CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Chuuk v. Robert,16 FSM Intrm. 73 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008)
CHUUK STATE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROMAN ROBERT,
Defendant.
CSSC CRIMINAL CASE NO. 117-2007
FINDINGS
Keske S. Marar
Associate Justice
Trial: July 24-August 1, 2008
Decided: August 20, 2008
APPEARANCES:
For the
Plaintiff: Charleston Bravo
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
For the Defendants: Johnny Meippen
P.O. Box 705
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942
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In order to find an accused guilty of misconduct in public office, the court must find that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 1) was a public official, and 2) he did an illegal act under the color of office, or he willingly neglected to perform the duties of his office as provided by law. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 76, 78-79 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
In order to find an accused guilty of grand larceny, the court must find that the accused 1) stole, took and carried away the personal property of another; 2) valued at more than $200 but less than $5,000; 3) without the owner's knowledge or consent: and 4) with the intent to permanently convert it to his own use. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 76, 80 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
In order to find an accused guilty of cheating, the court must find that the accused: 1) unlawfully obtained the property, services or money of another; 2) by false pretenses, knowing the pretenses to be false; and 3) with the intent thereby to permanently defraud the owner thereof. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 76, 81 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
To sustain a conviction, each element of a charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 78 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
Annual representation fund allowance are funds restricted to the purposes and by the procedures set forth in the Representation Fund Act. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 79 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
All public expenditures are required to be for a defined public purpose and the procedures for demonstrating entitlement to public expenditures are implemented through the Financial Management Act. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 79 & n.5 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
Funds appropriated under the Speaker and Staff Travel Fund Act provide for the official travel of the Speaker and Legislature employees and enable members to attend various public functions, as specified in the act. The Speaker administers the fund and authorizes selected persons to receive monies, subject to the act's limitations and appropriations to carry out the purposes of the act are authorized from the General Fund. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 79 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
A legislator who seeks to use representation fund monies for a medical referral, which is an impermissible purpose under the Representation Fund Act; who seeks to use Speaker and staff travel fund monies for a medical referral, which is neither permissible nor authorized; who altered the account and amount of his travel authorization request and submitted it for approval when it was not an authorized or permissible travel authorization; and who received the travel funds without the intention of using them for the approved travel, is guilty of misconduct in office. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 79-80 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
When, at no time before closing argument did the defendant object to or seek clarification of the government's charges through a bill of particulars, motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or other means, any defect in the information, other than lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, was waived by defendant's failure to raise the issue before trial. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 80 n.7 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
The pleading rules were designed to ensure simplicity of proceedings and to avoid technicalities and gamesmanship. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 80 n.7 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
When the accused sought and obtained a check in the amount of $3,100 from the Speaker's and staff travel fund for a medical referral when he was neither authorized nor legally entitled to use the funds, the funds, without authorization for a permissible purpose, remained the property of the state. When the owner of the funds, the allottee Speaker, did not have knowledge or consent to the taking and his authorization and approval was required in order for the accused to legally obtain funds from that account; when the accused intended to permanently convert the funds and never demonstrated his entitlement to using the $3,100; when the accused did not use the funds for an approved, allotted purpose or return them so that they could be used for an allotted purpose, the allottee of the funds was permanently deprived of their use; and when the accused intended to permanently convert the funds because he sought reimbursement to use the funds for a medical referral, which was not a lawful purpose, the accused is guilty of grand larceny. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 80-81 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
A voucher submitted for a travel authorization in October 2007 could not have been authorized in the spring of 2006 without obligating funds in advance of their appropriation in violation of the Financial Management Act. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 81 n.8 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
Even though the state was able to recover of some of the funds that were not returned and not used for permissible, authorized travel, such recovery did not excuse their taking since the funds were public monies held in the General Fund to be used only for their designated statutory purposes according to the requirements and procedures provided for by law. A travel authorization cannot lawfully be used as a means for a government employee to obtain an interest free personal loan, or for any other purpose not prescribed by statute in accordance with the Chuuk Constitution article VIII, § 2. The state's ability to recover any or all travel funds advanced to a particular traveler has little to no bearing on whether the traveler unlawfully obtained the funds or used them for an unlawful purpose. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 81 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
When the accused obtained travel fund monies for a purpose not authorized by law, which was his taking of funds from the Speaker and staff travel fund for the expressed purpose of a medical referral; when the accused represented that he was entitled to the funds through use of the representation fund account and the Speaker and staff travel fund account; when the accused altered the travel authorization and represented to the Department of Administrative Services that he was authorized to receive the funds in the altered travel authorization; and when the accused intended to permanently defraud the funds' owner seeking and obtaining public funds for an impermissible purpose and intended to convert the funds by taking an unauthorized amount of funds and failing to return or account for the funds, the accused is guilty of cheating. Chuuk v. Robert, 16 FSM Intrm. 73, 81-82 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).
