ARTICLE IX
Legislative

     Section 1.  The legislative power of the national government is vested in the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Case annotations:      Legislative Powers

It is doubtful that Congress would have power to require that all criminal prosecutions be in name of FSM.  FSM v. Boaz (II), 1 FSM Intrm. 2831 (Pon. 1981).

Seaman's Protection Act, originally enacted for entire Trust Territory by  Congress of Micronesia, relates to matters that now fall within legislative powers of nat. l gov. t under art. IX, 2 of Constitution, and has therefore become a nat. l law of FSM under art. XV .  That being so, a claim asserting rights under the Act falls within the jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court underart. XI , 6(b) of Constitution as a case arising under nat'l law.  19 FSMC 401-437.  Lonno v. Trust Territory (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 53(Kos. 1982).

Tax on gross revenues falls squarely within constitutional authorization given to Congress by art. IX, 2(e) to tax income.  Ponape Federation of Coop. Ass'ns v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 124 , 126 (Pon. 1985).

That Congress may tax "gross income" is plainly and unmistakably provided for in words of art. IX, 2(e) of Constitution.  Ponape Federation of Coop. Ass'ns v. FSM , 2 FSM Intrm. 124, 127 (Pon. 1985).

Congress enacted P.L. No. 1-72 and confirmed legislative power of state governments to supersede Trust Territory statutes within scope of their exclusive powers.  Pohnpei v. Mack , 3 FSM Intrm. 45, 54 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1987).

While Congress may have power to prohibit taking of and killing of turtles within 12 mile area as matter of nat'l law, it should lie with Congress, and not the court, to determine whether the power should be exercised.  FSM v. Oliver , 3 FSM Intrm. 469, 480 (Pon. 1988).

Once Congress has set a policy direction, barring constitutional violation, it is duty of this court to ascertain and follow that guidance.  In re Cantero , 3 FSM Intrm. 481, 484 (Pon. 1988).

Primary responsibility, perhaps even sole responsibility, for affirmative implementation of Professional Services Clause, FSM Const. art. XIII, 1 , must lie with Congress.  Carlos v. FSM , 4 FSM Intrm. 17, 29 (App. 1989).

Fixing of voting requirements is uniquely political task and falls within purview of political arms of gov't, so long as no legal rights are violated by a particular method selected. Constitutional Convention 1990 v. President, 4 FSM Intrm. 320, 324 (App. 1990).

Nature of constitutional convention as authorized by FSM Constitution, with direct control of people over identity of convention delegates, and ultimate acceptance of products of convention's efforts, and fact that framers view a constitutional convention as a standard and preferred amendment mechanism, preclude congressional control over convention's decision-making.  Constitutional Convention 1990 v. President, 4 FSM Intrm. 320, 327 (App. 1990).

Congress has no power to specify voting requirements for Con Con and therefore any attempt to exercise this power to uphold tradition is also outside powers of Congress under art. V, 2 of Constitution, which is not an independent source of congressional power but which merely confirms power of Congress, in exercising nat'l legislative powers, to make special provisions for Micronesian tradition.  Constitutional Convention 1990 v. President , 4 FSM Intrm. 320, 328 (App. 1990).

Legislative enactment of Financial Management Act does not conflict with constitutional provision stating Chief Justice is chief administrator of nat'l judiciary.  Mackenzie v. Tuuth , 5 FSM Intrm. 78, 80 (Pon. 1991).

Legislative passage of Financial Management Act rests upon provisions of Constitution, pursuant to which Dept. of Finance and General Fund were established to oversee nat. l administration and management of public money.  Mackenzie v. Tuuth , 5 FSM Intrm. 78, 81 (Pon. 1991).

Historically the concept of a single, general fund administered by one person is found in laws enacted by Congress of Micronesia.  Enactment of Financial Management Act reflects continuity of purpose and statutory consistency.  Mackenzie v. Tuuth , 5 FSM Intrm. 78, 82 (Pon. 1991).

Where there is in the Constitution a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch of gov't, such as Congress being the sole judge of the elections of its members, it is a nonjusticiable political question not to be decided by the court because of the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution.  Aten v. National Election Comm'r (III) , 6 FSM Intrm. 143, 145 (App. 1993).

