FSM 4 Intrm. 177-179

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

Cite as FSM v. Engichy ,

4 FSM Intrm. 177 (Truk 1989)

[4 FSM Intrm. 177]

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASIMIRO ENGICHY,

Defendant.

FSM CRIM. NO. 1981-1512

[4 FSM Intrm. 178]

ORDER

Before Richard H. Benson

Associate Justice

FSM Supreme Court

November 15, 1989

APPEARANCES

For the Government: Steven P. Pixley

Chief, Litigation

Attorney General Office

Federated States of Micronesia

P.O. Box 490

Pohnpei, FSM 96941

For the Defendant: Dan Maloney

Public Defender

Public Defender Office

Federated States of Micronesia

P.O. Box 756

Moen, Truk 96942

* * * *

HEADNOTE

Prisons and Prisoners

The serious illness of a prisoner's child does not constitute an emergency necessitating the defendant's release from prison, where the child will receive the treatment she requires whether the prisoner is released or not. FSM v. Engichy, 4 FSM Intrm. 177, 180 (Truk 1989).

* * * *

COURT'S OPINION

RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice:

This matter came before the court on the motion of the defendant filed November 10, 1989 for an order permitting his release so that he can travel to Phoenix, Arizona "to give support to wife and his daughter Rebecca Keleb, who must undergo extensive medical treatment."

The motion is supported with extensive documentation, the truth of which is not disputed by the government, that the 10 month old child suffers from Apert syndrome, a very serious condition which requires an extensive course of treatment.

The government's position is limited to a question of what assurance exists that the defendant would return to Truk.

[4 FSM Intrm. 179]

The defendant relies upon Soares v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 78 (App. 1989) to support his request. I agree that that case offers the only authority. Counsel have not furnished and the court has not been able to find any United States authority concerning releases for emergencies.

In context however, Soares is referring to emergencies in which the release of the prisoner is the proper act to meet the emergency. For instance, Soares uses the example of a jailer releasing prisoners in the event of a fire in the prison. Id. at 81-82.

In this case the emergency does not apply to the defendant himself; it is the child's. She is receiving the care and treatment that the emergency requires. She will receive that treatment whether the prisoner is released or not. The release of the defendant is sought so that the defendant can be present to render emotional support while that treatment is given.

I find that the facts do not bring this case within the meaning of "emergency" referred to in Soares. The letters and reports awake deep sympathy for the child and her present suffering and for her parents and family. However, I am compelled to deny the motion.

So ordered this 15th day of November, 1989.

* * * *


	THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Cite as FSM v. Engichy , 4 FSM Intrm. 177 (Truk 1989) [4 FSM Intrm. 177] FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, Plaintiff, vs. CASIMIRO ENGICHY, Defendant. FSM CRIM. NO. 1981-1512 [4 FSM Intrm. 178] ORDER Before Richard H. Benson Associate Justice FSM Supreme Court November 15, 1989 APPEARANCES For the Government: Steven P. Pixley Chief, Litigation Attorney General Office Federated States of Micronesia P.O. Box 490 Pohnpei, FSM 96941 For the Defendant: Dan Maloney Public Defender Public Defender Office Federated States of Micronesia P.O. Box 756 Moen, Truk 96942 * * * * HEADNOTE Prisons and Prisoners The serious illness of a prisoner's child does not constitute an emergency necessitating the defendant's release from prison, where the child will receive the treatment she requires whether the prisoner is released or not. FSM v. Engichy, 4 FSM Intrm. 177, 180 (Truk 1989). * * * * COURT'S OPINION RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice: This matter came before the court on the motion of the defendant filed November 10, 1989 for an order permitting his release so that he can travel to Phoenix, Arizona "to give support to wife and his daughter Rebecca Keleb, who must undergo extensive medical treatment." The motion is supported with extensive documentation, the truth of which is not disputed by the government, that the 10 month old child suffers from Apert syndrome, a very serious condition which requires an extensive course of treatment. The government's position is limited to a question of what assurance exists that the defendant would return to Truk. [4 FSM Intrm. 179] The defendant relies upon Soares v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 78 (App. 1989) to support his request. I agree that that case offers the only authority. Counsel have not furnished and the court has not been able to find any United States authority concerning releases for emergencies. In context however, Soares is referring to emergencies in which the release of the prisoner is the proper act to meet the emergency. For instance, Soares uses the example of a jailer releasing prisoners in the event of a fire in the prison. Id. at 81-82. In this case the emergency does not apply to the defendant himself; it is the child's. She is receiving the care and treatment that the emergency requires. She will receive that treatment whether the prisoner is released or not. The release of the defendant is sought so that the defendant can be present to render emotional support while that treatment is given. I find that the facts do not bring this case within the meaning of "emergency" referred to in Soares. The letters and reports awake deep sympathy for the child and her present suffering and for her parents and family. However, I am compelled to deny the motion. So ordered this 15th day of November, 1989. * * * *