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      This is an appeal from an FSM Supreme Court trial division post-judgment finding of contempt of court for failure to comply with an order in aid of judgment. The appellant, Patricio Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), contends that the trial court: (1) violated Article IV, Section 13 of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia when it sentenced him to serve 60 days in jail pursuant to 6 F.S.M.C. 1412; (2) violated Article IV, Section 10 of the FSM Constitution when it ordered him to seek immediate employment and report to his judgment creditor under threat of contempt; (3) violated 53 F.S.M.C. 604 when it ordered him to pay $65.00 per month to the Bank of the Federated States of Micronesia ("Bank") after he presented evidence that his only source of income was Social Security retirement benefits; and (4) erred by holding that he was in civil contempt based on its conclusion that he had the ability to comply with the court’s April 25, 2000 order and that he had failed to demonstrate that he could not comply with the order.

      We uphold in part, and vacate and remand in part the order of the trial court. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding Rodriguez in contempt based on its conclusion that he had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order and that he had failed to demonstrate that he could not comply with the order. We also hold that the trial court did not violate 53 F.S.M.C. 604 in ordering Rodriguez to pay $65.00 per month to the Bank after he had presented evidence that his only source of income was Social Security retirement benefits. We further hold that the trial court’s contempt order did not violate Rodriguez’s constitutional right against imprisonment for debt. Finally, we hold that the trial court’s order that Rodriguez seek immediate employment is not in violation of the constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude, but that where Rodriguez has submitted evidence that he is unable to work, the trial court must make a finding on Rodriguez’s fitness to work before ordering him to seek immediate employment.

        Accordingly, we vacate those parts of the trial court’s contempt order requiring Rodriguez to seek immediate employment and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court the opportunity to make a finding on the fitness to work issue. We uphold the remainder of the order.

       The defendant below, Patricio Rodriguez, borrowed $7,761.02 from the Bank of the FSM as a consumer loan at an interest rate of 15% per annum. On February 20, 1996, Rodriguez executed a promissory note agreeing to make monthly payments of $377.01 over a period of 23 months and then a final payment of $376.96 for payment on the loan.

       On February 17, 1997, the Bank filed a complaint against Rodriguez seeking $5,749.51, plus interest at the rate of 15% per annum and post-judgment interest of 9% per annum for the nonpayment of the promissory note. On April 7, 1997, the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $5,749.51, plus interest at the rate of 15% per annum from October 25, 1996 to the entry of the judgment, plus post-judgment interest of 9% per annum.

       On March 7, 2000, the Bank filed a motion for order in aid of judgment. After a hearing on April 19, 2000, the trial court entered an order in aid of judgment in favor of the Bank on April 25, 2000, which provided that Rodriguez would make monthly payments of $65.00 until the amount of the parties’ stipulated judgment was paid in full. On August 18, 2000, after having received only one payment of $65.00 from Rodriguez, the Bank filed a motion for order to show cause against Rodriguez based on his alleged failure to comply with the trial court’s April 25, 2000 order.

       On February 22, 2001, the trial court held a show cause hearing in which Rodriguez appeared and testified. On May 21, 2001, the trial court found Rodriguez in contempt of the April 25, 2000 order pursuant to 6 F.S.M.C. 1412. The court ordered Rodriguez: (1) committed to Pohnpei State jail for 60 days, but it suspended the entire sentence upon the condition that Rodriguez pay the Bank $65.00 per month commencing June 1, 2001, and continue such payments until he satisfies the balance; (2) if unemployed, to seek employment immediately and to report to the Bank once he obtains such employment; and (3) to pay the Bank $127.50 for attorneys’ fees. The trial court warned Rodriguez that his failure to comply with the order would permit the Bank to seek reinstatement of the jail sentence.

       Rodriguez responded to the trial court’s May 21, 2001 order by noticing this appeal on June 27, 2001, and requesting an automatic stay of his jail sentence pending appeal. On July 16, 2001, the trial court issued a stay of Rodriguez’s jail term pending this appeal.

