands. It is an Interior Department creation
from which there is no federal appeal. Its justices are appointed by and
removable by the Interior Secretary, and thus lack the independence and
local accountability which distinguish the federal judiciary structured by
the CNMI Constitution pursuant to the Covenant.
Temengil v. Trust Territory, 1
N. Mar. I. Commw. Rptr. 426, 445, 33 FEP Cases 1027, 1037 (D. N. Mar. I.
1983). These structural realities carry with them significant
implications. Based upon its review of the High Court's characteristics,
the Temengil court concluded that "continued jurisdiction of the High
Court in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands after
implementation of the Commonwealth form of government" was "incompatible
with the permanent judicial system designed by the Covenant." Id.
[4 FSM Intrm. 111]
For purposes of this appeal,
it is enough to recognize that these High Court characteristics, "point
toward the propriety and necessity of vigilance by the Supreme Court of
the Federated States of Micronesia to assure that the constitutional
rights of citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia are upheld." In re Iriarte (II), 1 FSM Intrm.
at 267.
2. New Constitutional Policies. New Constitutions approved by
the people of the Federated States of Micronesia depart fundamentally from
the judicial structures, and decisionmaking methods, of Trust Territory
days.
a. Local decisionmaking in
land cases - Under Trust Territory law, jurisdiction over land cases was
exclusively in the Trust Territory High Court. 6 F.S.M.C. 203. The
more local District Courts were prevented from exercising jurisdiction in
land cases. 6 F.S.M.C. 301(1)(a).
The founders of this new nation at the Micronesian Constitutional
Convention devoted considerable attention to land matters and reached an
apparent consensus that the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over land
cases in the Trust Territory High Court had not served Micronesians well.
Instead, they concluded that "land matters should be dealt with fully on
the district level." SCREP No. 36, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 848. See also
Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm.
53, 59 (App. 1985). This "profound distrust of non-local authority
over land" was "evidently a response to the policies of the Trust
Territory High Court." A. Burdick, The Constitution of the Federated
States of Micronesia, 8 U. Haw. L. Rev. 419, 476-77 (1986). See also N.
Meller, Constitutionalism in Micronesia 240 (1985); D. Olsen, Piercing
Micronesia's Colonial Veil, 15 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 473 (1976).
A
policy mandate of the Constitution is that determinations concerning
ownership of land should be made by state decisionmakers. This Court's
trial division has acted in numerous cases to assure state decisionmakers
the opportunity to resolve land issues. See, e.g., Etpison v. Perman, 1 FSM Intrm.
405 (Pon. 1984); In re Nahnsen, 1 FSM Intrm. 97
(Pon. 1982); Ponape Transfer & Storage, Inc. v.
Federated Shipping Co., 4 FSM Intrm. 37 (Pon. 1989). It would be
ironic indeed for us now to stay our hand, permitting violation of this
constitutional policy by the tribunal whose activities prompted the policy
in the first place.
b. A new approach to
decisionmaking - The framers also sought to assure that decisionmaking by
the courts would be carried out on a "new basis." A judicial guidance
clause was inserted in the Constitution to require that court decisions
"be consistent with this Constitution, Micronesian customs and traditions,
and the social and geographical configuration of Micronesia." FSM Const. art. XI, §
7. In proposing this provision, the Constitutional Convention's Committee
on General Provisions emphasized its desire that the new constitutional
courts re-examine the possibilities rather than unthinkingly accept the
approach developed by Trust Territory courts.
[4 FSM Intrm. 112]
The intent and purpose
of this provision is that future Micronesian courts base their decisions
not on what has been done in the past but on a new basis which would allow
the consideration of the pertinent aspects of Micronesian society and
culture.
The failure to include such a
provision in the Constitution may cause the courts to follow the decisions
of past Trust Territory cases or various foreign decisions which have
dealt with similar interpretive or legal questions. This may be
undesirable since much of the reasoning utilized in these various courts
may not be relevant here in Micronesia . . . . [I]n the past the
courts in the Trust Territory have copied to a great extent English common
law which the Committee feels is not always a relevant basis for decision
here in Micronesia. Therefore, the provision guarantees that future
Micronesian courts will not be bound to follow previous Trust Territory or
common law decisions.