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KESKE S. MARAR, Associate Justice:
In its August 10, 2007 information the Government charged defendant Roman Robert with seven counts–misconduct in public office (count I; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 708), grand larceny (count II; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 509), cheating (count III; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 510), forgery (count IV; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 517), misconduct in public office (count V; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 708), tampering with records (count VI; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 520), and obtaining signature by deception (count VII; Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 518)–arising from his conduct with respect to $3,100.00 in travel funds issued to him on May 1, 2006.
Trial began on July 24, 2008 with Charleston Bravo prosecuting and Johnny Meippen representing the defense. On July 30, 2008, the Government closed its case-in-chief whereupon Robert moved for acquittal of counts II, III, IV, VI, and VII pursuant to Rule 29 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court of the State of Chuuk. The Government did not oppose dismissal of counts IV, VI and VII, which charges were dismissed. The court denied the motion with respect to counts II and III and Robert proceeded to present his case. On July 31, 2008, the defense closed. On August 1, 2008, the parties rested after the Government called a rebuttal witness.
Prior to the delivery of its closing argument, the Government moved to dismiss count V and, with no opposition from the defense, the court granted the motion and dismissed the count. The court also granted the Government's motion to amend the information so that the first sentence of each of the remaining counts (I, II, and III) would read "That on or about May 1 or 2, 2006" rather than "That on or about May 1, 2006."
In count I of the information, Robert was charged with misconduct in public office. "A person commits the offense of misconduct in public office if "being a public official, [he does] any illegal acts under the color of office, or willingly neglect[s] to perform the duties of his office as provided by law." Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 708.
In count II of the information, Robert was charged with grand larceny. "A person commits the offense of grand larceny if he does unlawfully steal, take and carry away the personal property of another, of the value of $200.00 or more but less than $5,000.00, without the owner's knowledge or consent, and with the intent to permanently convert it to his own use." Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 509(1).
In count III of the information, Robert was charged with cheating. "A person commits the offense of cheating if he does unlawfully obtain the property, services or money of another by false pretenses, knowing the pretenses to be false, and with the intent thereby to permanently defraud the owner thereof." Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 510(1).
At the time of the events involved in this case, defendant Roman Robert was a long time member of the Legislature and frequent traveler on official business with substantial experience seeking and obtaining government travel funds.
According to a TA identified as A60623 and dated April 4, 2006, Robert sought to travel abroad on a medical referral between the dates of April 25, 2006 and May 8, 2006. As prepared by an accountant at the Legislature, the TA specified that the amount of $1,500.00 be drawn from Roberts' representation fund account as a "special allowance," which indicated that the funds were not restricted to any particular use.
After preparation of a TA by a legislative accountant, the Legislature's budget officer was required to certify the availability of funds for the requested TA and the Speaker or President was required to authorize and approve the allotment. If approved, a TA was sent to the Department of Administrative Services for final approval and disbursement of the funds.
Although typically the accountant would forward the TA to the budget officer, Robert personally brought TA A60623 to the budget officer for certification. Robert requested that the budget officer change the amount of the TA from $1,500.00 to $2,500.00. The budget officer made and initialed the change before certifying the TA.
The Vice Speaker approved the TA in the form submitted to him by the budget officer and it was forwarded to the Department of Administrative Services for final approval and disbursement of the requested funds.1 The TA is marked received on April 11, 2006.
As with accounting procedures at the Legislature, approval of a TA at DAS required a certification of availability of funds from accounting personnel as well as authorization and approval of the disbursement by an executive official.
When the departure date of April 25, 2006 specified in the TA arrived, DAS had not approved the TA for disbursement of the funds because the Director refused to authorize the disbursement of Robert's representation fund account monies for the purpose of a medical referral.