The issues presented are as follows:

       1. Did the trial court err when it ruled that Rodriguez was in civil contempt based on its finding that he had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order in aid of judgment and that he failed to demonstrate that he could not comply with the order?

       2. Did the trial court’s May 21, 2001 order compelling Rodriguez to pay $65.00 per month to the Bank, after Rodriguez presented evidence that his only source of income was Social Security retirement benefits, violate the susceptibility of benefits provision of 53 F.S.M.C. 604?

       3. Did the trial court’s May 21, 2001 order sentencing Rodriguez to 60 days in jail pursuant to 6 F.S.M.C. 1412 violate the prohibition against imprisonment for debt found in Article IV, Section 13 of the FSM Constitution?

       4. Did the trial court’s May 21, 2001 order compelling Rodriguez to seek immediate employment and report to the Bank once he obtained such employment under threat of contempt violate the prohibition against involuntary servitude found in Article IV, Section 10 of the FSM Constitution?

1. Rodriguez’s Ability to Comply with April 25, 2000 Order

       Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred when it held him in civil contempt based on its findings that he had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order in aid of judgment and that he had failed to demonstrate that he could not comply with the order.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       Before a trial court can hold a defendant in civil contempt of court for violating an order in aid of judgment on a debt, it must find that the alleged contemnor both knew of the court order and had the ability to comply with that order. Hadley v. Bank of Hawaii, 7 FSM Intrm. 449, 452-53 (App. 1996).

       This court has traditionally placed the burden on the movant to show that the debtor has the ability to comply. This has been deemed reasonable in light of the fact that in the FSM debtors usually

appear pro se and creditors do not. Once this burden has been met, it is then the debtor’s burden to show that he no longer has the ability to comply through no fault of his own despite his exercise of due diligence. Id. at 449, 452-53.

       The statutory remedy for violations of an order in aid of judgment, 6 F.S.M.C. 1412, provides:

(emphasis added.)1

        The inability of a judgment debtor to comply with an order in aid of judgment without fault on his part after his exercise of due diligence constitutes "good cause" within the meaning of 6 F.S.M.C. 1412. Hadley, 7 FSM Intrm. at 452-53.

       A finding that a judgment debtor is in civil contempt under 6 F.S.M.C. 1412 will be set aside on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 452. In determining whether a factual finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. The reviewing court will set aside a finding of fact only where there is no credible evidence in the record to support that finding, in part because the trial court had the opportunity to view the witnesses and the manner of their testimony. If, upon viewing all the evidence in the record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, it may then conclude that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous, but it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 452.

B. Knowledge of the Order

       In its May 21, 2001 order, which held Rodriguez in contempt, the trial court found that Rodriguez knew he was obligated to make monthly payments of $65.00 to the Bank. That finding was based upon the fact that he was in court when the order in aid of judgment was issued. Also when specifically asked by his counsel, "You understand that you do have a judgment against you from the Bank in this case, is that right?" Rodriguez replied, "Yes." Transcript at 15 (Feb. 22, 2001). The trial court’s finding that Rodriguez knew of the court order is not disputed by Rodriguez.

C. Present Ability to Comply with Order

       The trial court also found that Rodriguez still had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order in aid of judgment, which stated:

his needs and those of his dependents .

Order at 1 (Apr. 25, 2000) (emphasis added).

       Under the Hadley test, the Bank had the burden of proving that Rodriguez had the present ability to comply. The trial court concluded that this burden had been met, as it specifically stated that "defendant knew of and had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2001 Order" Order at 4 (May 21, 2001). The trial court also noted that at the April 19, 2000 hearing, Rodriguez was specifically found to have the ability to pay $65.00 per month to the Bank.

       The record indicates that Rodriguez was receiving around $424.002 per month in Social Security retirement benefits and that there had been no significant change in his general circumstances since the April 19, 2000 hearing.3 The record shows that Rodriguez was specifically questioned on matters relating to his income and expenses at the order to show cause hearing held on February 22, 2001. This questioning indicated that there had been no reduction in his Social Security retirement benefits,4 that he was suffering from the same illness he had during the April 19, 2000 hearing,5 and that there had been no change in the amount of children he was supporting.6

       Rodriguez was also questioned regarding his basic living expenses with regard to food, power, water, and telephone. There was no testimony from Rodriguez of any specific increases in these expenses and he was unable to supply specific figures for such things as the average monthly expenses for supporting his children,7 the average monthly food costs for his family,8 or his monthly payments

for power,9 even though he was specifically asked about these expenses.