SCREP No. 34, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 821-22.
This
affirmative desire to depart from Trust Territory precedent in order to
decide cases on "a new basis" is reflected in the state constitutions as
well. The Kosrae, Pohnpei and Yap constitutions
all contain clauses based upon the judicial guidance clause of the FSM Constitution.9
The Yap Constitution
also contains an even more pointed provision: "None of the decisional law
developed by the High Court of the Trust Territory shall have the force of
stare decisis in the adjudication of any case or controversy in the State
Court." Yap Const. art.
XV, § 2.
These constitutionally
established policies of self-government militate against acceptance of a
judgment concerning ownership of land, issued by the Trust Territory High
Court in clear violation of the Trust Territory High Court's limited
transitional role under S.O.
3039.
3. Pattern of Conduct. Secretarial Order 3039
was carefully drawn to minimize High Court involvement within the
Federated States of Micronesia after constitutional courts began
functioning. Unfortunately, the High Court disregarded the
[4 FSM Intrm. 113]
limitations on
its transitional role.
From the beginning, the Trust
Territory High Court appeared to lack sensitivity for constitutional
self-government, engaging in activities that have been characterized as
"bullying and demeaning of a constitutional government." A. Bowman,
Legitimacy and Scope of Trust Territory High Court Power to Review
Decisions of Federated States of Micronesia Supreme Court: The Otokichy
Cases, 5 U. Haw. L. Rev. 57, 78 (1983). In June, 1982 the FSM Congress
found it necessary to adopt a resolution seeking limitation of the High
Court's activities within the Federated States of Micronesia. Cong. Res.
2-87 (2d Cong., 3rd Reg. Sess.). That resolution noted, among other
things, that "events of late have sadly demonstrated the apparent lack of
purpose of the Trust Territory High Court to maintain the cooperation
needed to effectuate the full scope of jurisdiction of and the proper
transition of functions to the Federated States Supreme Court, thereby
undermining the effort toward constitutional self-rule."
a.
Special Joint Rule No. 1 - One example is the High Court response to
Special Joint Rule No. 1, adopted on July 13, 1981 in an attempt to avoid
transitional conflicts. That rule explained its own purpose.
The
Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia has been certified by
the Chief Justice of the Trust Territory High Court and has now begun to
exercise its jurisdiction throughout the Federated States of Micronesia.
The Trust Territory High Court shall remain active in the Federated States
of Micronesia to hear only those cases which do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia.
It is the intent of this jointly adopted rule that both Courts shall
cooperate to assure that the Supreme Court of the Federated States of
Micronesia immediately shall exercise the full scope of its
jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the Federated States of
Micronesia, and that the Supreme Court shall determine the scope of its
own jurisdiction. The following rule is therefore adopted jointly by the
Courts to specify procedures to be followed in cases originally filed in
the Trust Territory High Court or a Trust Territory District Court.
The
procedure provided to carry out this purpose was a simple one, designed to
avoid potential conflicts by assuring that only this Court would address
jurisdictional issues.
Either party may, from time
to time, file a motion with the Court where the case is pending, asserting
that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Federated States of
Micronesia. Upon receipt of any
[4 FSM Intrm. 114]
such motion,
the Trust Territory High Court or the Trust Territory District Court, as
the case may be, shall promptly certify the question of jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia.
The
rule was never honored by any High Court trial judge. In a case where the
rule was not at issue, the Trust Territory High Court Appellate Division
nonetheless went out of its way to denigrate and mischaracterize the rule:
Somehow, there is a gross misunderstanding as to what the Special Joint
Rule is. Jurisdiction is determined by statute or constitution. Rules are
promulgated to assist in the procedural handling of cases and for
administration of the court system. Rules, however well-intentioned,
cannot change the jurisdiction of the courts. This document was simply a
memorandum adopted to express general agreements to create an atmosphere
for smooth transition and cooperation. Anything specific that takes away
the authority of a court or adds to that of another court without
authority is simply gratuitous without any force or effect.