On May 1, 2006, Robert visited DAS and inquired into the status of the TA. At that time, the TA was being held by a certifying accountant. Upon Robert's inquiry, the TA was taken from the accountant by another DAS employee. Shortly after, an altered version of the TA was returned to the accountant. The alterations included a handwritten change in amount from $2,500.00 to $3,100.00 and a handwritten change in the account from Robert's representation fund account to the Speaker and staff travel fund account.2 The initials "RR" were handwritten next to the alterations of the account and the amount.
The accountant certified the altered TA, which was forwarded to the Deputy Director of DAS for final authorization. The Deputy Director, due to the unavailability of the Director, was charged with approving the TA. The Deputy Director had objected to approving any alterations of the TA without an initialing of the changes by the Legislature. He approved the altered and initialed TA.3 By the end of the day, Robert received a check in the amount of $3,100.00, as specified in the altered TA, issued out of the state=s General Fund account.
Although there was no evidence directly establishing that Robert personally made the alterations to the TA, Robert was the only person with a motive to alter the TA, and no one at DAS could have authorized the making of the alterations without being subject to, among other things, criminal liability for wrongfully authorizing an expenditure from the General Fund. Truk S.L. No. 5-44, §§ 8-9. Robert also had opportunity. The circumstances surrounding the approval and receipt of funds from the altered TA, including Robert's presence at DAS, on May 1, 2006, his inquiry into the status of the TA followed by its removal from the certifying accountant, its return in an altered form with the initials "RR" next to the alterations, and its subsequent approval, as well as Robert's failure to object to receiving TA monies that he should have known were not authorized, lead the court to conclude that Robert either altered the TA himself or directed some one else to do so.
A notice sent to Robert on June 20, 2006 informed him that the TA funds either must be returned or a voucher submitted demonstrating his entitlement to reimbursement.4 When Robert did not respond to the notice, the state processed the missing funds as a collection matter and began deducting amounts from Robert's payroll against the outstanding balance. Robert apparently had a rolling account set up to enable the state to automatically deduct amounts from his payroll and apply overpayments against advanced travel funds.
The criminal information was filed on August 10, 2007. Robert submitted a voucher, marked received on October 17, 2007, indicating that he traveled for a medical referral on TA A60623 between the dates of December 6, 2006 and December 20, 2006. The voucher specified that $2,108.00 was spent on the requested travel and therefore the amount of $992.00 was due the state from the $3,100.00 advanced to Robert. The voucher was approved by the new Director of DAS on November 15, 2007. As a result, the state sought to deduct only the amount of $992.00 from Robert's payroll against the original advance of $3,100.00.
A. Misconduct in Public Office
To sustain a conviction, each element of a charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to find Robert guilty on count I of the information for misconduct in public office, the court must find that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert 1. was a public official, and 2. he did an illegal act under the color of office, or he willingly neglected to perform the duties of his office as provided by law. Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 708.
The first element of the charge is satisfied, as it is undisputed that Robert was a public official at the time of the acts alleged. It is also beyond dispute that Robert sought and obtained the funds for TA A60623 while under the color of office.
To answer the question of whether he acted illegally, the inquiry must begin with an examination of what if any restrictions were placed on Robert's receiving the travel funds he sought and obtained.
Robert initially sought to have funds withdrawn from an account containing his annual representation fund allowance. These funds are restricted to the purposes and by the procedures set forth in the Representation Fund Act, Chk. S.L. No. 3-95-09, § 1 et seq. The Representation Fund Act was passed in the immediate aftermath of the ruling in Sauder v. Chuuk State Legislature, 7 FSM Intrm. 358 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995), wherein this court held that appropriations for legislators' representation allowances, in the absence of statutory provisions ensuring their use for a defined public purpose, were unconstitutional. The requirement of a defined public purpose for all public expenditures is set forth in the Chuuk Constitution, art. VIII, § 25 and procedures for demonstrating entitlement to public expenditures are implemented through the Financial Management Act, Truk S.L. No. 5-44, § 1 et seq.
In accordance with the holding in Sauder, the Representation Fund Act specifies that the fund is to be used for members to assist their constituents' emergency, educational, and civic needs not met by other appropriations. Chk. S.L. No. 3-95-09, § 1. The funds can also be used for tribute to community meetings within the member's jurisdiction. Id. Representation fund monies remain in the General Fund until a member demonstrates entitlement to reimbursement. Id. § 2.
