Cite as Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018)
[21 FSM R. 649]
CSSC-CRIMINAL CASE NO. 031-2017
Hearing: January 9, 2018
Decided: January 9, 2018
Memorandum Entered: January 15, 2018
APPEARANCES:
| For the Plaintiff: | Sherry Jane Edmond |
| State Prosecutor | |
| Office of the Chuuk Attorney General | |
| P.O. Box 1050 | |
| Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 | |
| For the Defendant: | Charleston L. Bravo |
| Office of the Public Defender | |
| P.O. Box 754 | |
| Weno, Chuuk FM 96942 |
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 652 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, it declares its own meaning and there is no room for construction. However, a statute that either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. A statute that is so vague and ill-defined that the acts prohibited cannot be understood by people of ordinary intelligence, cannot serve as a basis for criminal prosecution. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 652 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The FSM and Chuuk Constitutions both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. Instances of cruel and unusual punishment include deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs; confining prisoner in dangerously unsanitary conditions; an officer instead of protecting a person from an attack, throwing him to the ground and beating the person in the jail; use of force by police officers when arrestee was so drunk and unstable to resist or defend himself; when a police officer uses force because he is enraged at being insulted by arrestee; when a municipality employs untrained persons as police officers, and fails to train them and authorizes their use of excessive force and summary punishment; corrections officers' failing to permit the use of restroom facilities or to provide food and water; and keeping an individual imprisoned for an additional 161 days after his sentence ended. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 652-53 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When a person has not been tried, convicted, and sentenced, no question of cruel and unusual punishment arises. That is why the alleged mistreatment of pre-trial arrestees is subject to a due process analysis while that of convicted prisoners is analyzed under the cruel and unusual punishment standard. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 653, 656 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
Under both the FSM and Chuuk Constitutions, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This right has been incorporated into the Chuuk Rules of Criminal Procedure and requires that a criminal information be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged, and state, for each count, the citation of the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 653 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The standard for statutes to comply with a defendant's "right to be informed" is that a criminal statute must be sufficiently explicit to prescribe the offense with reasonable certainty and not be so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. The constitutional clauses speak of rights to be informed of the nature of the charges and to receive due process. This is not language calculated to require absolute precision or even the best possible statement of the charge or violation. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 653 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The Chuuk Legislature's finding of an apparent increase in the commission of violent crimes in the State and the need to promote public peace and safety caused the Legislature to find it necessary to increase certain minimum sentences to help the court impose stiffer sentences on the convicted violators in certain violent felony criminal cases to help deter future criminal tendencies and involvement. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 654 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The "definite, unambiguous, and certain" analysis is usually applied to statutory language which prohibits conduct as opposed to sentencing language. Courts are more deferential as to determining what constitutes a definite statement when sentencing guidelines are concerned. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 654-55 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
The court is subject to certain limits in sentencing when the state law sets a precise minimum of no less than five years imprisonment while the maximum sentence, as set by the FSM and Chuuk Constitutions, is life in prison because the Constitutions ban capital punishment. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 655 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
A statute that sets only a minimum sentence does not allow the court unbridled discretion to implement cruel and unusual punishments because the court is constrained by the FSM and Chuuk Constitutions; because the court has a traditional role of adjudication based on equity that involves the considering mitigating and aggravating factors before imposing sentence; and because all statutes are presumptively constitutional. Thus, this statute is not so unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous as to violate a defendant's due process rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 655-56 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
Chuuk courts are restricted in hearing only "live" cases, meaning the case must be one appropriate for judicial determination. A matter is appropriate for judicial determination when there is a justiciable controversy, as distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character, or one that is academic or moot. Thus, when a defendant has not yet stood trial and thus may not be convicted, the question of whether a potential sentence constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment is merely hypothetical and academic and not yet appropriate for judicial determination. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 656 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
When determining a statute's vagueness or ambiguity, the court must look to a statute that prescribes an offense that either forbids or requires the doing of an act. Thus, a sentencing requirement that states, "imprisonment for not less than five years, or a fine of not less than $5,000.00, or both" is not subject to a due process analysis for violating the defendant's right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him because the statute's sentencing provision is not the part of the statute that forbids or requires the doing of an act. In order to attack a statute's vagueness, the court is restricted to looking at the statute that prescribes an offense or that forbids or requires the doing of an act. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 656 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
There is no requirement that a statutory sentencing provision's language contain absolute precision or perfection. Informing a defendant that the sentence constitutes a minimum of five years imprisonment is sufficient notice because the sentencing statute provides a clear and explicit notice of a monetary and sentencing minimum for the defendant and leaves the court the equitable power to set a cap upon the sentencing as justice demands and as restricted by the Chuuk and FSM Constitutions. Thus, the statute provides notice to the defendant that he may be sentenced to between five years and life. Chuuk v. Silluk, 21 FSM R. 649, 657 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).