        There was testimony from Rodriguez that he owed money for power and that his telephone had been disconnected, but again he supplied no specific dollar amounts that he owed for power, nor details on the circumstances of his telephone being disconnected.

        Rodriguez was also asked whether he had any other expenses, aside from power, water, telephone, and food. He mentioned the expenses of taking care of his children, again without specific figures.10 He did not mention any other additional expenses, other than the basic expenses that had already been discussed.

       Rodriguez also testified regarding his illness. There was testimony that he has a heart ailment that required the installation of a pace maker. Rodriguez testified that he is on medication, but that the costs of the medication do not come from his household income.11 There was testimony that he had not paid for the medical fees and costs of his prior treatment, but that those may have been paid by the Pohnpei State government.12 There was also testimony that Rodriguez was scheduled to receive medical treatment in the Philippines and that his plane ticket would be covered through the sale of some items belonging to him, specifically mentioned was a boat.

       Based on the line of questioning and the record, the trial court concluded that Rodriguez had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order in aid of judgment. We cannot conclude here that there was no credible evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding and that it was clearly erroneous. The record indicates that Rodriguez’s general situation had not changed from the April 19, 2000 hearing and there was no testimony by Rodriguez indicating any increases in his basic living expenses or of any new expenses which would support a finding that he could no longer meet the $65.00 monthly payments required by the April 25, 2000 order. Due to this, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the trial court on this finding.

D. Noncompliance with Order Despite Reasonable Efforts to Comply

       The trial court further found that Rodriguez had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order, but wilfully failed to do so. The trial court stated: "The Court is of the opinion that defendant has not established that his inability to comply with the April 25, 2000 Order was due entirely to his inability to render obedience. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he has made in good faith ‘all reasonable efforts to comply’ with that order." Order at 4 (May 21, 2001).

        We examine the record for evidence that demonstrates that Rodriguez made all reasonable efforts to comply with the April 25, 2000 order. Under the Hadley test, the burden to show this fell upon Rodriguez. The record shows that Rodriguez had made only one monthly payment of $65.00 and this payment was made by other family members while he was on medical referral in the Philippines. There is nothing else in the record showing any effort by Rodriguez to meet and make the monthly payments as ordered by the trial court.

       As noted above, Rodriguez did not provide any specific figures indicating how much he paid per month for food, power, and expenses for his dependent children even though he was specifically asked about this. He could not say how much he was in debt for power, nor did he provide specifics surrounding the disconnection of his telephone. Additionally, he gave no testimony regarding increases in his basic expenses, nor did he bring up any additional expenses which might have explained why he could not meet the monthly payments to the Bank.

       In sum, Rodriguez demonstrated a consistent lack of knowledge regarding his family’s basic living expenses, and we find nothing in the record showing that any effort was made by Rodriguez to make the payments under the April 25, 2000 order. We therefore conclude that the trial court’s finding that Rodriguez had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he had in good faith made all reasonable efforts to make the required $65.00 per month payments was supported by the record and was not clearly erroneous.

       For the aforementioned reasons, we uphold the trial court’s findings that Rodriguez had the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order and that he had failed to demonstrate that he could not comply with the order.

2. Susceptibility of Social Security benefits under 53 F.S.M.C. 604

       Rodriguez contends that his rights under 53 F.S.M.C. 604 were violated when the trial court ordered him to pay $65.00 per month to the Bank after he presented evidence that his only source of income was Social Security retirement benefits.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

        This is an issue on the application of a statutory provision, and thus, an issue of law that we review de novo on appeal. Nanpei v. Kihara, 7 FSM Intrm. 319, 323-24 (App. 1995).