After DAS rejected Robert's request to have the funds withdrawn from his representation funds account, he sought to have them withdrawn from the Speaker and staff travel fund account. The Speaker and Staff Travel Fund Act provides for the official travel of the Speaker and employees of the Legislature. Truk D.L. No. 22-6, § 5. The purpose of the funds appropriated under the act is to enable members to attend various public functions, as specified in the act. Truk D.L. No. 22-27, § 1. The Speaker administers the fund and authorizes selected persons to receive monies, subject to the limitations of the act, and appropriations to carry out the purposes of the act are authorized from the General Fund. Id.6
The court finds that Robert committed the following illegal acts: seeking to use representation fund monies for a medical referral, which was an impermissible purpose under the Representation Fund Act; seeking to use Speaker and staff travel fund monies for a medical referral, which was neither permissible nor authorized;7 altering the account and amount of his TA request and submitting it for approval when it was not an authorized or permissible TA; and receiving the TA funds without the intention of using them for the approved travel. Although it was not part of the factual basis for the original charges since it occurred after the prosecution was initiated, Robert's submission of a voucher for an impermissible, unauthorized TA was also illegal.
The court therefore finds Robert guilty on count I for misconduct in public office.
B. Grand Larceny
In order to find Robert guilty on count II of the information for grand larceny, the court must find that Robert 1. stole, took and carried away the personal property of another 2. valued at more than $200.00 but less than $5,000.00 3. without the owner's knowledge or consent, and 4. with the intent to permanently convert it to his own use. Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 509 (1).
The court finds that the first and second elements of grand larceny were established due Robert's seeking and obtaining a check in the amount of $3,100.00 from the Speaker's and staff travel fund for a medical referral when Robert was neither authorized nor legally entitled to use the funds. Without authorization for a permissible purpose, the funds remained the property of the state.
The court also finds that the owner of the funds did not have knowledge or consent to the taking. Because the Speaker was the allottee and sole administrator of the Speaker and staff travel funds account, Truk D.L. 22-27, § 1, his knowledge and consent, in the form of his authorization and approval, was required in order for Robert to legally obtain funds from that account.
The court also finds that Robert intended to permanently convert the funds. The taking of an unauthorized amount of funds, in itself, strongly suggests Robert's intent to convert the funds. Further, Robert was required to provide an accounting of the funds within five days of the return date specified in the TA. If the travel was not taken as specified in the TA, then he was required to return the funds within thirty working days of the return date. Robert did not return the funds or submit a voucher demonstrating his entitlement to the funds or otherwise respond to the June 20, 2006 notice to account for the funds.
Robert never demonstrated his entitlement to using the $3,100.00 for an approved, allotted purpose. Although a voucher for the TA was approved on November 15, 2007, the approval was for an invalid TA. The voucher indicated that Robert traveled in December of 2006, which was during FY2007. Travel on TA A60623, however, was an allotment that was only authorized and approved from FY2006 appropriations. The use of that appropriation lapsed at the end of fiscal year 2006, see Truk S.L. No. 5-44, § 7, so travel during fiscal year 2007 would have required new authorization and approval for allotment of that year's appropriations.8 The approval of the voucher did not remedy the invalidity of the attached TA or the taking of the funds in 2006. When Robert did not use the funds for an approved, allotted purpose or return them so that they could be used for an allotted purpose, the allottee of the funds was permanently deprived of their use.
The court finds that Robert intended to permanently convert the TA funds on the additional ground that he sought reimbursement to use the funds for a medical referral, which was not a lawful purpose. See Truk D.L. No. 22-27, § 1 (specifying the permissible public purposes for use of the Speaker and staff travel fund monies).
The state was able, in this case, to recover of some of the funds that were not returned and not used for permissible, authorized travel. Such recovery did not excuse the taking. The funds were public monies held in the General Fund to be used only for their designated statutory purposes according to the requirements and procedures provided for by law. A TA cannot lawfully be used as a means for a government employee to obtain an interest free personal loan, or for any other purpose not prescribed by statute in accordance with the Chuuk State Constitution, art. VIII, § 2. The state's ability to recover any or all travel funds advanced to a particular traveler has little to no bearing on whether the traveler unlawfully obtained the funds or used them for an unlawful purpose.