In absence of any authority or compelling policy arguments court cannot conclude that a law, the enforcement of which entails a harsh result, is unconstitutional, and can only note that the creation of potentially harsh results is well within the province of the nation's constitutionally empowered legislators.  Mid-Pacific Constr. Co. v. Semes , 7 FSM Intrm. 102, 104 (Pon. 1995).

Congress has not unconstitutionally delegated its authority to define crimes by delegating to an executive agency the power to enter into fishing agreements because congressional approval is needed for these agreements to take effect.  FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (I), 7 FSM Intrm. 124, 127 (Pon. 1995).

       Section 2.  The following powers are expressly delegated to Congress:

           (a)  to provide for the national defense;

           (b)  to ratify treaties;

           (c)  to regulate immigration, emigration, naturalization, and citizenship;

           (d)  to impose taxes, duties, and tariffs based on imports;

Case annotations:  State excise tax which levies tax at port of entry on items imported into a state and which must be paid prior to release of those items from the port of entry, is an import tax within the meaning of FSM Constitution art. IX, 2(d).  Wainit v. Truk (II), 2 FSM Intrm. 86, 87 (Truk 1985).

Nat. l power to impose taxes based on imports is exclusive, and not shared by the states.Innocenti v. Wainit , 2 FSM Intrm. 173, 182 (App. 1986).

Taxes imposed on goods because of their entry into a port of entry of State of Truk, levied at port of entry in amounts based upon quality or value of imported goods, and which must be paid to the Division of Revenue prior to release of items from the port of entry, are taxes based on imports.  Such a tax represents an effort to exercise powers expressly delegated to the nat. l gov. t, is beyond the powers of the state, and is null and void.  Innocenti v. Wainit , 2 FSM Intrm. 173, 183-84 (App. 1986).

Although retroactive application of decision holding state tax unconstitutional would impose hardship upon a state, where funds collected under the tax have already been committed, such a result is not inequitable where the state legislature pushed on with the tax act despite strong resistance of business people to the tax in the form of a petition and establishment of an escrow account to hold contested payments, and a veto message by the governor of the state, and there is no evidence that the legislature seriously considered the constitutionality of the legislation.  Innocenti v. Wainit , 2 FSM Intrm. 173, 186 (App. 1986).

A state excise tax imposed on imports is unconstitutional, regardless of the manner of tax payment.  Gimnang v. Yap , 4 FSM Intrm. 212, 215 (Yap 1990).

Nat'l gov't has exclusive power to tax income and imports.  Power to levy other taxes, unless specifically barred by Constitution, is exclusive state power.  Sigrah v. Kosrae , 6 FSM Intrm. 168 , 169-70 (App. 1993).

Recovery of Taxes

The question whether taxes paid by plaintiffs under a taxing statute subsequently found to be unconstitutional may be refunded to them turns upon whether the tax was voluntarily paid.Innocenti v. Wainit , 2 FSM Intrm. 173, 187 (App. 1986).

Where taxpayers informed the gov't that they protested the tax as unconstitutional, and had to pay the tax in order to receive the taxed property, the payments are coerced, not voluntary, and taxpayers are entitled to the refund of all amounts paid.  Innocenti v. Wainit , 2 FSM Intrm. 173, 187 (App. 1986).

The FSM Supreme Court will abstain from a claim for recovery of taxes where the defendant state requests abstention, the claim is for monetary relief, and the state has endeavored to develop a body of law in the areas of excise taxes and sovereign immunity.  Gimnang v. Yap, 4 FSM Intrm. 212, 214 (Yap 1990).

Under traditional constitutional analysis, taxpayers' efforts to recover tax moneys unlawfully extracted from them by a state may be relegated to state procedures and decision-makers so long as there is a reasonable procedure under state law whereby the taxpayer may obtain meaningful relief.  Gimnang v. Yap, 5 FSM Intrm. 13, 23-24 (App. 1991).

The name given a tax by a taxing authority is not necessarily controlling as to the type of tax it is.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 119 (App. 1995).

The interval in which a tax is reported and collected and whether it is imposed without regard to profit or loss does not alter whether it is an income tax.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 119 (App. 1995).