        The provision at issue, F.S.M.C., Title 53, Section 604 states: "The benefits, the employees and employer contributions, and the securities in the several funds from all taxes presently or hereinafter levied shall not be subject to execution, attachment, or garnishment and shall be nonassignable except as specifically provided in this subtitle." (emphasis added).13

B. Statutory Interpretation

       The statutory provision set forth above is very specific and provides that Social Security benefits shall not be subject to execution, attachment, or garnishment and shall not be assignable except as provided in the FSM Social Security Act.

       Both execution14 and attachment15 are legal processes carried out by writ. Likewise, garnishment is carried out by writ issued pursuant to 4 F.S.M.C. 117,16 6 F.S.M.C. 1404,17 and 6 F.S.M.C. 1405 (see supra note 15). Bank of Guam v. Elwise, 4 FSM Intrm. 150 (Pon. 1989).

       The plain meaning of a statutory provision must be given effect whenever possible. Setik v. FSM, 5 FSM Intrm. 407, 410 (App. 1992). Courts should not broaden statutes beyond the meaning of the law as written. Joy Enterprises, Inc. v. Pohnpei Utilities Corp., 8 FSM Intrm. 306, 310 (Pon. 1998).

       In this case, none of the three methods specifically listed in 53 F.S.M.C. 604 for enforcing a judgment has been applied to Rodriguez’s Social Security retirement benefits, nor has an assignment been made of such benefits.

       Rodriguez’s Social Security retirement benefits are received by him and have not been subjected to any sort of direct levy, allotment or garnishment, nor is there any execution, attachment, or assignment of these benefits. These Social Security retirement benefits may be commingled with any other income Rodriguez may have available to him, and from these funds he may meet his living expenses and any of his other obligations. The trial court’s April 25, 2000 order in aid of judgment does not require that payment of the $65.00 per month come from any particular source of income.

C. Comparison with United States Statute

       Rodriguez points to the United States Social Security statute, 42 U.S.C.S. § 407(b), which states in pertinent part: "no benefits or other rights under these [social security and retirement] programs can be made subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal processes . . . ." See 42 U.S.C.S. § 407(b) (emphasis added.).

       The role of the court in this case is to construe the relevant statute as the legislature intended. Legislative intent is determined, first and foremost, by the wording of the statute. The text of the statute is considered the best evidence of legislative intent or will. Thus, we must give effect to the plain meaning of a statutory provision whenever possible. FSM Social Sec. Admin. v. Kingtex (FSM) Inc., 8 FSM Intrm. 129, 131 (App. 1997).

       We observe here that 53 F.S.M.C. 604 does not contain the broader language of, "or other legal processes" and therefore cannot be interpreted in a manner which is identical to the United States statute.18 The FSM provision is more restrictive than the United States provision, as it protects Social Security benefits specifically from execution, attachment, garnishment, and assignment. It does not protect such benefits from legal processes not specifically enumerated.

D. Policy of Social Security Act Advanced

Section 602 of the FSM Social Security Act provides that:

(emphasis added).

       The procedures followed by the trial court and its specific findings in its April 25, 2000 order

in aid of judgment indicate that the trial court’s actions were in accordance with the policies set forth in 53 F.S.M.C. 604. The trial court specifically found that Rodriguez could make the payments of $65.00 per month to the Bank "while still retaining sufficient funds for his needs and those of his dependents." Order at 1 (April 25, 2000).

       We hold that in this case there is no violation of the susceptibility of benefits rule as set forth in 53 F.S.M.C. 604, where there has been no execution, attachment, garnishment, or assignment of Rodriguez’s Social Security retirement benefits and where the trial court specifically found that Rodriguez would have sufficient funds for his and his dependents’ basic support.

