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HEADNOTES

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COURT'S OPINION

MARTIN G. YINUG, Chief Justice:

This comes before the court on the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, filed March 14, 2012, and defendant State of Chuuk's Opposition to Motion to Amend, filed March 26, 2012. Joannes Iwo

[18 FSM R. 254]

seeks, in response to the court's February 10, 2012 Notice of Possible Lack of Jurisdiction, to amend his complaint to clearly plead Chuuk's violation of the FSM Constitution and thus this court's jurisdiction. The Chuuk Public Utility Corporation did not respond to the motion to amend. Also before the court is that part of Chuuk's pending summary judgment motion not resolved on February 10, 2012.

I. IWO'S MOTION TO AMEND

Chuuk opposes the motion to amend because, in its view, amending Iwo's complaint would be futile since Iwo's suit is, on its face, barred by the statute of limitations. Chuuk contends that since the complaint, even if amended, alleges that Chuuk forcibly entered Iwo's land sometime in late 1990 to install public utilities including sewer lines and since this case was filed over twenty years later on February 22, 2011, the twenty-year statute of limitations for the recovery of an interest in land bars Iwo's entire claim.

Leave to amend a complaint must be freely given if justice so requires, FSM Civ. R. 15(a), but the court must deny leave to amend when the amendment would be futile. Tom v. Pohnpei Utilities Corp., 9 FSM Intrm. 82, 87 (App. 1999). One reason an amendment would be futile is if the claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations. Id.

Fairly summarized, Iwo's claim is that Chuuk took an easement over his property without just compensation and he seeks to recover an interest in land – the easement – or to be compensated for the taking. Chuuk asserts that Iwo's cause of action is time-barred because it accrued in late 1990 when Iwo alleges that Chuuk did the taking. The parties agree, at least for the purpose of this motion, that the applicable limitations period is the twenty-year period for the recovery of an interest in land. (Twenty years is the longest limitations period on the statute books.)

A cause of action arises or accrues when the right to bring suit on a claim is complete; that is, when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion. Allen v. Allen, 17 FSM Intrm. 35, 39 (App. 2010): Kosrae v. Skilling, 11 FSM Intrm. 311, 315 (App. 2003); Nahnken of Nett v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 485, 488-89 & n.1 (App. 1996); Waguk v. Kosrae Island Credit Union, 6 FSM Intrm. 14, 17 (App. 1993). Chuuk contends that Iwo could have first successfully maintained his cause of action in late 1990.

Although Iwo does allege that the "taking" took place in late 1990, Iwo also alleges that, following the taking, Chuuk, through its Land Management Office, promised him that there would be a written agreement for the use of his land that would include compensation for him. Iwo further alleges that the same office which made this promise to him later told him that no agreement or compensation would be forthcoming. Iwo does not recite any dates for these events so they could have also been in late 1990, or sometime in 1991, or even later.

The running of a statute of limitations can be tolled – suspended – by certain events. A defendant's wrongful conduct can, as a form of estoppel, toll or suspend the running of a statute of limitations – for instance, a defendant would be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense when, by his wrongful conduct, he induced the plaintiff not to sue until the statute of limitations had run out. Pohnpei v. AHPW, Inc., 14 FSM Intrm. 1, 18 n.3 (App. 2006). In E.M. Chen & Assocs. (FSM), Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 9 FSM Intrm. 551, 559 (Pon. 2000), the court held that since leave to amend a pleading must be freely given when justice so requires, the plaintiff would be granted leave to amend its complaint to present its argument that the statute of limitations was tolled by a request that the parties submit their dispute to arbitration as provided for in the parties' contract.

[18 FSM R. 255]

In this case, Chuuk's alleged promise to compensate Iwo and its alleged subsequent repudiation of that promise may have tolled the running of the statute of limitations. If those events occurred after February 21, 1991, Iwo's cause of action might not, depending on the circumstances, be time-barred. This is not a matter that can determined from the face of the complaint or the face of the proposed amended complaint. Since this is a factual matter subject to proof, Iwo's proposed amended complaint is not futile on its face. Iwo may be able to prove his claims are not time-barred or it may be shown that his claims are time-barred. The factual evidence needed for the court to make such a determination is not present at this stage.

Accordingly, since leave to amend is freely given and since it is not apparent from the proposed amended complaint's face that the amended complaint is futile, Iwo's motion to amend his complaint is granted. Cf. Aunu v. Chuuk, 18 FSM Intrm. 48, 51 (Chk. 2011) (when there are significant factual issues that may affect the defendant's statute of limitations defense, a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds must be denied); Lonno v. Trust Territory (III), 1 FSM Intrm. 279, 281-82 (Kos. 1983) (same).

II. CHUUK'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

This also comes before the court for a ruling on Chuuk's motion for summary judgment based on the twenty-year statute of limitations since the court's February 10, 2012 ruling deferred resolution of that issue until Iwo had clarified his pleading concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. Iwo's amended complaint has done that.

From what it has before it, the court cannot determine when the statute of limitations for Iwo's claim started to run or if it was tolled. There is thus an inadequate factual basis to grant Chuuk's summary judgment motion on this ground.

Chuuk also asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on other defenses – laches, estoppel, and waiver – that it has raised. Since these defenses generally require certain factual determinations about a party's acts or omissions and since those facts have not been established, there is an insufficient factual basis on which to grant Chuuk summary judgment on these defenses either.

Chuuk's summary judgment motion is accordingly denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Iwo's motion to amend his complaint is granted and Chuuk's summary judgment motion is denied. Iwo's amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of this order, and the defendants, if they wish to amend their answers may do so by filing and serving their amended answers within twenty days of this order's entry.