           (e)  to impose taxes on income;

Case annotation:  The tax on gross revenues falls squarely within the constitutional authorization given to Congress by art. IX, 2(e) to tax income.  Ponape Federation of Cooperative Associations v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 124, 126 (Pon. 1985).

Constitutional interpretation must start and end with the words of the provision when the words themselves plainly and unmistakably provide the answer to the issue posed.  The Court may not look to constitutional history nor to United States interpretations of similar constitutional language in this circumstance.  Ponape Federation of Cooperative Associations v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 124, 126 (Pon. 1985).

That Congress may tax "gross income" is plainly and unmistakably provided for in the words of art. IX, 2(e) of the Constitution.  Ponape Federation of Cooperative Associations v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 124, 127 (Pon. 1985).

Power granted to Congress by FSM Constitution art. IX, 2(e) "to impose taxes on income" includes power to tax gross revenue.  Afituk v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 260, 264 (Truk 1986).

Gross revenue tax as enacted by Congress of Micronesia continued in effect in FSM by virtue of the transition article of the FSM Constitution but, because it was subsequently amended by the FSM Congress and was included in the codification of FSM Statutes, may now be considered a law enacted by Congress.  Afituk v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 260, 264 (Truk 1986).

There is no evidence in the journal of the Constitutional Convention that the phrase "to impose taxes on income" in FSM Constitution, art. IX, 2(e) was derived from the Sixteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which permits the U.S. Congress to "lay and collect taxes on income" so in determining the meaning of the FSM constitutional provision, no particular weight should be given to U.S. cases.  Afituk v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 260, 264 (Truk, 1986).

Kosrae transaction tax of KC 9.301 is a selective tax rather than an income tax and is not an encroachment upon the nat'l government's exclusive power to tax income.  Youngstrom v. Kosrae, 5 FSM Intrm. 73, 76 (Kos. 1991).

Nat. l gov. t has the exclusive power to tax income and imports.  The power to levy other taxes, unless specifically barred by the Constitution, is an exclusive state power.  Sigrah v. Kosrae, 6 FSM Intrm. 168, 169-70 (App. 1993).

A transaction tax oriented toward individual transactions and not total income, and only triggered by the transactions it covers, even though paid by the vendor, is analogous to a selective sales tax and is not an unconstitutional encroachment on the nat. l government's exclusive power to tax income.  Sigrah v. Kosrae, 6 FSM Intrm. 168, 170 (App. 1993).

A Chuuk state tax on a lessor or landowner who rents or leases land, building or housing unit, for residential, or office space, or other use is not an unconstitutional encroachment on the nat. l government's exclusive power to tax income.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 6 FSM Intrm. 310, 311 (Chk. 1994) (Overruled in a February, 1995 case).

Only the nat'l gov't may constitutionally tax income. The states' taxing power does not include the power to tax income.  Truk Continental Hotel,Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 119 (App. 1995).

Rents are income taxable under the FSM Income Tax Statute, and a state tax on gross rental receipts combines to create vertical multiple taxation of a form of income.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 119 (App. 1995).

The name given a tax by a taxing authority is not necessarily controlling as to the type of tax it is.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 119 (App. 1995).

The interval in which a tax is reported and collected and whether it is imposed without regard to profit or loss does not alter whether it is an income tax.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 119 (App. 1995).

If a state wishes to obtain funding from a consumption tax, it can avoid a constitutional confrontation by making the taxable incident the sale or rental transaction, and by expressing the requirement that the tax be paid by the consumer.  Therefore a state tax on the gross rental receipts of a landlord is an unconstitutional tax on income.  Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 117, 120 (App. 1995).

          (f)  to issue and regulate currency;

          (g)  to regulate banking, foreign and interstate commerce, insurance, the issuance and use of commercial paper and securities, bankruptcy and insolvency, and patents and copyrights;

Case annotations:       Interstate and Foreign Commerce

Although foreign and interstate commerce and shipping involve profound nat'l interests, where Congress has not seen fit to assert those interests and there is no nat'l regulation or law to enforce, the fact that a case affects interstate and foreign commerce and shipping is not sufficient to deny abstention if other strong grounds for abstention exist.  Ponape Transfer & Storage, Inc. v.Federated Shipping Co., 4 FSM Intrm. 37, 47 (Pon. 1989).