3. Prohibition on Imprisonment for Debt Under FSM Constitution Article IV, Section 13

A. Ripeness Issue

        We first address the issue of ripeness19 raised by the Bank. The Bank contends that the trial court did not actually impose the jail sentence, but merely stated that it would entertain a motion from the Bank to impose the sentence if Rodriguez did not begin making payments. We find that the trial court imposed a specific sentence and specific conditions that must be met for Rodriguez to avoid imposition of that sentence. We further recognize that the finding of contempt is final and appealable pursuant to 4 F.S.M.C. 119(3),20 and that the legality of the specific sanction of imprisonment should be reviewed at the same time in the interest of judicial economy. We therefore hold that this issue is ripe for appellate review.

B. Constitutional Provision; History and Intent

       Rodriguez contends that the trial court violated Article IV, Section 13, of the FSM Constitution when it sentenced him to serve 60 days in jail21 pursuant to 6 F.S.M.C. 1412.

       The constitutionality of imprisonment resulting from a contempt order that sanctions a debtor for violating an order in aid of judgment presents an issue of first impression for this court.

       Article IV, Section 13 of the FSM Constitution states: "Imprisonment for debt is prohibited." In interpreting a constitutional provision, a court must initially analyze the actual words of the constitution. If those words are clear and permit only one possible result, then the court should go no

further. Tafunsak v. Kosrae, 7 FSM Intrm. 344, 347 (App. 1995) (interpreting Kosrae Constitution).

       While Article IV, Section 13 is simply stated, the word "debt" is subject to various definitions. Since this provision is not clear and does not permit only one possible result, we should next consult the Journal of the Constitutional Convention to ascertain the intent of the framers in drafting this language. Tafunsak, 7 FSM Intrm. at 347; Robert v. Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 394, 397 (App. 1994).

        The Journal of the Constitutional Convention in SCREP No. 57, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 884-85 provides some insight into the intent of the framers on this constitutional provision. During the Constitutional Convention, the Committee on Civil Liberties described Comm. Pro. No. 34 regarding imprisonment for debt in SCREP. No. 57 (page 884 to 885 of Volume II). This standing committee report provides, in pertinent part:

SCREP No. 57, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 884-85 (emphasis added). 22

C. Civil Contempt Under the Statute and Constitutional Analysis

       The possibility of imprisonment faced by Rodriguez proceeds from the violation of an order in aid of judgment and a finding of Rodriguez to be in civil contempt. The imprisonment sanction is contained in the trial court’s May 21, 2001 order finding Rodriguez in contempt and is made pursuant to 6 F.S.M.C. 1412. The order provides that, if Rodriguez purges his contempt, the sanction does not come into effect.

        One of the questions which arises from the present case is whether the constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt places a restriction on the manner in which 6 F.S.M.C. 1412 is applied, because that statute includes imprisonment as one of the possible sanctions for violations of an order in aid of judgment. We hold that in this case it does not. As in the situation earlier cited in the Journal of the Constitutional Convention in SCREP No. 57, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. regarding

payment decrees in alimony cases, the imprisonment here is for disobeying a binding command of the court.

       The laws of the nation are presumed to be constitutional. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 8 FSM Intrm. 353, 374, 387 (Pon. 1998). Where possible, statutory provisions should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any potential conflicts between the statute and the Constitution. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 76 (Pon. 1985).

       The subject constitutional prohibition is a restriction on the courts against the enforcement of judgments of a certain character, and in this case, does not restrict the exercise of, the power of a court to enforce its lawful orders by imprisonment for contempt. Even where the violation of the order is for failure to make payments for the recovery of a judgment enforceable by an order in aid of judgment, if the order is one which the court could lawfully make, the imprisonment is not for failure to pay the debt, but failure to obey a lawful order of the court.

       We also point out that this case involves civil, not criminal, contempt. 6 F.S.M.C. 1412. Civil contempt is not punishment for the failure to pay a debt. It is a prospective remedial measure designed to encourage, or even coerce, compliance with a lawful court order when the contemnor has been found to have the ability to comply with that order.23 Davis v. Kutta, 10 FSM Intrm. 125, 127 (Chk. 2001). A person sent to jail after being adjudged in civil contempt can get out of jail anytime he or she chooses merely by complying with the court order and thereby purging himself or herself of the contempt. 6 F.S.M.C. 1412 (upon an adjudication of civil contempt, the contemnor "shall be committed to jail until he complies with the order"). Thus, the purpose of an adjudication of civil contempt is to secure compliance with a lawful court order when the contemnor has the ability to do so.

