FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300 (Chk. 2017)
CHUUK HEALTH CARE PLAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FSM DEVELOPMENT BANK,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2015-1021
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Dennis K. Yamase
Chief Justice
Decided: June 27, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff: Yoslyn G. Sigrah, Esq.
P.O. Box 3018
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Defendant: Jeffrey S. Tilfas
Acting Attorney General
P.O. Box 870
Tofol, Kosrae FM 96944
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An FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted will be granted only if it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any state of facts which could be proven in support of the claim. Such a motion is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted because few complaints fail to meet the liberal pleading requirements set forth in FSM Civil Rule 8(a). Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 303 (Chk. 2017).
In ruling on a FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court assumes the allegations in the complaint as true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. The motion is evaluated only on whether a plaintiff’s case has been adequately stated in the complaint without resolving the facts or merits of the case. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 303 (Chk. 2017).
The rules require only notice pleading, and are flexible and informal rather than technical. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 304 (Chk. 2017).
A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, and nothing more, will not suffice to survive a motion to dismiss because a court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 304 (Chk. 2017).
The complaint need only be a short and plain statement of the claim and give the defendant fair notice of the factual wrong on the basis of the facts asserted, and the legal theory advanced, if one is advanced, need not be correct or even averred. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 304 (Chk. 2017).
State law does not need to be expressly pled because the court may take judicial notice of any state law. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 304 (Chk. 2017).
A plaintiff's failure to reference state regulations enacted pursuant to the state's enabling legislation is not fatal to its complaint since state law need not be expressly pled. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 304 (Chk. 2017).
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all-important or controlling factor. The primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain and declare the legislature's intention, and to carry such intention into effect to the fullest degree. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 305 (Chk. 2017).
A statutory provision's plain meaning must be given effect whenever possible. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 305 (Chk. 2017).
A court should construe a statute as the legislature intended as determined by the statute's wording. What a legislature says in the statute's text is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 305 (Chk. 2017).
A long-standing norm of statutory construction holds that provisions of law must be read so as to be internally consistent and sensible. Interpretations which strip clauses of substance and effect go against the norms of interpretation and are greatly disfavored. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 305 (Chk. 2017).
Unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 305 (Chk. 2017).
The Chuuk Health Care Plan enabling statute clearly imposes liability for the payments of premiums on all employers employing eligible residents of Chuuk. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 305 (Chk. 2017).
Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06 contemplates a comprehensive health insurance system whereby premium payments were required on behalf of eligible enrollees employed by the national government. The statute's language contemplates a system of "universal" coverage automatically extending to all eligible enrollees, which includes all employed Chuuk residents regardless of their employer. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 306 (Chk. 2017).
When, although the regulations for the Chuuk Health Care Plan implement the actual premium amounts due, the statute itself provides for liability to make the premium payments, the Plan has shown facts that, if proven, entitle it to the relief sought for the defendant's non-payment of premiums. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 308 (Chk. 2017).
A plaintiff's averment that the defendant engaged in practices designed to discourage employee enrollment in health insurance is merely a conclusory allegation insufficient to state a claim because there are no facts alleged in support of the conclusion. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 309 (Chk. 2017).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, only the well-pled or well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true. Conclusory allegations or legal allegation masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss, and, the court also does not have to credit invective, bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 309 (Chk. 2017).
Although Rule 8(a)'s pleading requirements are very liberal, more detail often is required than the plaintiff's bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 309 (Chk. 2017).
A plaintiff's claim for penalties that simply states that the defendant is engaged in the prohibited activities is vague, conclusory, and unsupported by material facts, and, for that reason, the plaintiff's action for penalties based on that allegation must fail. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. FSM Dev. Bank, 21 FSM R. 300, 309 (Chk. 2017).
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DENNIS K. YAMASE, Chief Justice:
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed November 30, 2015; the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed on December 7, 2015; the plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed January 12, 2016; and the defendant's reply to the plaintiff's opposition and motion to strike plaintiff's opposition, filed January 19, 2016.1 The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The reasons follow.
On November 13, 2015, the plaintiff, Chuuk Health Care Plan ("the Plan"), a public health care insurance corporation created by Chk. S.L. No. 2-94-06 for the purpose of administering a state-mandated health insurance scheme for Chuuk residents, filed suit against the defendant, FSM Development Bank ("the Bank"), alleging that the Bank was required by law to pay the Plan statutory health insurance premiums for its employees (to include the employees' share as well as the Bank's share thereof), but that it had failed to remit the premiums to the Plan since the year 2009, plus statutory interest and penalties.
