CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Chuuk v. Rotenis,16 FSM Intrm. 398 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2009)
CHUUK STATE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RENTY ROTENIS, MANTY FITI, KASTA
NINGER, MACKARTY FITI, DOONE AISEK,
RUS ROTENIS, and DANTY FITI,
Defendants.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 130-2007
ORDER
Camillo Noket
Chief Justice
Decided: April 16, 2009
APPEARANCES:
For the
Plaintiff: Ken Uehara
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants: Michael Marco
(Ninger)
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants: Kent Cheipot
(Aisek)
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants: George Z. Isom
(Manty Fiti)
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants: Ben Enlet
(Mackarty Fiti)
P.O. Box 1650
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants: Kachie Sana
(D. Fiti)
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
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The government is not required to specifically allege what acts constituted each of the defendants' alleged aiding and abetting, but the government is required, as a practical matter, to reasonably inform the defendants of what acts or omissions may result in their criminal liability. Chuuk v. Rotenis, 16 FSM Intrm. 398, 400 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2009).
An information charging certain defendants with liability for another's crimes of assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault, manslaughter, and murder will be dismissed when the only conduct clearly asserted against the defendants is that they participated in the transporting and disposal of the body after the killing To support the charges of liability for another's crimes, intent to participate in or ability to prevent the commission of those offenses must be shown, and, at a minimum, there must be some reasonable inference that the defendants had knowledge of or were present when the victim was struck. Liability for crimes of another cannot be based merely on conduct occurring after the crimes were already committed. But participation in the transporting and disposal of the body after the killing, if proven, results in criminal liability under other provisions of the Criminal Code. Chuuk v. Rotenis, 16 FSM Intrm. 398, 400 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2009).
An information will not be dismissed on the ground that the supporting affidavit was unreliable when the affidavit was prepared by an investigating officer who based his testimony on his own interviews with witnesses since hearsay statements of witnesses can establish probable cause. Chuuk v. Rotenis, 16 FSM Intrm. 398, 401 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2009).
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CAMILLO NOKET, Chief Justice:
In the Government's September 20, 2007 twelve-count information, seven defendants – Renty Rotenis, Manty Fiti, Kasta Ninger, Mackarty Fiti, Doone Aisek, Rus Rotenis, and Danty Fiti – are criminally charged for the death of Ekson Ruben. According to the Government's allegations, on the evening of April 23, 2006, defendant Rotenis struck Ruben with a re-bar causing his death. Rotenis is charged with aggravated assault, assault with a dangerous weapon, murder, and manslaughter (counts I-IV). Defendant Manty Fiti, who was allegedly present during the killing, is charged with liability for crimes of another pursuant to Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 301 (counts V-VIII). According to the attached affidavit, none of the other defendants participated in the killing, but assisted only in transporting and disposing of the victim's body. They are also charged with liability for crimes of another (counts IX-XII).
Defendants Ninger, Aisek, and Danty Fiti each filed motions to suppress and dismiss. They assert that the information and affidavit contain misrepresentations or at least inconsistencies of fact. In essence, they contend that they Government cannot sustain charges of liability for Rotenis's acts against the victim because the Government's affidavit does not specify that they participated in those acts other than their assistance in transporting and disposing the victim's body.
The Government opposed the motions to dismiss, relying primarily on the language from § 301(a)(c), which states that a person can be held liable for the conduct of another if, having a legal duty to prevent the commission of an offense, the person fails to make proper effort to do so. The Government also asserts that whether the defendant had the intent required for liability under § 301 is usually a matter for the trier of fact. Opp'n to Ninger's Motion to Dismiss at 6 (citing State v. Jones, 642 So. 2d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
The court acknowledges that the Government was not required to specifically allege what acts constituted each of these defendants' alleged aiding and abetting. Hartman v. FSM, 5 FSM Intrm. 224, 232 (App. 1991). The Government was required as a practical matter, however, to reasonably inform these defendants of what acts or omissions may result in their criminal liability. FSM v. Xu Rui Song, 7 FSM Intrm. 187, 190 (Chk. 1995). The only conduct clearly asserted against these defendants is that they participated in the transporting and disposal of the body after the killing. Such conduct, if proven, results in criminal liability under other provisions of the Criminal Code. To support the charges of liability for crimes of another for assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault, manslaughter, and murder, however, intent to participate in or ability to prevent the commission of those offenses must be shown. At a minimum, there must be some reasonable inference that these defendants had knowledge of or were present when Rotenis allegedly struck the victim. Liability for crimes of another cannot be based merely on conduct occurring after the crimes were already committed.
In his March 12, 2009 motion to suppress and dismiss, defendant Manty Fiti contends that the Government's affidavit should be suppressed as a result of its unreliability. Citing the court's granting
of a motion to suppress in Chuuk v. Chosa, 16 FSM Intrm. 95 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008), Manty Fiti argues that the affidavit is defective because the affiant relied solely on hearsay testimony contained in a police report of an unidentified officer. Unlike in Chosa, however, where the affidavit was prepared by a counselor who reviewed the police report of an unidentified police officer, the affidavit in this case was prepared by an investigating officer who based his testimony on his own interviews with witnesses. Since hearsay statements of witnesses can establish probable cause, the court does not find that the affidavit is unreliable.
Therefore, the court grants defendants Ninger, Aisek, and Danty Fiti's motions to suppress and dismiss. The court dismisses counts IX, X, XI and XII against all defendants without prejudice. The court denies defendant Manty Fiti's motion to suppress and dismiss.
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