CAMILLO NOKET, Chief Justice:
On June 12, 2017, Defendant Marfino Silluk was charged with one count of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of Chuuk State Law (CSL) 6-66, § 407, as amended by 13-16-12, § 2, in addition to one count of assault and battery. Defendant filed his Motion for Declaratory Relief on December 6, 2017, requesting this Court to find CSL 13-16-12 unconstitutional. The Chuuk State Supreme Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(a) mandates that "objections before trial . . . shall be raised only by motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief" while abolishing all other demurs. To comply with this rule, the Defendant's motion will be treated as a Motion to dismiss the charge of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon against Defendant. This Court now DENIES Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Relief.
Two issues are raised by Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Relief. These issues are:
1. Whether or not Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 section 2, amending section 407 of CSL 6-66, imposes a definite, unambiguous and certain penalty for the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon?
2. Whether or not Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 section 2, amending section 407 of CSL 6-66 violates the declaration of rights and due process rights and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation protected by the FSM and Chuuk State Constitution?
A. Statutory Construction and Definite Statements
It is well-established canon of statutory construction that statutes are presumed to be constitutional. FSM v. Masis, 15 FSM R. 172, 175 (Chk. 2007). When a "statute's language is plain and unambiguous, it declares its own meaning and there is no room for construction." FSM v. Wainit, 12 FSM R. 105, 111 (Chk. 2003). However, a statute that "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." FSM v. Nota, 1 FSM R. 299, 304 (Truk 1983). Furthermore, a statute that is "so vague and ill-defined that the acts prohibited cannot be understood by people of ordinary intelligence, cannot serve as a basis for criminal prosecution." Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503, 506 (App. 1984).
B. Due Process
The Chuuk State Constitution mandates that "[e]xcessive bail may not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Chk. Const. art. III, § 6 (emphasis added). The FSM Constitution also protects against cruel and unusual punishment and states, "Excessive bail may not be required, excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." FSM Const. art. IV, § 8 (emphasis added). Some instances of cruel and unusual precedents throughout the FSM have included deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs; confining prisoner in dangerously unsanitary conditions; an officer instead of protecting a person from an attack, threw him to the ground and beat the person in the jail; use of force by police officers when arrestee was so drunk and unstable to resist or defend himself and when police officer used force because he was enraged at being insulted by arrestee; where a municipality employed untrained persons as police officers, failed to train them and authorized their use of excessive force and summary punishment; corrections officers' failure to permit the use of restroom facilities or to provide food and water; keeping an individual imprisoned for an additional 161 days after their sentence ended. Plais v. Panuelo, 5 FSM Intrm. 179, 199-200, 208 (Pon. 1991); Meitou v. Uwera, 5 FSM Intrm.139, 144 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991); Alaphen v. Municipality of Moen, 2 FSM Intrm. 279, 280 (Truk 1986); Warren v. Pohnpei State Dep't of Public Safety, 13 FSM R. 483, 494 (Pon. 2005); Kon v. Chuuk, 19 FSM R. 463, 466 (Chk. 2014). However "[w]here a person has not been tried, convicted and sentenced, no question of cruel and unusual punishment arises." Paul v. Celestine, 4 FSM Intrm. 205, 208 (App. 1990). That is why, "[g]enerally, the alleged mistreatment of pre-trial arrestees is subject to a due process analysis while that of convicted prisoners is analyzed under the cruel and unusual punishment standard." Kon v. Chuuk, 19 FSM R. 463, 466 (Chk. 2014).