Otokichy v. Appellate Division
of FSM Supreme Court, 8 TTR 295, 303-04 (App. 1983) (footnote omitted).
The statement that Special Joint Rule No. 1 could not change the
jurisdiction of the courts was certainly correct. However that is not what
the rule aspired to do. The rule's purpose was not to change jurisdiction,
but to specify procedures for deciding jurisdictional issues. Moreover,
the High Court's contention that the rule is "simply a memorandum" was
itself, at best, a "gross misunderstanding as to what the Special Joint
Rule is." The rule was much more than just a memorandum. It was an
exercise of the rulemaking power of both courts and was legally binding on
both.
b. Active trial - The same
Trust Territory High Court refusal to accept limitations upon its
transitional role is apparent in its response to the "active trial"
exception specified in S.O.
3039.
An example is the case of
Swain v. Aten, Civ. 8-84. The Swain case was filed with the Trust
Territory High Court trial division in Truk on February 3, 1984, almost
three years after the FSM Supreme Court began functioning. Under FSM trial
division holdings, the case fell within the jurisdiction of the FSM
Supreme Court trial division since the plaintiffs were citizens of
[4 FSM Intrm. 115]
Truk and of
the Federated States of Micronesia and several of the defendants were
foreign citizens. In re Nahnsen, 1 FSM Intrm. 97
(Pon. 1982). Thus, the High Court had no apparent authority to accept
the filing of the case.
Pleadings framing the issues
were still being filed in the High Court litigation after April 20, 1984
and the "initial trial" did not begin until August, 1985. See Truk v.
Aten, 8 TTR 631 (App. 1988). Thus, the case plainly was not in "active
trial" on April 20, 1984. Even if somehow the Trust Territory High Court
believed the case to fall outside FSM Supreme Court jurisdiction, there
should have been no doubt that S.O.
3039 required transfer to the Truk State Court when the court was
certified on April 20, 1984.
The High Court appellate
division's decision made no mention of the fact that the High Court trial
division was precluded by S.O.
3039 from even accepting the case. Rather, the appellate division
contented itself with upholding the trial court's failure to transfer the
case pursuant to S.O.
3039, saying:
The language "active trial"
which appears in quotation marks in Secretarial Order 3039,
5(a) was not intended to be a legalistic term meaning when the first
witness in a trial was sworn or when a jury had been impaneled or to refer
to any other specific time in pending litigation but was intended to be a
term of administrative guidance to the High Court in making its decision
whether to transfer or retain jurisdiction of a case depending on the
totality of the circumstances of a particular case as determined by the
Judge handling the case.
Aten v. Swain,
slip op. 3, App. No. 416 (App. 1985).
C. Direct appellate division
violations - The failure of the Trust Territory High Court appellate
division went beyond mere failure to restrict the trial division's
transitional role to that contemplated by S.O. 3039. The appellate
division directly violated S.O.
3039 in its own right.
Just as the Trust Territory
trial division was not permitted by S.O.
3039 to accept newly filed cases after constitutional courts were
established, the Trust Territory appellate division had no further
authority to accept appeals from trial court decisions. After
constitutional courts began functioning, the appellate division had
authority to accept appeals only by writ of certiorari and only from
courts of last resort. S.O.
3039, § 5(b).
[4 FSM Intrm. 116]
The Trust Territory High
Court appellate division simply ignored this restriction, and continued to
accept appeals from the High Court trial division. Appeal No. 420 in
Swain, for example, was filed more than one year after all constitutional
courts in the Federated States of Micronesia were functioning. The High
Court heard oral argument in the case on October 10, 1986, more than five
years after the FSM Supreme Court had been in existence, and two and
one-half years after the Truk State Court began functioning.