D. "Tainted by Fraud"

       Additionally, the Constitutional Convention records indicate that the prohibition on imprisonment for debt is to bar imprisonment for honest failure to pay contractual debts. The finding of civil contempt in this case necessitates a finding that the defendant failed without good cause to comply. As discussed above, good cause is the inability of a judgment debtor to comply with an order in aid of judgment without fault on his part after his exercise of due diligence. Here the trial court found that Rodriguez wilfully failed to comply with the order in aid of judgment.

       The word "wilful," implies a purpose or willingness to commit the act, and although it does not require a criminal intent, it implies that the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing, and acts freely. A debtor who knows that he is under the order of the court to pay an amount certain, has the ability to pay the amount, and still refuses to pay it, acts against good morals and fair

dealing. We find here that such a situation amounts to being "tainted by fraud" as it was cited to earlier in the Journal of the Constitutional Convention in SCREP No. 57, II J. of Micro. Con. Con., and is within the exceptions to the prohibition on imprisonment for debt.

D. United States Caselaw

       While we acknowledge that in the United States many state constitutions have similar prohibitions against imprisonment for debt, we observe that courts in the United States have ruled differently on similar issues. We cite and discuss some similar United States cases generally supporting this court’s holding.

       In Robbins v. Labar Transp. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 705, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1984), a federal district judge in Illinois interpreted a provision of the Illinois Constitution which allows imprisonment for debt only if there is a "strong presumption of fraud," i.e., if the judgment debtor has the ability to pay but refuses to do so, or had the money and wrongfully disposed of it. The court noted that if it could not hold in contempt (and imprison as a sanction for contempt) an employer who had been ordered to make contributions to its employee trust fund, then the court would be powerless to require the prescribed payments to be made, and would have "lost the most effective sanction for its decree." (Citation omitted). Id. at 708.

       In Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1997), the appellant, Thompson, was alleged to have fraudulently caused a medical clinic to sustain nearly $619,000 in losses. Thompson had failed to comply with a court order that required him to describe and value his assets, and had been held in contempt for that failure. He was ordered incarcerated indefinitely, pending his full compliance with the original court order. In discussing Thompson’s argument that his imprisonment violated a Texas constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt, the court noted that a contemnor cannot even raise such a defense unless he has demonstrated his inability to pay whatever he has been ordered to pay. Id. at 242.

       In State v. Campbell, 929 P.2d 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), the defendant was ordered but failed to pay court costs, restitution and a victim assessment as part of his underlying criminal conviction. At a show cause hearing to determine why he should not be held in contempt, the defendant testified that he earned $700 per month and had expenses of $500 per month. The trial court ordered him to serve 60 days in jail but suspended the jail time on the condition that he pay $25 per month. The defendant appealed on the ground that he was being subjected to imprisonment for debt. The appellate court, citing earlier Washington cases, held that imprisonment based solely upon one’s willful refusal to pay a debt would be acceptable unless the individual were unable to pay. The appellate court concluded:

929 P.2d at 1178 (citation omitted).

For all of the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the trial court did not violate Article IV, Section 13 of the Constitution when it sentenced Rodriguez to 60 days in jail for civil contempt based upon 6 F.S.M.C. 1412.

[11 FSM Intrm. 384]

4. Prohibition on Involuntary Servitude Under FSM Constitution Article IV, Section 10

       Rodriguez contends that the trial court violated Article IV, Section 10 of the FSM Constitution when it ordered him to seek immediate employment and report to his judgment creditor under threat of contempt. Additionally, he contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was even fit to work.

A. Constitutional Provision; History and Intent

       Article IV, Section 10 of the FSM Constitution states: "Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited except to punish crime."