Questions regarding the validity of the provisions of promissory notes for personal loans, executed with a nat'l bank operating in each state of the FSM and having in part foreign ownership, are closely connected to the powers of the nat'l legislature to regulate banking, foreign and interstate commerce, and bankruptcy, and to establish usury limits, and they have a distinctly nat'l character.  The FSM Supreme Court therefore will formulate and apply rules of nat'l law in assessing such issues.  Bank of Hawaii v. Jack, 4 FSM Intrm. 216, 218 (Pon. 1990).

Power to regulate the incorporation and operation of corporations falls within the constitutional power of the nat'l gov't to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.  Mid-Pac Constr. Co. v. Senda, 4 FSM Intrm. 376, 380 (Pon. 1990).

A municipal license fee ordinance which separately defines banking and insurance businesses and specifically imposes a different rate upon those businesses than would be imposed upon other kinds of businesses on its face appears to be an effort to regulate banking and insurance and is unconstitutional and void.  Actouka v. KoloniaTown, 5 FSM Intrm. 121, 122 (Pon. 1991).

          (h)  to regulate navigation and shipping except within lagoons, lakes, and rivers;

          (i)  to establish usury limits on major loans;

          (j)  to provide for a national postal system;

          (k)  to acquire and govern new territory;

          (l)  to govern the area set aside as the national capital;

           (m)  to regulate the ownership, exploration, and exploitation of natural resources within the marine space of the Federated States of Micronesia beyond 12 miles from island baselines;

          (n)  to establish and regulate a national public service system;

          (o)  to impeach and remove the President, Vice-President, and justices of the Supreme Court;

           (p)  to define national crimes and prescribe penalties, having due regard for local custom and tradition;

Editor's note:  Art. IX, 2(p) was amended by Constitutional Convention Committee Proposal No. 90-13, SD1 which became effective on July 2, 1991.  A copy of this amendment follows this Constitution.

The original language of art. IX, 2(p) was as follows:

"(p)  to define major crimes and prescribe penalties, having due regard for local custom and tradition; and"

Case annotations prior to the effective date of the constitutional amendment interpret art. IX, 2(p) as originally worded.

Case annotations:  . Major Crimes

A simple assault, one without a weapon or the intent to inflict serious bodily injury, is punishable only by six months' imprisonment.  Therefore, it is neither a major crime under the Nat'l Criminal Code, because it does not call for three years' imprisonment, nor a felony.FSM v. Boaz (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 22, 24n.* (Pon. 1981).

Because Congress defined a major crime under the Nat'l Criminal Code as one calling for imprisonment of three years or more and because assaults under Title 11 of the Trust Territory Code are punishable by only six months' imprisonment, it is clear that the assault provisions of the Trust Territory Code are left intact.  FSM v. Boaz (II), 1 FSM Intrm. 28, 30 (Pon. 1981).

Exclusive nat'l gov't jurisdiction over major crimes is not mandated by the Constitution; such jurisdiction would be exclusive in any event only if criminal jurisdiction was a power of indisputably nat'l character.  Truk v.Hartman, 1 FSM Intrm. 174, 181 (Truk 1982).

The Nat'l Criminal Code is an exercise of Congress' power to define and provide penalties for major crimes. FSM Const. art. IX, 2(p).  In re Otokichy, 1 FSM Intrm. 183, 187 (App. 1982).

The Weapons Control Act violations punishable by imprisonment of three or more years are nat'l crimes.  Joker v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 38,41 (App. 1985).

In light of the Constitution's Transition Clause, action by the FSM Congress is not necessary in order to establish that violations of the Weapons Control Act are prohibited within the FSM.  The only question is whether those are state or nat. l law prohibitions or both.  If the definition of major crimes in the Nat. l Criminal Code bears upon the Weapons Control Act at all, it is only for that purpose of allocating between state and nat. l law.  Joker v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 38,43 (App. 1985).

The Weapons Control Act seems well attuned to the recognition of shared nat'l-state interest in maintaining an orderly society and the goal of cooperation in law enforcement as reflected in the Major Crimes Clause, art. IX, 2(p) of the Constitution as well as the Joint Law Enforcement Act, 12 FSMC 1201.  Joker v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 38, 44 (App. 1985).