Thus,
the Swain opinion, issued on November 17, 1986, failed not only to address
the trial division's wrongful acceptance of a newly filed case after the
constitutional court began functioning, but also avoided discussion of the
appellate division's own lack of jurisdiction. It is impossible to avoid
the conclusion that the failures to address such obvious and fundamental
issues amounted to a manifest abuse of authority and betrayed incapacity
of the High Court appellate division to make a determination of its own
jurisdiction. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 12(1) and (3).
d.
After Presidential Proclamations - On November 3, 1986 the Presidents of
the Federated States of Micronesia and of the United States jointly
declared that the United States and United Nations
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands is
terminated.12 Those proclamations
terminated the applicability to the Federated States of Micronesia of S.O. 3039, wiping out any
remaining authority the Trust Territory courts may have had to adjudicate
rights of parties in cases within the Federated States of Micronesia. See
Vol. 2 of the FSM Code, page 359 (1987 Supp.).
Even that did not stop the
High Court. Although it retained no apparent governmental power to act on
cases within the Federated States of Micronesia, the High Court still
refused to transfer any of the FSM cases pending before it. Indeed, the
decision in Swain v. Aten, referred to above, was issued on
[4 FSM Intrm. 117]
November 17,
1986, two weeks after the Presidential Proclamations. Even then, the High
Court appellate division remanded the case to the High Court trial
division for further proceedings which apparently were held in Truk in
January of 1987. The High Court appellate division issued yet another
opinion in Swain on September 22, 1988. Astonishingly, that opinion
remanded the case yet another time to the High Court trial division for
further findings. Truk v. Aten, 8 TTR 631 (App. 1988).
4.
The Mizpah Litigation Finally, we note that the
particular actions of the Trust Territory High Court trial division in
civil action 1-76 by no means represent a departure from the pattern of
High Court actions just described. Section 5(a) of S.O. 3039 says that,
"Determination as to whether a case is in `active trial' shall be made by
the Judge before whom such case is pending."
The record of the litigation
before the Trust Territory trial division is devoid of any trial judge's
finding as to whether the case was in active trial. The High Court simply
retained the case.
Indeed, the first time the
High Court seems to have thought of the "active trial" issue was after
judgment, when the Church moved for relief from judgment. In that motion,
the Church questioned, apparently for the first time, whether the Trust
Territory High Court had jurisdiction to enter judgment in the case.
In
addressing that motion, the High Court trial judge did not maintain that
he or any other judge had ever determined the case to be in "active
trial." He also did not review the "totality of the circumstances" of the
case as Aten v. Swain suggested. Instead, he set out to make a
postjudgment determination concerning the active trial issue. To do this,
he simply called the former Trust Territory Chief Justice, then retired
and living in Honolulu, and asked him "what the status of this case was on
the date of the certification." Order Denying Relief From Judgment (TTHC
Tr. Div., Jan. 20, 1987).13
The
High Court trial judge's January 20, 1987, order went on to say:
[4 FSM Intrm. 118]
On December
11, 1986, I telephoned Judge Burnett wherein he told me that on or about
the date of [FSM Supreme Court] certification, he made the decision that,
because the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was a party to the
lawsuit and because of the long history of the matter, he determined that
the Mizpah High School case was in `active trial' pursuant to Secretarial Order 3039.
Slip op. at 2. As the FSM Supreme Court trial division correctly noted,
neither of those considerations has any bearing whatever upon whether the
case was in "active trial." 3 FSM Intrm. at 451.
Moreover, the record in High Court civil action 1-76 reveals that Chief
Justice Burnett's only involvement in the Mizpah case was on January 23,
1976 when he accepted reference of the litigation from the land commission
on behalf of the High Court. Thereafter, three different Trust Territory
justices entered notices, orders, memoranda and notes in the trial file,
but Chief Justice Burnett took no further part in the case. Plainly, Chief
Justice Burnett was not the "Judge before whom such case [was] pending" at
any time after May 5, 1981. He therefore had no authority under S.O. 3039, § 5(a) to
determine whether the case was in active trial.
