CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018)
CHUUK STATE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANDER JOSE,
Defendant.
CSSC-CRIMINAL CASE NO. 091-2017
ORDER REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN
DEFENDANT'S PLEA
Camillo Noket
Chief Justice
Hearing: March 28, May 23, 2018
Decided: May 28, 2018
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Sherry Jane Edmond
State Prosecutor
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants:
Charleston L. Bravo
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 1555
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
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A statutory provision's plain meaning must be given effect whenever possible. Because issues of statutory construction are issues of law, courts have final authority over them and the court will construe and give effect to the provisions' plain meaning. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
A court should construe a statute as the legislature intended. Legislative intent is determined by the statute's wording – what a legislature says in a statute's text is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
A court must give effect to a statutory provision's plain meaning whenever possible. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
Chuuk State Law No. 13-16-12 amended the sentencing provisions for some of the most violent felonies listed within Chuuk State Law No. 6-66 in order to help courts impose stiffer sentences on the convicted violators so as to help deter future criminal tendencies and involvement. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The commonly understood meaning of the term "imprisonment,” and its definition in both legal and regular dictionaries, is confining someone in prison or jail, and these definitions consistently allude to detention or captivity within a structure, as opposed to "suspended sentences," but the scope of imprisonment possibly includes house arrest, since it is a type of lawful restraint upon movement. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
Chuuk courts have consistently relied on the discretionary authority vested upon them under Section 1110, to suspend the execution of sentences that the court imposed. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 570 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
A Chuuk court may direct that the execution of the whole or any part of a sentence of imprisonment it imposes be suspended on such terms as to good behavior and on such conditions as the court may think proper. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 570 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When the statute never defines imprisonment, the plain meaning of the term governs, which could leave the possibility of defining imprisonment to include house arrest, but the statute's context narrows the definition of imprisonment to refer only to confinement in jail. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 570 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When the statute requires that a defendant convicted of murder be sentenced to a minimum of term of not less than 40 year(s), and eligible for parole after 20, the term imprisonment, as used within the statute, means a punishment of not less than 40 years in prison. Otherwise, the term parole is left meaningless, since it can only refer to release from prison, as opposed to house arrest, or the lifting of a suspended sentence. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
Parole is the conditional release of prisoners before they complete their sentence. Paroled prisoners are supervised by a parole officer. If paroled prisoners violate their release conditions, they may be returned to prison. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The commonly understood meaning of parole is the conditional release from prison. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When a statute states that "a person convicted under this Section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years," has consistently been interpreted to refer to the imposition of sentences, leaving the court the opportunity to suspend the execution of its imposed jail terms for sexual abuse, but when the punishment provision was amended to "not less than five years" instead of "not more than five years" imprisonment and the punishment section’s wording otherwise remains the same, therefore, although imprisonment means jail term, the mandated punishment refers to the imposition of such jail term as opposed to its execution. Therefore, courts may still suspend such sentences. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When the amended statute added some additional subsections requiring that the defendant serve a minimum five-year sentence, the "shall serve" within this provision refers to the execution of a sentence. But when the notable term missing within the paragraph is "jail" sentence, the court must impose a five-year imprisonment term, which it may then suspend in whole or in part, although the defendant is required to serve a five-year sentence. Since the provision lacks the term "jail" before "sentence," it only requires the court to impose at least a five-year jail sentence – which the court may then suspend by virtue of its discretionary power. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571-72 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
Only those sections that contain a provision which mandates that defendant shall serve a mandatory x year jail sentence supersede § 1110 and thereby actually remove the court's equitable power to suspend such jail sentence. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 572 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
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CAMILLO NOKET, Chief Justice:
After Defendant Ander Jose pleaded guilty of one count of "Sexual Abuse," the State and Defense counsel presented their sentencing recommendations to the Court. Defense recommended a five year suspended sentence while the State recommended a three year jail term followed by a two year suspended sentence.
The Sentencing Recommendations within the Plea Agreement present this Court with two issues:
1. Whether the term "imprisonment," as defined within the context of CSL 13-16-12; includes within its scope suspended sentences and house-arrests, as opposed to merely incarceration in a jail?
2. Whether Section 1110 of CSL 6-66 continues to vest the Court with the authority to suspend
the execution of sentences for a first offense under Section 404 as amended by CSL 13-16-12?
A. Statutory Construction
The plain meaning of a statutory provision must be given effect whenever possible. Setik v. FSM, 5 FSM R. 407, 410 (App. 1992). "Because issues of statutory construction . . . are issues of law, courts have final authority over them . . . and the court will construe and give effect to the provisions' plain meaning." Chuuk State Bd. of Educ. v. Sony, 17 FSM R. 56, 60 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2010) (Tasked with defining vacancy, the Court explained that the word vacancy within a statute shall be given its plain meaning unless the statute defined the word otherwise – which it did).