The Bank, in lieu of answering the Complaint, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, along with exhibits "A,"2 "B,"3 and "C."4 In its motion, the Bank contends the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim because neither the statute nor the regulations adopted pursuant thereto provide for assessment of premiums against the FSM National Government or FSM National Government instrumentalities such as the Bank.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted only if it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any state of facts which could be proven in support of the claim. Nahnken of Nett v. United States, 7 FSM R. 581, 586 (App. 1996); Dorval Tankship Pty, Ltd. v. Department of Finance, 8 FSM R. 111, 114 (Chk. 1997); Jano v. King, 5 FSM R. 388, 390 (Pon. 1992); Faw v. FSM, 6 FSM R. 33, 37 (Yap 1993). Such a motion is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted because few complaints fail to meet the liberal pleading requirements set forth in FSM Civil Rule 8(a).
In ruling on a FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the allegations in the complaint as true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Dorval Tankship Pty, Ltd., 8 FSM R. at 114; Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 7 FSM R. 563, 569-70 (Pon. 1996). The motion is evaluated only on whether a plaintiff's case has been adequately stated in the complaint without resolving the facts or merits of the case. Dorval Tankship Pty, Ltd., 8 FSM R. at 114.
Rule 8(a) of the Civil Rules of Civil Procedure states, inter alia, "[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Thus, "the rules require only notice pleading, and are flexible and informal rather than technical." Berman v. College of Micronesia-FSM, 15 FSM R. 582, 595 (App. 2008). However, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, and nothing more, will not suffice to survive a motion to dismiss because a court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, 940 (2007).
The complaint need only be a short and plain statement of the claim and give the defendant fair notice of the factual wrong on the basis of the facts asserted and the legal theory advanced, if one is advanced, need not be correct [or even averred]. Semwen v. Seaward Holdings Micronesia, 7 FSM Intrm. 111, 113-14 (Chk. 1995); see also FSM v. Kana Maru No. 1, 14 FSM Intrm. 368, 372 (Chk. 2006); Annes v. Primo, 14 FSM Intrm. 196, 203 (Pon. 2006); Adams v. Home Island Homes Constr., Inc., 11 FSM Intrm. 445, 449 (Pon. 2003). Foreign law is a fact which must be pled and proven. FSM Civ. R. 44.1. But state law does not need to be expressly pled, Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 343 F.2d 670, 685 (8th Cir. 1965), because the court may take judicial notice of any state law. Bower v. Casnave, 44 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). . . . [T]he court must "take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information[.]" FSM Evid. R. 201(d).
Berman, 15 FSM R. at 595 (footnote omitted).
A. The Complaint's Failure to Reference the Plan's Regulations
In its motion, the Bank first contends that the Plan's Complaint fails to reference the regulations under the Plan, "which would necessarily be the sole basis for its claims against FSMDB for premium payments." The Bank's Mot. to Dismiss Complaint at 8. The Bank claims this omission is fatal to the Complaint, in part because the amount due and owing can only be calculated by reference to the regulations.
This argument must fail as a matter of law since, as the Bank concedes, the Court has held that state laws and regulations need not be expressly pled in order for a complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and because judicial notice may be taken of state laws and regulations. Berman v. College of Micronesia-FSM, 15 FSM R. at 595 (citing Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 343 F.2d 670, 685 (8th Cir. 1965)). Therefore, the Plan's failure to reference the regulations enacted pursuant to the enabling legislation is not fatal to its complaint because state law need not be expressly pled.
B. The Bank's Liability for Premiums Under the Chuuk Health Care Plan Act of 1994 and Regulations Adopted Pursuant Thereto
The Bank's second argument contends that an FSM National Government instrumentality created under the laws of the FSM such as itself, FSM Dev. Bank v. Estate of Edmond, 19 FSM R. 425, 433 (App. 2014), is exempt from the assessment of premiums and penalties under the Chuuk Health Care Plan Act of 1994 pursuant to the Chuuk Health Care Plan regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees pursuant to its authority thereunder.