C. For purposes of res judicata
analysis, it has been necessary to consider the activities of the Trust
Territory High Court within the Federated States of Micronesia after the
Constitution went into effect. That review enables us to determine that
insistence upon maintaining control over cases within the Federated States
of Micronesia, in disregard of the limitations of S.O. 3039, and to the
exclusion of the new constitutional courts, was a solidly entrenched
institutional refusal, or incapacity, of the High Court to transfer cases
to this and other constitutional courts.
We find it quite significant
in this regard that the characterizations of Special Joint Rule No. 1 as
"simply a memorandum," and of the words, "active trial," in Secretarial Order 3039,
as merely "administrative guidance," were in appellate division decisions,
without a single dissent.
It is instructive as well
that it was not only the trial division that accepted cases for filing
after the constitutional courts had been established. That the High Court
appellate division itself accepted new appeals long after it was precluded
from doing so by S.O.
3039, that it continued to decide appeals within the Federated States
of Micronesia even after S.O.
3039 was terminated, and that even after November 3, 1986 it continued
to remand cases back to the High Court trial division for further action,
are all important facts.
In light of this information
there can be no doubt that the High Court was "a court lacking capacity to
make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own
jurisdiction," that any effort by the Church to
[4 FSM Intrm. 119]
have the High
Court consider its own jurisdiction would have been futile, and that it is
procedurally fair now to afford the Church an opportunity to question that
jurisdiction. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12(3).
That
the High Court improperly retained the case for four years after the FSM
Supreme Court was certified, and continued to hold the case more than a
year after the Truk State Court was established, issuing a judgment based
upon filed papers, without there ever having been any trial, let alone an
"active trial," in the case, establishes that, by the time the judgment
was issued on August 18, 1985, the subject matter of the Mizpah litigation
was "so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the
action was a manifest abuse of authority." Id. § 12(1).
Most
important, allowing the judgment to stand would undermine the
decisionmaking guidelines and policies reflected in the judicial guidance
clauses of the national and state constitutions and would thwart the
efforts of the framers of the Constitution to reallocate court
jurisdiction within the Federated States of Micronesia by giving local
decisionmakers control over disputes concerning ownership of land. Thus,
allowing this judgment of a nonconstitutional court to stand would
infringe upon important constitutional policies and specifically upon the
authority of the Truk State Court. Accordingly, section 12(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments also calls for a finding that the
judgment is void.
The other common test, in
addition to the standards supplied by section 12 of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, is that employed by the United States federal
courts for judgments of other federal courts. Under that approach, an
erroneous determination of jurisdiction is given res judicata effect if it
is the product of a good faith determination or if the party attacking the
judgment had an opportunity at the trial level to raise the question of
jurisdiction. As already discussed, no good faith determination was made
in the High Court Mizpah litigation although S.O. 3039 explicitly
requires such a determination. Moreover, the pattern of High Court conduct
establishes that any effort by the Church to have raised with the High
Court the question of jurisdiction would have been futile.
Thus
all of the standard tests for determining whether res judicata effect
should be given to a judgment issued by a court lacking jurisdiction over
the subject matter lead to a conclusion that the judgment must be set
aside as void.
IV. Laches or Estoppel The trial division
of this Court, troubled by the fact that the United Church of Christ had
not objected to retention of the case by the High Court prior to judgment,
regarded that acquiescence as a kind of "fault" attributable to the
Church, which prevented collateral attack upon the judgment.
We
are persuaded otherwise. In the first place, we think it clear that
[4 FSM Intrm. 120]
any effort by
the Church to question the jurisdiction of the High Court at any stage of
the High Court litigation would have been futile. Thus, the Church's
participation in the High Court litigation can hardly be characterized as
blameworthy.
Moreover, our review of the
law in general concerning res judicata, and of the facts concerning
transitional activities of the High Court in particular, convinces us that
decisions of this kind are, and typically should be, made on the basis of
larger policy considerations, rather than the equities lying with or
against a particular party. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 135-37, 99 S.