The Major Crimes Clause, with its admonition to Congress to have due regard for local custom and tradition, unmistakably reflects awareness of the framers that Congress would be empowered under this clause to regulate crimes that would require consideration of local custom and tradition.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 57 (App. 1985).

Departure from the form of the U.S. Constitution reveals an intention by the framers of the FSM Constitution to depart from the substance as well, so far as major crimes are concerned.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 58 (App. 1985).

Major crimes obviously were not viewed by the framers as simply a local or state problem. The Major Crimes Clause undoubtedly reflects their judgment that the very integrity of this new nation could be threatened if major crimes could be committed with impunity in any part of the nation, with the nat'l gov't forced helplessly to stand aside.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 58 (App. 1985).

The framers of the Constitution stipulated that the line for determining whether a crime is major be drawn on the basis of severity or gravity of the crime rather than by reference to principles of federalism developed under the U.S. Constitution.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 58 (App. 1985).

The members of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention obviously did not believe the Major Crimes Clause was improperly at odds with their general view that governmental power should be less centralized under the FSM Constitution than it had been in Trust Territory days.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 59 (App. 1985).

The scope of state police powers under the FSM Constitution must be determined by reference to the powers of the nat'l gov't under the Major Crimes Clause.  It follows that legitimate exercise of the nat'l gov't power to define major crimes can not be viewed as an unconstitutional encroachment upon the police powers of the states.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 59 (App. 1985).

The precise line to be drawn in defining major crimes is to be determined by Congress.  The policy determined in the Constitutional Convention was that the major-minor crimes distinction be based on the severity of the crime; and that local custom be taken into account.  Tammow v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 53, 60 (App. 1985).

Even where the parties have not asserted that any principle of custom or tradition applies, the Court has an obligation of its own to consider custom and tradition.  Semens v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.(I), 2 FSM Intrm. 131, 140 (Pon. 1985).

The general rule of criminal procedure is that jurisdiction over a particular crime places in the trial division the necessary authority to find a defendant guilty of any offense necessarily included in the offense charged.  Kosrae v. Tosie, 4 FSM Intrm. 61, 63 (Kos. 1989).

Under the constitutional and statutory framework of the FSM, the FSM Supreme Court trial division, when exercising jurisdiction over cases reasonably initiated as major crimes charges, may also exercise jurisdiction over lesser included offenses prohibited by state law.Kosrae v.Tosie, 4 FSM Intrm. 61, 65 (Kos. 1989).

Rather than rely heavily on United States precedent for guidance in establishing principles of federalism in matters of criminal regulation, the FSM Supreme Court is under an affirmative obligation to develop approaches suited to permit implementation of the nat'l major crime responsibilities identified by Congress.  Kosrae v. Tosie, 4 FSM Intrm. 61, 65 (Kos. 1989).

In the course of the formation of the FSM, the allocation of responsibilities between states and nation was such that the impact of the nat'l courts in criminal matters was to be in the area of major crimes and as the ultimate arbiter of human rights issues.  Hawk v. Pohnpei, 4 FSM Intrm. 85, 93 (App. 1989).

                      National Crimes

The intent of the Constitutional Convention is that major crimes, as defined by Congress and committed prior to voter ratification, fall within the jurisdiction of the nat'l gov't and may be prosecuted pursuant to the nat'l law after the effective date of the amendment.  In re Ress, 5 FSM Intrm. 273, 276 (Chk. 1992).

The nat'l court should not abstain from deciding a criminal case where the crime took place before the effective date of the 1991 amendment removing federal jurisdiction over major crimes because of the firmly expressed intention by the Constitutional Convention delegates as to the manner of transition from nat'l jurisdiction to state jurisdiction.  In re Ress, 5 FSM Intrm. 273, 276 (Chk. 1992).

Where the crimes charged are no longer those expressly delegated to Congress to define, or are not indisputedly of a nat'l character the FSM Supreme Court has no subject matter jurisdiction.  FSM v. Jano, 6 FSM Intrm. 9, 11 (Pon. 1993).

Ever since the ratification of the constitutional amendment removed from Congress the power to define "major crimes" and substituted for it the power to define "national crimes" the nat'l gov't has had no general criminal jurisdiction.  That jurisdiction now lies with the states.  In re Extradition of Jano, 6 FSM Intrm. 93, 102 (App. 1993).