In its Complaint, the Plan alleges that FSMDB is an employer as that term is defined in the Chuuk Health Care Plan Act of 1994 and that it therefore had the obligation to enroll or otherwise cause to be enrolled all of its employees in the Chuuk Health Care insurance and to remit statutory premiums to the Chuuk Health Care Plan by withholding its employees' shares from their wages together with the employer's share. Complaint ¶¶ 4-5. The Plan further avers that the Bank has not fulfilled its statutory duty as an employer under the law to remit premiums to the Plan from the year 2009 up to and through the date of this action. Id. ¶ 6. The Plan claims the Bank has not remitted the required premiums to the Plan since 2009, thereby depriving the Plan of premiums to which it is entitled.
In order to resolve the issue presented, the Court must view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Plan upon the statutory and regulatory backgrounds of the Chuuk Health Care Plan Act of 1994 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
"In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all-important or controlling factor. . . . Accordingly, the primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature, and to carry such intention into effect to the fullest degree." 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 145, at 351 (2d ed. 1974). The plain meaning of a statutory provision must be given effect whenever possible. Setik v. FSM, 5 FSM R. 407, 410 (App. 1992). The Court should construe a statute as the legislature intended as determined by the wording of the statute. What a legislature says in the text of the statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Thus, the Court must give effect to the plain meaning of a statutory provision whenever possible. FSM Social Sec. Admin. v. Kingtex (FSM), Inc., 8 FSM R. 129, 131 (App. 1997).
A long-standing norm of statutory construction holds that provisions of law must be read so as to be internally consistent and sensible. McCaffrey v. FSM Supreme Court, 6 FSM R. 279, 281 (App. 1993). Interpretations which strip clauses of substance and effect go against the norms of interpretation and are greatly disfavored. FSM v. George, 2 FSM R. 88, 94 (Kos. 1985). Unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. Michelsen v. FSM, 3 FSM R. 416, 426 (Pon. 1988).
The enabling statute clearly imposes liability for the payments of premiums on all employers employing eligible residents of Chuuk. Chuuk Health Care Plan v. Pacific Int'l, Inc. 17 FSM R. 535, 539 (Chk. 2011).
"The Board, by regulation, shall provide for an essential level of health coverage . . . which coverage shall extend to all eligible enrollees," thereby establishing a system of universal coverage for all eligible employees in Chuuk. Chk. S.L. No. 2-94-06, § 4-7. The Act further states "[b]y regulation, the Board shall assess the requisite amounts and sources for universal coverage for essential care in accordance with State law . . . ." Id. at § 5-1.
(1) The Board by regulation may, subject to Section 5-4 of this Act, establish classifications for the portion of premium payments to be billed to an enrollee, employer, State Government, National Government or other entity or person. Such classification shall be based on one or more of the following:
(a) Payments on behalf of the enrollees or employers of a State Government of the Federated States of Micronesia, the National Government, the Government of the United States of America, or any other source;
(b) Time of payment; and
(c) Any other factor reasonably related to the purpose of this Act.
(2) The plan shall bill the amounts determined under this Section.
Id. at § 5-2. Liability for the payment of the billed amounts, similarly to be set forth by regulations, is set forth in § 5-4:
(1) An employer of an enrollee with respect to whom a premium amount is billed shall be responsible for payment of one-half of such premium amount. The employer may, by written agreement filed with the Plan, assume responsibility to pay more than one-half of the premium amount.
(2) The employer shall collect the balance of the premium by deducting and withholding such amount from the enrollee's compensation with respect to pay periods as specified by the Board's regulation. Every employer required to deduct and withhold a premium amount shall be liable for the payment of such amount as well as the employer's share of the premium amount and shall pay such amounts to the Plan with reports or returns as specified by the Board by regulation.
. . .
(3) Any person required to pay a premium amount for whom a collection procedures [sic] is not otherwise provided in this Act or the regulations shall pay such premium amount of the Plan with report or returns as specified by the Board.