       This is our first opportunity to rule on whether requiring a debtor to seek employment, in a contempt order, amounts to involuntary servitude under our Constitution. We begin by noting that, while Article IV, Section 10 of the Constitution may have had its source in the Trust Territory Bill of Rights24 and the Constitution of the United States,25 it has particular meaning within the FSM’s historical context of forced labor by former foreign administering authorities. Some still-living citizens of this nation have experienced firsthand the evils of slavery and involuntary servitude. Article IV, Section 10 was meant to ban those types of atrocities forever.

       While Article IV, Section 10 is simply stated, the words "involuntary servitude" are subject to various definitions. Since this provision is not clear and does not permit only one possible result, we consult the Journal of the Constitutional Convention to ascertain the intent of the framers in drafting this language. Tafunsak v. Kosrae, 7 FSM Intrm. 344, 347 (App. 1995); Robert v. Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 394, 397 (App. 1994).

       The Journal of the Constitutional Convention in SCREP No. 23, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 803-04 provides some insight into the intent of the framers on this provision. During the Constitutional Convention, the Committee on Civil Liberties described Comm. Pro. No. 14 regarding the bill of rights in SCREP. No. 23. This standing committee report provides, in pertinent part:

payment by means of criminal proceedings of a purely civil liability arising from breach of contract. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (1903).

SCREP No. 23, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 803-04 (emphasis added).

B. United States Interpretations, Caselaw, and Analysis

       Another method for determining the meaning of a constitutional provision is to trace the language to its source. Where the language in the FSM Constitution and the United States Constitution is similar, it is appropriate to look to interpretations by United States courts, especially those in existence at the time of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, as a guide to the intended meaning of the words employed in the Constitution. Paul v. Celestine, 4 FSM Intrm. 205, 208 (App. 1990). We find that the FSM and the United States26 constitutional provisions on involuntary servitude are similar.

       Generally, under United States law, involuntary servitude has been described as follows:

45 Am. Jur. 2d Involuntary Servitude § 4, at 931 (1969) (emphasis added).

       Absent a violation of a criminal statute, the court cannot compel a person to labor for the liquidation of a debt to another with the threat of punishment for failure to perform. Id. § 10. Involuntary servitude thus has been held to encompass peonage, where a person is bound to the service of a particular employer until an obligation to that person is satisfied.

       In the United States, a 1998 California court ruled that when a person claiming involuntary servitude is simply expected to seek and accept employment, if available, and is free to choose the type of employment and employer, and is also free to resign that employment if conditions are unsatisfactory or to accept other employment, none of the aspects of "involuntary servitude" are present. Moss v. Superior Court (Ortiz), 950 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1998).

       An examination of the trial court’s May 21, 2001 order in the present case shows that Rodriguez was not directly ordered to labor for his debt. The trial court did not impute additional income to

Rodriguez, in calculating his ability to pay, and did not require him to perform any labor. The order stated that: "If defendant is presently unemployed, he is required to actively seek employment and be prepared at the next hearing to present persuasive evidence of his attempts to find a job." Order at 4 (May 21, 2001) (emphasis added.). The order further enumerated that: "(4) If defendant is presently unemployed, he is ordered to seek employment immediately and is ordered to report to plaintiff once he obtains employment." Id. at 5.

       In this case, Rodriguez is not being forced into labor for the purpose of paying off his debt to the Bank. This is not a situation in which the trial court ordered Rodriguez to do work for the Bank or some other party, and have the fruits of that labor directly channeled toward paying off his debt.

C. Fitness to Work

      While we hold that, in this case, the trial court’s order to Rodriguez to seek immediate employment is not a violation of the constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude, we must also address Rodriguez’s challenge that he was even capable of working. We hold that, in this particular case where Rodriguez had presented evidence that he was unable to work, the trial court must make specific findings as to whether Rodriguez was fit to work before ordering him to seek immediate employment.