Ct. 2205, 60 L. Ed. 2d 767, 774-75 (1979) (res judicata effect denied to
state court decision about dischargeability of a debt because "giving
finality to those rulings would undercut Congress' intention to
commit...issues to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court....It makes
little sense...to resolve a federal dischargeability question according to
whether or not the parties in state court waived their right to engage in
hypothetical litigation in an inappropriate forum."); United States v.
United States Fidelity Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S. Ct. 653, 84 L. Ed. 894
(1940) (failure to object to jurisdiction of court to award cross-claim
against claim asserted by United States in the same litigation, did not
bar United States from attacking the judgment collaterally); Capital
Service v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 504-05, 74 S. Ct. 699, 98 L. Ed. 887, 892
(1954) ("when Congress, acting within its constitutional authority, has
vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter
and the intrusion of a state would result in conflict of function, the
federal court may enjoin the state proceeding in order to preserve the
federal right."); 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas, T. Currier, Moore's Federal
Practice ¶ 0.405 [4.-1] at 214-15 (2d ed. 1983) ("[I]f taken as
absolute,...[this general principle that a court has authority to
determine its own jurisdiction and therefore the doctrine of res judicata
extends to jurisdictional determinations] might occasionally result in a
serious interference with constitutional or statutory allocations of
power. As a consequence it has been held in an occasional case that
competing considerations dictate that collateral attack on jurisdictional
grounds be permitted.")
Exemplary of this view is
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 343, 60 S. Ct. 343, 84 L. Ed. 370 (1940),
which, more than any other case brought to our attention, parallels the
facts of this case. In Kalb, a mortgage foreclosure action had been
initiated in a county court in Wisconsin, in the United States. While the
action was pending, the defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy court.
This in turn triggered the United States federal bankruptcy law, placing
the defendants and all their property under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal bankruptcy court.
Nonetheless, the county court
pressed on with the foreclosure litigation. Judgments of foreclosure were
issued, the sheriff sold the property, the county court issued writs of
assistance, the sheriff executed the writs, and the appellants and their
families were ejected from the mortgaged farms. All this was done after
the county court should have stopped acting, and without objection by the
parties.
[4 FSM Intrm. 121]
After the time for appealing
from the county court judgment had expired, the appellants instituted a
new case in the Wisconsin state court system seeking to set aside the
county court orders. That relief was denied and the second case was
dismissed. This later decision was affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, which said:
It would seem from a
consideration of section 75 as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203, that the filing
of the petition automatically operated to extend the period of redemption.
It is possible that that state of facts if made to appear would make the
order of the trial court erroneous but the order would be within the power
of the court to make. No appeal having been taken, no showing having been
made in the state court, an order of sale having been confirmed, and the
purchaser put in possession, the plaintiff is in no position to claim that
the order of the circuit court is void.
Kalb v. Luce, 285 N.W. 431, quoted in Kalb, 308 U.S.
at 438, 60 S. Ct. at 345. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, concluding that the county court
judgment must be set aside in order to uphold important national
policies.
The States cannot, in the
exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest State courts with
power to violate the supreme law of the land. The Constitution grants
Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy and under this power
Congress can limit the jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can
exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the
bankruptcy law. If Congress has vested in the bankruptcy courts exclusive
jurisdiction over farmer-debtors and their property, and has by its Act
withdrawn from all other courts all power under any circumstances to
maintain and enforce foreclosure proceedings against them, its Act is the
supreme law of the land which all courts - State and Federal - must
observe.
308 U.S. at 439,
60 S. Ct. at 346.
The constitutional and
statutory circumstances of this case are strikingly similar to those in
Kalb. The Trust Territory High Court originally had full and legitimate
jurisdiction over this litigation, just as did the Wisconsin county court
in Kalb. However, as in Kalb, subsequent events mandated a shift in
jurisdiction to a different court.