The language in the Act is clear. It is clear that Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06 contemplates a comprehensive health insurance system whereby premium payments were required on behalf of eligible enrollees employed by the national government. The language used by the statute contemplates a system of "universal" coverage automatically extending to all eligible enrollees, which includes all employed residents of Chuuk regardless of their employer. Chk. S.L. No. 2-94-06 § 4-7; Chuuk Health Care Plan v. Department of Educ., 18 FSM R. 491, 496 (Chk. 2013) (The statute "does not need each state employee to notify it[s employer] that the employee is enrolled in the Plan. The statute does that. It provides for universal coverage for Chuuk residents."). "Since the obligation to withhold the Plan insurance premium contributions arises by operation of law, . . . the Plan insurance premium contributions would be properly obligated and should be paid." Department of Educ., 18 FSM R. at 496-97. Furthermore, the Act makes several references to the FSM National Government as an employer that is liable for premiums billed to it under the Plan. Finally, as stated, the Act automatically enrolls every eligible resident of Chuuk, Chk. S.L. No. 2-94-06§ 4-7, and the Bank does not dispute that it falls within the statute's definition as an employer, id. at §§ 1-4(5), 1-4(10),5 that employs eligible employees, id. at §§ 1-4(4), 1-4(5),6 who are residents of Chuuk, id. at § 1-4(15).7
Nevertheless, the Bank's argument, and therefore the Court's inquiry, does not rest there. The heart of the Bank's motion relies on the regulations promulgated under the Act because the Act itself does not establish the premium rates to be assessed or how they are to be assessed. Instead, the Act instructs the Board to devise regulations determining the premium amounts for coverage which shall be paid in proportion by the enrollee and his or her employer, to establish a billing system and bill those premium amounts to the enrollee and his or her employer in order to impose liability on the employer for those amounts.
Part 1.3.8 of Chapter III of the regulations govern the assessment of premiums and establishes which employers are liable for what amount of premium payments. Part 1.3.8 of Chapter III of the regulations states:
1. A medical security tax (pursuant to section 8.10 of the State Law no. 2/94-06 as amended); is hereby imposed on the gross wages of all employed residents of the State of Chuuk which shall be payable by employers and employees in accordance with the following:
| Chuuk State government | 2.5% |
| Chuuk State government employee | 2.5% |
| Private Sector Employer | 2.5% |
| Private Sector Employee | 2.5% |
2. The employers shall pay the percentage of their employees' gross wages as specified in subpart (1) of this part,
3. Employees shall pay the percentage of their gross wages specified in subpart (1) of this part . . .
The Bank contends that, pursuant to the above-quoted part 1.3.8 of the regulations, the only employers required to pay the premium, or what the regulations label a "medical security tax," are Chuuk State Government and private sector employers. The Bank concludes, therefore, that because it is an FSM National Government instrumentality and not a Chuuk State Government or private sector employer, part 1.3.8 is inapplicable to the Bank and does not obligate it to pay premiums.
The Bank contends that other Parts of Chapter III of the regulations confirm its conclusion. Parts 1.3.9 through 1.3.12 state the following:
Part 1.3.9 Liability for Premium Payments
Government. The State Department of Treasury on behalf of the State and Municipal Governments shall collect the balance of the premium by deducting and withholding such amount from the enrollees compensation as well as the employer's share of the premium amount; and
Part 1.3.10 (2) The State Treasury should make a bi-weekly deposit into the Plan's Fund of such collection.
Part 1.3.11 (3) Private Sector. Every employer require to deduct and withholding [sic] their enrollee's premium amount as well as the employer's share of the premium amount; and
Part 1.3.12 (4) The employer shall pay on a bi-weekly basis such premiums amount at the CSHCP's [sic] office . . .
The Bank concludes, because there are no provisions in Parts 1.3.9 through 1.3.12 for premium payments to be made specifically on behalf of FSM National Government instrumentalities, such as itself, it cannot be liable for the relief sought in the complaint for the alleged non-payment of premiums and penalties. Last, in support of its argument, the Bank quotes Chapter V, Part 1.0.5 of the regulations, which states the following:
The Board is authorized to enter into agreement with the National Government, international organizations, or other entities to extend the benefits of the act and this regulation to persons within Chuuk not otherwise eligible. The Board in entering into such agreement shall be subject to other state laws, regulations, and agreed upon practices regarding negotiating agreements with non-state entities.
Based on this provision allowing, but not requiring, the Board to enter into agreements with the National Government to extend benefits of the Act and regulations to persons not otherwise eligible, the Bank argues that it may voluntarily, but is not required to, participate in the Chuuk Health Care Plan. It argues that because such voluntary participation requires an agreement and none has been entered into between the Plan and the Bank, the Bank's employees are exempt from coverage under the regulations and the Act.
Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06 provides that "[a]ny person required to pay a premium amount for whom a collection procedures [sic] is not otherwise provided in this Act or the regulations shall pay such premium amount of the Plan with report or returns as specified by the Board." Therefore, although the regulations for the Plan implement the actual amounts due under the premium, the statute itself provides for liability of the premium payments. Therefore, the Plan has shown facts that, if proven, entitle it to the relief sought for the Bank's non-payment of premiums pursuant to Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06, § 5-7(1).
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the Bank's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint insofar as the Plan has stated a claim to relief for the alleged non-payment of statutorily imposed premiums.