      We find the following in the record: (1) Rodriguez was 62 years old;27 (2) he suffered from a serious heart ailment necessitating hospitalization, testing, and an operation for the insertion of a pace maker in the Philippines;28 (4) he had been to the Philippines for medical referral twice;29 (5) his illness caused him occasional pain and shortness of breath;30 (5) he had been spending more time in the hospital than at home;31 (6) at the time of the hearing on February 22, 2001 he was currently hospitalized, but was given special permission by his doctor to appear at the hearing for a limited time until he got back to the hospital;32 (7) at the hearing on February 22, 2001 he stated that he was being scheduled to go on medical referral again to the Philippines in the next month;33 (8) he stated that he was unable to work.34

       We note that at 62 years old Rodriguez is already collecting a monthly old age benefit through the FSM Social Security program and is beyond the normal retirement age of 60 as set forth in the Pohnpei Pension Plan Act of 1993. Rodriguez was suffering from a very serious heart ailment necessitating multiple medical referrals to the Philippines where he had a pace maker installed. His illness caused him to suffer from pain and shortness of breath and he was instructed to go immediately to the hospital when that occurred. He testified that he was in the hospital more than at home. He stated that he was going to undergo more time on medical referral in the Philippines.

       While we hold that the trial court did not violate the involuntary servitude provision of the Constitution when it ordered Rodriguez to seek immediate employment, we also hold that where Rodriguez has presented evidence that he is unable to work, the trial court must make specific findings with regard to his fitness for work before it orders him to seek immediate employment. We, therefore, vacate item number (4) of the trial court’s order and those parts of the order requiring Rodriguez to seek immediate employment and remand to the trial court for its findings on this issue.

       For all of the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding Rodriguez in contempt based on his having the ability to comply with the April 25, 2000 order in aid of judgment and on his having failed to demonstrate that he could not comply with the order. We further hold that the trial court did not violate 53 F.S.M.C. 604 in ordering Rodriguez to pay $65.00 per month to the Bank after he had presented evidence that his only source of income was Social Security retirement benefits. We also hold that the trial court’s contempt order did not violate Rodriguez’s constitutional right against imprisonment for debt.

       On the involuntary servitude issue, we find that the trial court’s order to Rodriguez to seek immediate employment was not unconstitutional, but that where Rodriguez has presented evidence that he is unable to work, the trial court must make specific findings as to his fitness to work before ordering him to seek immediate employment.

        We therefore vacate item number (4) and the other parts of the order requiring Rodriguez to seek immediate employment and remand to the trial court on the issue of fitness to work. We uphold the remainder of the order.

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1.The source for this section is TT Code 1966 § 292; TT Code 1970, 8 TTC 58; TT Code 1980, 8 TTC 58.

2. It is not clear whether Mr. Rodriguez receives $424.00 or $427.00 monthly, as it is stated differently in the record. Transcript at 7, 14 (Feb. 22, 2001).

3. Numerous questions were framed in such a way as to compare the current circumstances of Rodriguez to his circumstances at the April 19, 2000 hearing. Testimony from the April 19, 2000 hearing was not made a part of the record on appeal.

4. Rodriguez was asked by the court, "In answer to a question by the plaintiff, you said that there was a change in the amount of the social security benefit, what did you mean?" Rodriguez replied, "Maybe my hearing it was not correct, I would like to explain that there is no decrease." Transcript at 18-19 (Feb. 22, 2001).

5. Rodriguez was asked by the court, "During the hearing in April, you told the Court you had illness, is that the same illness that you described today?" He replied, "Yes." Id. at 19.

6. Rodriguez was asked by the court, "Also in April, during the hearing, you told the Court you had eight children under your care. Has there been any increase or reduction in the number of children or does it stay the same as eight, since April?" He replied, "Still the same because the daughter whom I adopted the children from has already been married and have other kids that are staying with their mother on their own." Id. at 19.

7. Rodriguez was asked by the counsel for the Bank how much it costs to support his children, "Mr. Rodriguez, what is a typical expense for a month that you pay – for a month, what do you normally pay in a month?" Rodriguez replied, "Mostly for what is good for the living expenses and myself and what we live off." Id. at 8.

8. Rodriguez was asked by the counsel for the Bank, "How much is average food cost that you pay to your family every month, rough estimate?" Rodriguez replied, "I’d like to beg your pardon on this matter because I – this is not something that I do. It’s my wife who takes care of that." Id. at 9.