FSM 6 Intrm. 166-167

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

Cite as Darmalane v. Pohnpei Transportation Authority (I) ,

6 FSM Intrm. 166 (App. 1993)

[6 FSM Intrm. 166]

KADALINO DAMARLANE et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

POHNPEI TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

Appellee.

APPEAL CASE NO. P3-1991

ORDER

Richard H. Benson

Associate Justice

Submitted: February 1, 1993

Decided: August 25, 1993

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Mary Berman, Esq.

P.O. Box 163

Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

For the Appellee: no appearance

* * * *

HEADNOTE

Appeal and Certiorari

Where appellants request a rehearing on the grounds that it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application, and neither the appellate order of dismissal nor the judgment in the state court had by their terms any prospective application the motion will be denied. Damarlane v. Pohnpei Transp. Auth. (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 166, 167 (App. 1993).

* * * *

COURT'S OPINION

RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice:

The appellants request a rehearing of this appeal pursuant to FSM Civil Rules 60(b)(5) and (6). The motion was filed February 1, 1993.

On June 12, 1992 our memorandum of decision in this case was entered. Damarlane v. Pohnpei Transp. Auth., 5 FSM Intrm. 322 (App. 1992). It dismissed the appeal, which was from a

[6 FSM Intrm. 167]

decision in the trial division of the Pohnpei State Supreme Court declaring that certain dredged coral was the property of Pohnpei Transportation Authority.

The appellants cite Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) for authority but fail to describe how it applies. They say "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Both our order dismissing the appeal and the judgment in the state court by their terms have no prospective application. We cannot conclude that the rule cited justifies the relief the appellants seek. The appellants have not given any authority that Rule 60 applies to appellate matters, and we see no reason to decide the issue.

The motion is denied.

* * * *


	THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Cite as Darmalane v. Pohnpei Transportation Authority (I) , 6 FSM Intrm. 166 (App. 1993) [6 FSM Intrm. 166] KADALINO DAMARLANE et al., Appellants, vs. POHNPEI TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Appellee. APPEAL CASE NO. P3-1991 ORDER Richard H. Benson Associate Justice Submitted: February 1, 1993 Decided: August 25, 1993 APPEARANCES: For the Appellant: Mary Berman, Esq. P.O. Box 163 Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941 For the Appellee: no appearance * * * * HEADNOTE Appeal and Certiorari Where appellants request a rehearing on the grounds that it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application, and neither the appellate order of dismissal nor the judgment in the state court had by their terms any prospective application the motion will be denied. Damarlane v. Pohnpei Transp. Auth. (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 166, 167 (App. 1993). * * * * COURT'S OPINION RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice: The appellants request a rehearing of this appeal pursuant to FSM Civil Rules 60(b)(5) and (6). The motion was filed February 1, 1993. On June 12, 1992 our memorandum of decision in this case was entered. Damarlane v. Pohnpei Transp. Auth., 5 FSM Intrm. 322 (App. 1992). It dismissed the appeal, which was from a [6 FSM Intrm. 167] decision in the trial division of the Pohnpei State Supreme Court declaring that certain dredged coral was the property of Pohnpei Transportation Authority. The appellants cite Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) for authority but fail to describe how it applies. They say "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Both our order dismissing the appeal and the judgment in the state court by their terms have no prospective application. We cannot conclude that the rule cited justifies the relief the appellants seek. The appellants have not given any authority that Rule 60 applies to appellate matters, and we see no reason to decide the issue. The motion is denied. * * * *