Further, a court should construe a statute as the legislature intended. FSM v. Wainit, 12 FSM R. 105, 111 (Chk. 2003). Legislative intent is determined by the statute's wording. Id. What a legislature says in a statute's text is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Bank of the FSM, 11 FSM Intrm. 367, 379 (App. 2003)); see also FSM Social Sec. Admin. v. Kingtex (FSM) Inc., 8 FSM Intrm. 129, 131 (App. 1997). Thus a court must give effect to the plain meaning of a statutory provision whenever possible. Id.
B. CSL 13-16-12 and Section 404 of CSL 6-66
On November 1, 2016, Governor Elimo signed Chuuk State Law (CSL) 13-16-12 into effect after the legislature responded to an apparent increase in violent crime throughout Chuuk. CSL 13-16-12 amended the sentencing provisions for some of the most violent felonies listed within CSL 6-66 to "help Courts impose stiffer sentences on the convicted violators . . . [so as] to help deter future criminal tendencies and involvement." Chk. S.L. No. 13-16-12, pmbl. Neither CSL 13-16-12 amendments nor CSL 6-66 define the term imprisonment.
The applicable sentencing provision of Section 404 (for sexual abuse), within CSL 6-66 prior to the amendment read: A person convicted under this Section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. As amended, a person convicted under this section (for sexual abuse) shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 5 years or a fine of not less than $5,000, or both.
C. "Imprisonment as Commonly Understood"
Generally, both legal and regular dictionaries define imprisonment as "confining someone in prison/jail." See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2 ed. 2008); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, available at: https://thelawdictionary.org/imprison/; Dictionary.com, available at: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/imprisonment; MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/imprisonment;ENGLISH-COLLINS DICTIONARY, available at: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/imprisonment; OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/imprisonment. Most variances within the definition, including footnoted passages such as "restriction on freedom," generally reference the concept of "false imprisonment" – a situation where a private party wrongfully restrains another against that other's will. However, these dictionaries consistently allude to detention or captivity, within a structure as opposed to "suspended sentences." These dictionaries therefore may define the scope of imprisonment to possibly include house arrest, since it is a type of lawful restraint upon movement.
Notably, the Court's exhaustive search has revealed no dictionary that includes within its
definitions of imprisonment, terms such as: suspended sentences or threats of being placed in jail at a later time. Instead, the definitions all clearly allude to confinement.
D. Section 1110 of CSL 6-66
During their sentencing process, Courts in Chuuk have consistently relied on the discretionary authority vested upon them under Section 1110, to suspend the execution of sentences that the Court imposed. "The court which imposes a sentence upon a person convicted of a criminal offense may direct that the execution of the whole or any part of a sentence of imprisonment imposed by it shall be suspended on such terms as to good behavior and on such conditions as the court may think proper to impose." Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 1110.
On December 15, 2017, the State charged Defendant Ander Jose with one Count of Sexual Assault in violation of CSL 6-66 § 403 as amended by CSL 13-16-12 and one Count of Sexual Abuse in violation of CSL 6-66 § 404 as amended by CSL 13-16-12. Defendant pleaded "not guilty" to both counts. The matter proceeded to trial on March 8, 2018, where the parties concurred to a plea agreement where Defendant changed his plea to guilty as to one count of "Sexual Abuse" in exchange for the State dismissing one count of "Sexual Assault." On March 23, 2018, the State submitted its sentencing recommendation: a three year jail term followed by a two year suspended sentence. On March 28, 2018 the Court held a hearing where Defense submitted its sentencing recommendation: a five year suspended sentence. At the hearing, the Court questioned the parties as to the definition of the term imprisonment, as used in the sentencing guidelines with CSL 6-66 as amended by CSL 13-16-12. The Court then instructed the parties to submit briefs on the subject by April 13, 2018 and response briefs by May 1, 2018. The Court continued the hearing to May 23, 2018 at 9:30 a.m., where the parties made oral arguments.
A. Chuuk State Law No. 13-16-12
As CSL 13-16-12 never defined imprisonment, the plain meaning of the term governs. Although dictionary definitions have clearly rejected the notion of "suspended sentences," they have left the possibility of defining imprisonment to include house arrest. The context of CSL 13-16-12, however, narrows the definition of imprisonment to refer only to confinement in jail.
Throughout the entire statute, the words "imprisonment" and "jail sentence" are used interchangeably. Examples include: CSL 13-16-12, § 407 "Assault with a Dangerous Weapon": Subsection 2: imprisonment for not less than 5 years . . . (followed by subsection 3) defendant will serve a mandatory five year sentence in addition to any other jail terms the court may impose. Within § 407, the third subsection section clarifies that imprisonment refers to jail terms. "Any other jail terms" directly refers to "sentence," which in turn refers to "imprisonment."