Congress has not unconstitutionally delegated its authority to define crimes by delegating to an executive agency the power to enter into fishing agreements because congressional approval is needed for these agreements to take effect.  FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (I), 7 FSM Intrm. 124, 127 (Pon. 1995).

          (q)  to override a Presidential veto by not less than a 3/4 vote of all the state delegations, each delegation casting one vote; and

          (r)  to promote education and health by setting minimum standards, coordinating state activities relating to foreign assistance, providing training and assistance to the states and providing support for post-secondary educational programs and projects.

Editor's note:  Art. IX, 2(r) was added by Constitutional Convention Committee Proposal No. 90-25, CD1, SD1which became effective on July 2, 1991.  A copy of this amendment follows this Constitution.

Case annotations:  The nature of the expressly delegated powers in art. IX, 2, of the Constitution--including the power to impose taxes, to provide for the nat. l defense, ratify treaties, regulate immigration and citizenship, regulate currency, foreign commerce and navigation, and to provide for a postal system--strongly suggests that they are intended to be the exclusive province of the nat'l gov't, since they call for a uniform nationally coordinated approach.  Innocenti v. Wainit, 2 FSM Intrm. 173, 181-82 (App. 1986).

      Section 3.  The following powers may be exercised concurrently by Congress and the states:

          (a)  to appropriate public funds;

          (b)  to borrow money on the public credit; and

          (c)  to establish systems of social security and public welfare.

Editor's note:  Art. IX, 3 was amended by Constitutional Convention Committee Proposal No. 90-25, CD1, SD1 which became effective on July 2, 1991.  A copy of this amendment follows this Constitution.

The original language of art. IX, 3 formerly included a subsection (c) which read as follows:

"(c)  to promote education and health; and"

      Section 4.  A treaty is ratified by vote of 2/3 of the members of Congress, except that a treaty delegating major powers of government of the Federated States of Micronesia to another government shall also require majority approval by the legislatures of 2/3 of the states.

      Section 5.  National taxes shall be imposed uniformly.  Not less than 50% of the revenues shall be paid into the treasury of the state where collected.

      Section 6.  Net revenue derived from ocean floor mineral resources exploited under Section 2(m) shall be divided equally between the national government and the appropriate state government.

      Section 7.   The President, Vice-President, or a justice of the Supreme Court may be removed from office for treason, bribery, or conduct involving corruption in office by a 2/3 vote of the members of Congress.  When the President or Vice-President is removed, the Supreme Court shall review the decision.  When a justice of the Supreme Court is removed, the decision shall be reviewed by a special tribunal composed of one state court judge from each state appointed by the state chief executive.  The special tribunal shall meet at the call of the President.

      Section 8.  The Congress consists of one member elected at large from each state on the basis of state equality, and additional members elected from congressional districts in each state apportioned by population.  Members elected on the basis of state equality serve for a 4-year term, and all other members for 2 years.  Each member has one vote, except on the final reading of bills.  Congressional elections are held biennially as provided by statute.

      Section 9.  A person is ineligible to be a member of Congress unless he is at least 30 years of age on the day of election and has been a citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia for at least 15 years, and a resident of the state from which he is elected for at least 5 years.  A person convicted of a felony by a state or national government court is ineligible to be a member of Congress.  The Congress may modify this provision or prescribe additional qualifications; knowledge of the English language may not be a qualification.

Case annotations:  While the Constitution makes ineligible for election to Congress persons convicted of felonies in FSM courts, the Constitution gives to Congress the power to modify that ineligibility by statute.  Robert v. Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 394, 398 (App. 1994).

Congress has the Constitutional power to prescribe, by statute, additional qualifications for eligibility for election to Congress beyond those found in the Constitution.  Such additional qualifications must be consistent with the rest of the Constitution.  Knowledge of English may not be a qualification.  Robert v.Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 394, 399 (App. 1994).

Congress, not the FSM Supreme Court, has the constitutional power to make persons granted a pardon of a felony conviction eligible for election to Congress.  The court cannot exercise a power reserved to Congress.  Robert v. Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 394, 401 (App. 1994).