In Kalb, the change was
required by the United States Bankruptcy Act and the United States Supreme
Court set aside the county court judgment as issued in violation of
national policies set by the United States Congress. In this case S.O. 3039 requires
transfer of the case and the High Court's issuance
[4
FSM Intrm. 122]
of a judgment
in violation of the transfer requirement was contrary to important
constitutional policies and to constitutional self-government itself. In
Kalb, the court held that the bankruptcy act provision calling for
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court was "self-executing" and did
not require action by the defendant in the state court proceedings. 308
U.S. at 443, 60 S. Ct. at 348. That being so the court said,
"considerations as to whether the issue of jurisdiction was actually
contested in the County Court, or whether it could have been contested,
are not applicable where the plenary power of Congress over bankruptcy has
been exercised as in this Act." 308 U.S. at 444, 60 S. Ct. at 348.
Here,
the jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court under article XI, section 1 of
the Constitution is itself self-executing. Moreover, the transition
procedure set out in Secretarial Order 3039 does not require a motion or
any kind of affirmative action by the parties to the litigation.
Consistent with constitutional requirements and "to provide the maximum
permissible amount of self-government," S.O. 3039, § 1, the order
requires that "all cases . . . shall be transferred to the functioning
courts." S.O. 3039, § 5(a).
The actions of the High Court
taken after establishment of functioning constitutional courts, and
without a good faith determination after a full and fair hearing as to
whether the "active trial" exception permitted retention of the cases,
were without authority of law and were void. The failure of the Church to
object does not alter the fact that the High Court was without
jurisdiction to act and that its conduct constituted usurpation of power.
Enforcement of the judgment must be enjoined not because the United Church
of Christ was without fault, but because the judgment is void.
As
already noted, once the High Court judgment was issued and the opportunity
to appeal denied, the Church has pursued this matter with vigor, and
apparently no payments have been made or actions taken in reliance on the
High Court judgment. Therefore, this is not an occasion for considering
whether postjudgment inaction by the party seeking to set the judgment
aside could give rise to a claim of estoppel or laches, justifying court
refusal to enjoin enforcement of the judgment.
V. Conclusion The underlying dispute in
this case involves ownership of land. Under our constitutional system, the
case apparently falls within the jurisdiction of the Truk State Court and
that court should have an opportunity to decide it. The Trust Territory
High Court judgment, issued in violation of S.O. 3039 and in
disregard of policies and jurisdictional allocations prescribed by the
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, must be set aside to
give the Truk State Court the opportunity to decide the case. The decision
of the trial division of this Court is reversed and the case is remanded
to the trial division for issuance of injunctive relief consistent with
this opinion.
So ordered the 10th day of
July, 1989.
* * * *
Footnotes:
1. Secretarial Order 3039,
which was issued by the United States Secretary of the Interior on April
25, 1979, is reprinted in volume 2 of the FSM Code, pages 950-56.
Throughout this opinion the order will be referred to as S.O. 3039.
2. Hamo v. United Church Board of World
Ministries, Trust Territory High Court trial division, Civ. No. 1-76.
3. Pretrial conferences were scheduled for
August 30, 1978; October 16, 1978; May 27, 1983; February 6, 1984; and
December 7, 1984. Trial was at one time set for January 19, 1979. For
reasons not fully explained in the record, none of these actually took
place. Prior to March 18, 1985, the only hearings actually held seem to
have been a pre-trial hearing on September 28, 1978 and a calendar call on
June 1, 1982.
4. The Church, before the trial division of the
FSM Supreme Court, challenged the monetary damages award as
unconstitutional for lack of notice, contending also that: the $300,060
had been paid by the Trust Territory Government to the American Board, not
to the United Church of Christ of Moen, which was ordered to "repay" the
money; that the lease specifically provided that the lease money was to be
returned to the government upon any determination that the Church did not
have title to the land; and that there had been no request by any party to
the case for an award of damages. The FSM Supreme Court trial division
concluded that there was "no basis" for the award of monetary damages, 3 FSM Intrm. at 453 n.2, but
rejected the Church's claim that the procedures followed by the High Court
were violative of due process. Those conclusions are not challenged, and
are not before us on this appeal.