Section 416 on "Manslaughter" parallels § 407, where subsection 2 follows the same structure on the provision of imprisonment and 3 elaborates on jail terms based on the number of victims. "Manslaughter for one victim is punishable by a minimum jail sentence of 5 years."
Section 417 on "Aggravated Assault" again parallels § 407's language. Section 418 on "Sexual Assault" again parallels this language: imprisonment for not less than 3 years, defendant must serve a mandatory 3 year jail term for the first victim, and a minimum 5 years jail term for a second
conviction.
The language within § 404 "Sexual Abuse" lacks a parallel jail sentence and sentencing clause provision compared to the other sections. Subsection 2 provides that "the Defendant be sentenced to no less than 5 years imprisonment or not less than a $5,000 fine or both." It further stipulates that if this is Defendant's "second conviction under the statute, he shall be sentenced to an additional 2 years, in addition to whichever jail term the court imposes." The fact that a jail term is not required for the first offense – but instead can be replaced with a fine over $5,000, generally explains the legislature's decision not to include a repetitive jail sentencing provision within this section a first offense of sexual abuse.
The remaining section,§ 415 "Murder" clearly refers to a jail sentence within the context of imprisonment when it uses "parole" within the same section. Section 415 mandates that Defendant be sentenced upon conviction to a minimum of term of not less than 40 year(s), and eligible for parole after 20.
The Cornell Legal Institute defines parole as: conditional release of prisoners before they complete their sentence. Paroled prisoners are supervised by a . . . parole officer. If paroled prisoners violate the conditions of their release, they may be returned to prison. Parole, THE WEXLER LEGAL DICTIONARY, available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parole.
By virtue of the commonly understood meaning of parole – which is, in short defined as a "conditional release from prison," the term imprisonment has been used within § 415 to mean a punishment of not less than 40 years in prison. Otherwise, the term parole is left meaningless, since it can only refer to release from prison, as opposed to house arrest, or the lifting of a suspended sentence.
All the sections amended by CSL 13-16-12 interchange jail term and imprisonment. The statute never alludes to any other meaning for imprisonment other than incarceration in a jail.
B. The Court's Authority to Suspend Imposed Sentences under CSL 6-66 § 1110
Although the term "imprisonment" refers to jail sentences, the sentencing guidelines under CSL 6-66 § 1110 continue to provide the Court with the equitable option to suspend the execution of any sentence within CSL 6-66 unless a provision within the specific section requires that the Defendant serve a mandatory jail sentence.
The first subsection of the originally phrased § 404, in relevant part, states that "a person convicted under this Section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years." Chuuk State Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to refer to the imposition of sentences. Hence, CSL 6-66 § 1110 applied to this provision and provided the Court's with the opportunity to suspend the execution of its imposed jail terms for § 404. CSL 13-16-12 merely amended the punishment provision to not less than five years instead of not more than five years imprisonment. Otherwise, the wording of the punishment section remains the same. It would defy the basic canons of statutory interpretation to interpret the now amended § 404 to refer to the execution as opposed to the imposition of a sentence when the phrase in question remains unchanged by the amendments. Therefore, although imprisonment means jail term, the mandated punishment refers to the imposition of such jail term as opposed to its execution. Therefore, the Courts may still use § 1110 to suspend such sentences.
CSL 13-16-12 had added some additional subsections to § 404, requiring that the Defendant
serve a minimum 5 year sentence. "Shall serve" within this provision refers to the execution of a sentence. The notable term missing within this paragraph is "jail" sentence. Therefore, the Court must impose a 5 year imprisonment term, which it may then suspend in whole or in part . . . but the Defendant is required to serve a 5 year sentence. Since the provision lacks the term jail before sentence, it only requires the Court to impose at least a five year jail sentence – which the Court may then suspend by virtue of its discretionary power under § 1110. Only those sections that contain a provision which mandates that defendant shall serve a mandatory x year jail sentence supersede § 1110 and therefore actually remove the Court's equitable power to suspend such mandatory jail sentence in the applicable section.
The Court now finds that the term "imprisonment," as defined within the context of CSL 13-16-12, does not include within its scope suspended sentences and house-arrests, as opposed to merely incarceration in a jail. However, this Court finds that Section 1110 of CSL 6-66 continues to vest the Court with the authority to suspend the execution of sentences for a first offense under Section 404 as amended by CSL 13-16-12. Therefore, both the State and Defense have presented this Court with sentencing recommendations in compliance with the law. This Court will now hold a hearing as to whether to accept Defendant's guilty plea on May 31, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. with consideration as to the sentencing recommendations as they now stand.
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