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The issue of standing is a threshold issue going to a court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . because when a plaintiff does not have standing to pursue an action, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action and the [matter] will be dismissed. Chuuk State Bd. of Educ. v. Sony, 16 FSM Intrm. 213, 219 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008). The Chuuk courts are restricted in hearing only "live" cases, meaning "the case must be one appropriate for judicial determination." Id. A matter is appropriate for judicial determination when there is a justiciable controversy, as distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character, or one that is academic or moot. Id.; see also Kallop v. Pohnpei, 18 FSM Intrm. 130, 133 (Pon. 2011).
D. Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusations
The Chuuk State Constitution, in its Declaration of Rights, provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." Chk. Const. art. III, § 4 (emphasis added). It parallels a provision within the FSM Constitution which states that "the defendant in a criminal case has a right . . . to be informed of the nature of the accusation." FSM Const. art. IV, § 6 (emphasis added). This right has been incorporated into the Chuuk Rules of Criminal Procedure and requires that a criminal information "shall be a plain, concise and defi nite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . . .The information shall state for each count the citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged to have violated." Chk. Crim. R. 7(a).
The FSM Supreme Court has firmly established the standard for statutes to comply with a defendant's "right to be informed." A criminal statute "must be sufficiently explicit' to prescribe the offense with 'reasonable certainty' and not be 'so vague' that persons of common intelligence' must 'necessarily guess at its meaning.'" Laion, 1 FSM Intrm. 503, at 507. The constitutional clauses speak of rights to be informed of the "nature" of the charges and to receive "due" process. This is not language calculated to require absolute precision or even the best possible statement of the charge or violation." Id. at 506-07.
On June 12, 2017, Defendant Marfino Silluk was charged with one count of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, pursuant to Chuuk State Law (CSL) 6-66, § 407, as amended by 13-16-12, and one count of and one count of Assault and Battery in violation of CSL 6-66, § 409 as amended by CSL 3-95-13, § 1 (409).
Defendant filed a Motion for Declaratory Relief on December 6, 2017, requesting this Court to find CSL 13-16-12 unconstitutional. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Enlargement to Respond to Defendant's Motion as well as its opposition to Defendant's motion on December 29, 2017, in its Reply to Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Relief. On January 8, 2018 Defendant filed a motion in opposition to Enlargement (to both Plaintiff's extension of discovery and to respond to the above-mentioned motion). The Court orally ruled against Defendant's motion in Opposition to Enlargement since Defendant had failed to follow proper procedure so as to compel discovery and it is within the Court's equitable power of discretion to grant motions for enlargement, liberally. In fairness to the Defendant, the Court continued the trial date to March 13, 2018 at 9:30 a.m.
The matter proceeded to a hearing on Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Relief on January 9, 2018, at which time both parties presented their arguments. This Court then verbally DENIED Defendant's Pretrial Motion.
There are two issues raised throughout the Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Relief, both of which are based on the premises that CSL 13-16-12 is unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous for failure to provide a definite, unambiguous and certain penalty for the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. First, whether Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 is unconstitutionally vague on its face to create a mechanism for courts to violate Defendant's Due process rights by implementing a cruel and unusual punishment in sentencing, in violation of Chuuk State Constitution Article III, § 6. Second, whether Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 is unconstitutionally vague enough as to deny Defendant his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, in violation of Chuuk State Constitution Article III, § 4.This Court disagrees with Defendant's reasoning based on the foregoing analysis.
Chuuk State Law (CSL) 6-66, § 407, which criminalized assault with a dangerous weapon, was amended on November 1, 2016, when CSL 13-16-12 was put into effect. Chk. S.L. No. 13-16-12. CSL 6-66, § 407 was originally punishable "by imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both." CSL 6-66, § 407 (emphasis added). The amendment changed the punishment for assault and battery to "imprisonment for not less than five years, or a fine of not less than $5,000.00, or both." Chk. S.L. No. 13-16-12, § 2 (emphasis added). Additionally, the amendment also included changes to murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, sexual assault, and sexual abuse, making the sentences for all of those charges higher by setting minimum sentencing requirements, without providing maximum sentences. Chk. S.L. No. 13-16-12, §§ 3-5. Precipitating the change in the criminal sentencing was a finding by the Chuuk State Legislature of an "apparent increase in the commission of violent crimes in the State" and the need to "promote public peace and safety." Chk. S.L. No. 13-16-12, § 1. On that basis the Legislature found it necessary "to help the court impose stiffer sentences on the convicted violators in certain violent felony criminal cases to help deter future criminal tendencies and involvement." Id.