C. The Bank's Liability for Penalties Under the Chuuk Health Care Plan Act of 1994 and Regulations Adopted Pursuant Thereto
The Plan failed to provide a short and plain statement of the facts on which its legal conclusion rests in paragraph 7 of the Complaint under Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06, thereby subjecting it to FSM Civil Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The Complaint, Paragraph 7 states in its entirety:
As an employer, defendant is prohibited under CSL 2-94-06 from engaging in any form of practices designed to discourage or otherwise prevent its employees from enrolling in the Plan or from accepting the first level of coverage under C.S.L. 2-94-06. To the contrary, defendant has engaged in practices which discouraged or otherwise prevented its employees from enrolling in the Plan or from accepting the first level of coverage that is provided enrollees of the Plan from 2009 to present, in violation of CSL 2-94-06. As a result, defendant is liable to the plaintiff for penalty 10 times the amount of the principal due and owing from 2009 to the present in the amount of $332.800 [sic].
Complaint ¶ 7. The Plan's averment that the Bank engaged in practices designed to discourage employee enrollment is merely a conclusory allegation insufficient to state a claim because there are no facts alleged in support of the conclusion. FSM Civ. R. 8(a)(2); Arthur v. Pohnpei, 16 FSM R. 581, 593 (Pon. 2009). "[O]n a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, only the well-pled or well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true." Arthur, 16 FSM R. at 593 (citing FSM v. Koshin 31, 16 FSM R. 15, 18 (Pon. 2008); Rudolph v. Louis Family, Inc., 13 FSM R. 118, 129 (Chk 2005)).
"[C]onclusory allegations or legal allegation masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F. 2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). . . . And, the court also does not have to credit "invective, . . . bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like." Aulson v. Blanchard, 88 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
Arthur, 16 FSM R. at 593. "Although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant." 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1990). The Plan's claim under Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06, § 5-7(2) that simply states that the Bank is engaged in the prohibited activities is vague, conclusory, and unsupported by material facts. For that reason, the Plan's action for penalties sought under Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06, § 5-7(2) must fail. See Arthur, 16 FSM R. at 593; Adams v. Island Homes Constr., Inc., 11 FSM R. 445, 449 (Pon. 2003); Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007); Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1971).
ACCORDINGLY, for the foregoing reasons, FSMDB's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART, insofar as the cause of action in paragraph 7 of the Complaint under Section 5-7(2) of Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06 for penalties is DISMISSED, and DENIED IN PART insofar as the cause of action in paragraph 6 of the Complaint pursuant to Section 5-7(1) of Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06 for failure to pay premiums is left untouched by this Order.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that FSMDB shall file its answer to the remaining claim within ten days of service of this Order upon it. FSM Civ. R. 12(a).
________________________Footnotes:
1 At the outset of the April 27, 2017 hearing on all pending motions, the Court requested the parties to clarify what motions were currently pending and the preferred order in which they should be addressed. First, the defendant withdrew its motion to strike the plaintiff's opposition to its motion to dismiss. Second, good cause appearing and no objection to the defendant's motion to enlarge time within which to file its response to the Complaint, filed on November 30, 2015, the Court grants the motion nunc pro tunc, thereby leaving only the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
2 A copy of Chuuk State Law No. 2-94-06.
3 A copy of Chapter III of the Chuuk Health Care Plan Regulations, titled "Trust Fund," as adopted by its Board of Trustees in May 2001.
4 A copy of Chapter V of the Chuuk Health Care Plan Regulations, titled "Eligibility for Enrollment in the Plan," as adopted by its Board of Trustees in May 2001.
5 The Act defines an "employer" to mean "any person as defined in Subsection (10) of this Section who employs the services of others and pays them wages or salaries or a person who is self-employed, that is, a person who earns money for labor or goods." The Act defines "Person" to "include[] any individual, trust, estate, partnership, corporation, association, joint stock company, bank, insurance company, credit union, cooperative, or other entity or group (including any government, whether local or foreign, or any agency or instrumentality thereof)."
6 The Act defines an "employee" to mean "any individual who has been employed for wages or salaries for services from an employer as defined in Subsection (5) of this Section for at least 15 working days who regularly provides such services to the employer for 20 hours or more each week."
7 The Act defines "resident" to mean "any citizen of Chuuk for whom Chuuk is his principal residence, or any noncitizen who has established on ongoing physical presence in Chuuk and whose presence is sanctioned by law and is not merely transitory in nature."
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