5. The Church obtained new counsel after
this unsuccessful effort to appeal. The Church's present counsel was not
involved in the litigation before the Trust Territory High Court, until
after the judgment in question here had been entered. Present counsel then
filed the motion for relief from judgment which was denied by the High
Court on January 20, 1987.
6. Section 1
of S.O. 3039 says: "Purpose: The purpose of
this Order is to provide the maximum permissible amount of
self-government, consistent with the responsibilities of the Secretary
under Executive Order 11021,
for the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau,
pursuant to their respective constitutions as and when framed, adopted,
and ratified, pending termination of the 1947 Trusteeship
Agreement under which the United States of America undertook to act as
Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands.
7. Section 5 of S.O. 3039 also excepts
from the transfer requirement suits against the Trust Territory. That
exception in not at issue on this appeal however. The FSM Supreme Court
trial division held that the Trust Territory litigation was not a "suit
against the Trust Territory" since the case had been referred to the High
Court by the Land Commission and the Trust Territory had voluntarily
intervened in the litigation. No party contests now that conclusion of the
trial division.
8. Section 2
of S.O. 3039 provides as follows: "Delegation
of Authority. Until the termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement and subject to the limitations contained in this Order and
in existing treaties, laws, and regulations of the United States generally
applicable in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, executive,
legislative, and judicial functions of the Government of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands are, except as otherwise provided herein,
hereby delegated to the three political subdivisions of the Trust
Territory known as the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall
Islands, and Palau."
9. The Kosrae
Constitution provides as follows: "Court decisions shall be consistent
with this Constitution, State traditions and customs, and the social and
geographical configurations of the State." Kos. Const. art.
VI, § 9. The Yap provision is almost identical. Yap Const. art.
VII, § 7.
The Pohnpei
Constitution says: "The decisions of all courts and adjudicatory
bodies shall be consistent with this Constitution and the concepts of
justice of the people of Pohnpei." Pon. Const.
art. 10, § 11.
As of
now, the Truk Charter established before self-government remains in effect
and there is no constitution for the State of Truk.
10. The Trust Territory Chief Justice had
rulemaking authority under 5 TTC 202 (1980), now 5 F.S.M.C. 512; the
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia places rulemaking power
in the Federated States of Micronesia Chief Justice. FSM Const. art. XI, §
9.
11. Section 5(b) of S.O. 3039 says:
"Appellate Functions. As the functions of the
Community Courts, the District Courts, and the Trial Division of the High
Court have been phased out and transferred to the local courts pursuant to
the provisions of Section 5a of this Order, the Appellate Division of the
High Court shall retain jurisdiction by writ of certiorari to
entertain appeals from the courts of last resort of the respective
jurisdictions of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands,
and Palau.
The
ruling of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
upon all appeals shall be final, binding, and enforceable in accordance
with their terms. All appeals now pending or taken before the
determination has been made pursuant to Section 5a of this Order that
functioning courts exist in a jurisdiction shall be retained by and
disposed of by the High Court."
12. See Presidential Proclamation of FSM
President Tosiwo Nakayama, Nov. 3, 1986; U.S. Presidential Proclamation
No. 5564, Nov. 3, 1986, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1986), excerpted in 81 Am. J. Int'l
L. 405 (1987). The joint declarations also triggered implementation of the
Compact of Free
Association. See Vol. 2 of the FSM Code, Editor's Note page 318 (1987
Supp.); United States Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1771 (1986).
13. The High Court trial judge in his order
also recited that he and the Truk State Court Chief Justice had met at
some unspecified date after April 20, 1984, and "we agreed that the High
Court would retain jurisdiction." Slip op. 3. Of course no such agreement
is permissible under the Constitution or under S.O. 3039. See Suldan v. FSM (I), 1 FSM Intrm.
201, 205 (Pon. 1982) ("Judiciary members may not simply decide among
themselves to reassign the decisionmaking responsibilities set forth in
the statute.") |
|