B. CSL 13-16-12, provides a definite, unambiguous and certain penalty for the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.
The Defendant presents a weak argument as to why CSL 13-16-12, § 2, should be subject to the "definite, unambiguous, and certain" analysis; since Laion and other FSM cases have applied this analysis to statutory language which prohibits conduct as opposed to the sentencing language that stands before this Court. Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM R. 503 (App. 1984). Moreover, Defendant has not presented a single case before this Court where an FSM court has ruled a statute to not be definite. Even within the U.S. cases that Defendant cites as mere persuasive authority, those courts have been more deferential as to determining what constitutes a definite statement when sentencing guidelines are concerned. On this basis alone, the CSL 13-16-12 is definite and unambiguous.
Furthermore, Laion has established a much lower standard than the U.S. Supreme Court for statutes in order to meet the "definite and unambiguous requirement," citing that "absolute perfection is unnecessary" when it held that the statutory language of "dangerous weapon" was not vague or indefinite. Id. The definition of dangerous weapon was undefined and therefore open to interpretation by judicial courts (as are sentencing maximums) with consideration for past judicial definitions - an argument which the U.S. Supreme Court has recently rejected. Id.; compare to Johnson v. United States, 57x U.S. XXX, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015) (which struck down a residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act: stating that the provision "and other dangerous felonies" was too vague" even though it was defined as a crime which "involves conduct" that presents too much risk of physical injury). This Court notes that a significant difference in jurisprudence on the vagueness doctrine exists between the U.S. and FSM Courts - and therefore does not view the U.S. cases as being persuasive authority so far as the vagueness doctrine is concerned.
Even if sentencing language was required to be as definite as language within statutes that prohibits conduct, it is common knowledge that the Court is subject to certain limits in sentencing. Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 sets a precise minimum of "no less than five years imprisonment while the maximum sentence is set by the FSM and Chuuk State Constitution as being "life in prison." It is common knowledge that the Chuuk State Constitution bans capital punishment, the only sentence which exceeds "life in prison" in severity. Chk. Const. art. III, § 8. Therefore, CSL 13-16-12 provides a definite statement as to the sentencing that the Defendant may expect for the commission of this crime to be not less than five years (if one victim). Moreover, it is common knowledge that the maximum for this serious offense is "life in prison." Likewise, CSL provides the Court with an option for a minimum fine of $5,000 and the maximum fine is left for the Court to determine based on the notions of equity in the case. It has been in the traditional power of this Court to discretion to assign sentences based on equity. There is notice that the fine may be hefty, but reasonable, as required by the equity of the case before the Court. Therefore, Defendant has failed to persuade this Court that the CSL 13-16-12 provides an indefinite statement.
C. CSL 13-16-12 on its face, Does Not Violate Defendant's Due Process Rights
The Defendant argued that CSL 13-16-12, § 2 is unconstitutionally vague since the Court has unbridled discretion in the possible imposition of the maximum penalty" ? in other words, the possibility that it may impose a cruel and unusual punishment. Def.'s Mot. at 6. As discussed, the sentencing provision is definite so as to provide the Court with discretion to sentence the Defendant between five years and life (and/or a fine that may be over $5,000 if equity so requires) upon conviction for an assault with a deadly weapon.
However, this statute does not allow the Court unbridled discretion to implement cruel and unusual punishments. First, the Court is constrained by the Constitution of Chuuk and FSM. Moreover, the Court has a traditional role of adjudication based on equity that involves the consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors prior to extending a sentence. Thus, the Court's unbridled discretion to impose punishments that may amount to being cruel and unusual, is limited by the notions of equity as well as the Chuuk and FSM Constitutions. Defendant's argument therefore does not overcome the burden that all statutes are presumptively constitutional. In conclusion, this Court does not find CSL 13-16-12, § 2 so unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous so as to violate the Defendant's due process rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment as Applied is outside this Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction since this claim is premature.
The Defendant has prematurely raised the question of whether the application of CSL 13-16-12, § 2 constitutes a violation of due process via cruel and usual punishment prior to Defendant's conviction and sentencing. Therefore, this Court currently lacks subject matter jurisdiction on this matter and may not render a decision whether a potential sentence under CSL 13-16-12, § 2 is cruel and unusual.