     Section 10.  At least every 10 years Congress shall reapportion itself.  A state is entitled to at least one member of Congress on the basis of population in addition to the member elected at large.  A state shall apportion itself by law into single member congressional districts.  Each district shall be approximately equal in population after giving due regard to language, cultural, and geographic differences.

     Section 11.  A state may provide that one of its seats is set aside for a traditional leader who shall be chosen as provided by statute for a two-year term, in lieu of one representative elected on the basis of population.  The number of congressional districts shall be reduced and reapportioned accordingly.

     Section 12.  A vacancy in Congress is filled for the unexpired term.  In the absence of provision by law, an unexpired term is filled by special election, except that an unexpired term of less than one year is filled by appointment by the state chief executive.

       Section 13.  A member of Congress may not hold another public office or employment.  During the term for which he is elected and three years thereafter, a member may not be elected or appointed to a public office or employment created by national statute during his term.  A member may not engage in any activity which conflicts with the proper discharge of his duties.  The Congress may prescribe further restrictions.

Case annotation:  Where plaintiffs seek to challenge issuance to a third party of a permit which plaintiffs reasonably allege will cause them harm, and where they allege that the actions of a nat'l senator were crucial to issuance of the permit, those plaintiffs have standing to be heard on the question of whether the senator's membership on the board is violative of the "incompatibility clause,"  art. IX, 3 of the FSM Constitution.  Aisek v. FSM Foreign Investment Board, 2 FSM Intrm. 95, 101 (Pon. 1985).

     Section 14.  The Congress may prescribe an annual salary and allowances for members.  An increase of salary may not apply to the Congress enacting it.

     Section 15.  A member of Congress is privileged from arrest during his attendance at Congress and while going to and from sessions, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.  A member answers only to Congress for his statements in Congress.

     Section 16.  The Congress shall meet in regular, public session as prescribed by statute.  A special session may be convened at the call of the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, or by the presiding officer on the written request of 2/3 of the members.

     Section 17.
           (a)  The Congress shall be the sole judge of the elections and qualifications of its members, may discipline a member, and, by 2/3 vote, may suspend or expel a member.

Case annotations:  Where there is in Constitution a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch of gov't, such as Congress being the sole judge of the elections of its members, it is a nonjusticiable political question not to be decided by the court because of separation of powers provided for in Constitution.  Aten v. National Election Comm'r (III), 6 FSM Intrm. 143, 145 (App. 1993).

          (b)  The Congress may determine its own rules of procedure and choose a presiding officer from among its members.

          (c)  The Congress may compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documents or other matters before Congress or any of its committees.

Case annotations:  Legislative power to investigate is not unlimited.  There is no general authority to expose private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the legislature, and right to privacy embodied in Article III, section 3 of the Chuuk Constitution is a restraint on the investigative power of the legislature.  In re Legislative Subpoena, 7 FSM Intrm. 261, 265 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

Legislature's investigative powers are greatest when it is inquiring into and publicizing corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies or branches of gov't.  In re Legislative Subpoena, 7 FSM Intrm. 261, 265 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

     Section 18.  A majority of the members is a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and compel the attendance of absent members.

     Section 19.  The Congress shall keep and publish a journal of its proceedings.  A roll call vote entered on the journal shall be taken at the request of 1/5 of the members present.  Legislative proceedings shall be conducted in the English language.  A member may use his own language if not fluent in English, and Congress shall provide translation.

     Section 20.  To become law, a bill must pass 2 readings on separate days.  To pass first reading a 2/3 vote of all members is required.  On final reading each state delegation shall cast one vote and a 2/3 vote of all the delegations is required.  All votes shall be entered on the journal.

     Section 21.
           (a)  The Congress may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill.  The enacting clause of a bill is "BE IT ENACTED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA:"  A bill may embrace but one subject expressed in its title.  A provision outside the subject expressed in the title is void.

          (b)  A law may not be amended or revised by reference to its title only.  The law as revised or section as amended shall be published and re-enacted at full length.

     Section 22.  A bill passed by Congress shall be presented to the President for approval.  If he disapproves of the bill, he shall return it with his objections to Congress within 10 days.  If Congress has 10 or less days remaining in its session, or has adjourned, he shall return the bill within 30 days after presentation.  If the President does not return a bill within the appropriate period, it becomes law as if approved.