While the Chuuk and FSM Constitutions protect individuals from cruel and unusual punishment by the government, Paul v. Celestine established that: where an individual has not been tried, convicted, and sentenced, there is not yet a question of cruel and unusual punishment. Instead of a cruel and unusual analysis, the mistreatment of pre-trial arrestees is subject to a due process analysis. As stated above, defendant's due process arguments failed. The various precedential instances of cruel and unusual punishment cases clearly reflect the cruel and unusual punishments occurred after the prisoner had been sentenced, or at least after the prisoner had been imprisoned. In the present matter, the Defendant is not arguing a prior incident of cruel and unusual punishment, but rather a prospective and hypothetical punishment.
Chuuk courts are restricted in hearing only "live" cases, meaning "the case must be one appropriate for judicial determination." Chuuk State Bd. of Educ. v. Sony, 16 FSM R. 213, 219 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008). A matter is appropriate for judicial determination when there is a justiciable controversy, as distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character, or one that is academic or moot. Id.; see also Kallop v. Pohnpei. 18 FSM R. 130, 133 (Pon. 2011). In this pending case, Defendant Marfino has not stood on trial or received a sentence. There is a possibility that the Attorney General will not meet its burden of proof in convicting the Defendant - and the Defendant will avoid being sentenced under the provision. Therefore, the question of whether a potential sentence under CSL 13-16-12, § 2 constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment is merely hypothetical and academic. In conclusion, this issue is not appropriate for judicial determination at this stage of the proceeding. Chuuk State Bd. of Educ. v. Sony, 16 FSM R. 213, 219 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
E. CSL 13-16-12 Complies with Defendant's Right to Know the Nature and Cause of Accusations under the Chuuk State and FSM Constitutions
All individuals are ensured the right to know of the nature and cause of criminal charges of which they have been accused. The question before this Court is whether CSL 13-16-12 is so vague and ambiguous that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. In determining a statute's vagueness or ambiguity, case law establishes that the Court must look to a statute that "prescribe[s] [an] offense" that "either forbids or requires the doing of an act." Laion, 1 FSM Intrm. at 507, 506. The portion of CSL 13-16-12 that is purportedly vague is the sentencing requirement of assault with a dangerous weapon, which states, "imprisonment for not less than five years, or a fine of not less than $5,000.00, or both." First, this portion of the statute is not subject to a due process analysis for violating the defendant's right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him because the sentencing provision of the statute is not the portion of the statute that forbids or requires the doing of an act. In order to attack the vagueness of CSL 13-16-12 the Court is restricted in looking at a statute that prescribes an offense or that forbids or requires the doing of an act. Courts are far more inclined to set aside as unconstitutionally vague statutes or ordinances reaching into marginal areas of human conduct such as prohibitions against loitering or vagrancy aimed at conduct often thought of as offensive or undesirable, but not directly dangerous to others. Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM R. 503, 509 (App. 1984). Moreover, since "vagrancy" or "loitering" are highly subjective terms, their interpretation varies so vastly between individuals so as to not provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct to the individual. The sentencing portion of CSL 13-16-12 is not the proper means by which a due process attack can be made on the basis of vagueness. Secondly, if the sentencing provision were to be tested for vagueness, it passes the Laion test, as there is no requirement that the criminal statutory language contain absolute precision or perfection. Informing a defendant that sentencing constitutes a minimum of five years imprisonment is sufficient notice. The "nature" of the sentencing is one which provides a clear and explicit notice of a monetary and sentencing minimum for the Defendant. It also leaves the Court the equitable power to set a cap upon the sentencing as justice demands and as restricted by the Chuuk and FSM Constitutions, and which is in accord with the statutory reasoning behind the implementation of the statute. Therefore, the statute provides notice to the Defendant that he may be sentenced between five years and life. Therefore, this Court does not find CSL 13-16-12, § 2 neither unconstitutionally vague nor ambiguous so as to violate the Defendant's right to know the nature and cause of the accusation.
The Court now finds that Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 section 2, amending section 407 of CSL 6-66, imposes a definite, unambiguous and certain penalty for the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.
The Court also finds that Chuuk State Law 13-16-12 section 2, does not violate the declaration of rights nor the due process rights nor the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation as protected by the FSM and Chuuk State Constitution.
Therefore, based on arguments presented by Defendant and the foregoing reasoning, at this time the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Relief.