C. Cheating
In order to find Robert guilty on count III of the information for cheating, the court must find that Robert 1. unlawfully obtained the property, services or money of another 2. by false pretenses, knowing the pretenses to be false, and 3. with the intent thereby to permanently defraud the owner thereof." Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 510(1).
The first element of cheating is met by Robert's obtaining travel fund monies for a purpose not authorized by law, which was his taking of funds from the Speaker and staff travel fund for the expressed purpose of a medical referral. The second element is met by the fact that Robert represented that he was entitled to the funds through use of the representation fund account and the Speaker and staff travel fund account, and by altering the TA and representing to DAS that he was authorized to receive the funds in the altered TA.
The element of intent to permanently defraud the owner is shown by Robert's seeking and obtaining public funds for an impermissible purpose. Robert's apparent intent to use the TA funds for a medical referral was evident from the TA in all of its versions. Robert's intent to convert the funds is also shown by his taking of an unauthorized amount of funds and his failure to return or account for the funds.
Therefore, the court found Roman Robert guilty of misconduct in public office in violation of Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 708, grand larceny in violation of Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 509, and cheating in violation of Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 510.
Sentencing of this matter was scheduled for August 29, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. The probation officer will submit a pre-sentence investigation report no later than August 27, 2008.
_______________________________Footnotes:
1 The budget officer testified that only the Speaker and President could approve TAs or amendments to TAs. Such policy comports with the provisions of budget appropriation acts, which typically name the Speaker and President as allottees for Legislature appropriations, and the Financial Management Act, which provides that only an allottee or his designee may offer evidence of an obligation. Truk S.L. No. 5-44, § 6. There was no evidence establishing whether or not the allottee power had been delegated to the Vice Speaker for the purpose of approving Robert's TA.
2 During the course of its examination of its first witness, the Legislature's budget officer, the Government asked the court to take judicial notice of the Speaker's and staff travel fund statute, Truk D.L. No. 22-27, and admitted a copy of its provisions.
3 One further alteration of the TA occurred after the Deputy Director approved it: the original travel dates were crossed out and new travel dates beginning on what might be June 9, 2006 and ending on June 20, 2006 were written in. The alteration of the travel dates, like the alterations made on May 1, 2006, was initialed "RR."
4 The notice states, according to Administrative Directive No. 94-03:
all government travelers with outstanding travel advance must submit their travel expense report/voucher no later than five (5) working days after completion of their trip(s) and must return the amount of any unused portion of the advances(s) to the Division of Treasury no later than 30 working days after completion of the trip(s)."
5 Chuuk Constitution, art. VIII, § 2 requires that expenditures of public funds must be for a public purpose prescribed by statute:
No public funds may be paid out of the treasury of the State of Chuuk except as prescribed by statute. The appropriation of public money or property and the use of public credit, directly or indirectly, may only be for a public purpose. No person may be made a direct recipient or beneficiary of public funds, unless pursuant to a public purpose, and no person may be made an allottee of public funds, unless pursuant to an executive capacity.
6 Although amendments were proposed to revise the act so that the Speaker and the President both have administrative authority over the fund monies, the court is unaware of the passage of any such amendment into law.
7 In count I of its information, the Government alleged that Robert "did an illegal act under the color of his office by obtaining a check in the amount of $3,100.00 representing his travel allowance when he did not in fact travel."
At trial, the Government varied its presentation mainly between two somewhat contradictory factual premises to support its general claim that Robert illegally sought and obtained TA funds. The first theory was that Robert obtained the TA funds illegally because he intended to use them for an illegal purpose, that is, a medical referral. The second theory was that Robert obtained the funds illegally because he did not intend to travel at all with the funds he received. During closing argument, the Government urged the court to find that the illegal act supporting its count I was Robert's use of the TA funds for a medical referral. At that point, the defense objected to the vagueness of the count, contending that the only issue before the court was whether or not Robert traveled and not whether the travel was for a legal purpose.
At no time before closing argument did defendant object to or seek clarification of the Government's charges through a bill of particulars, motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or other means. The pleading rules were designed to ensure simplicity of proceedings and to avoid technicalities and gamesmanship. Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503, 518 (App. 1984). Any defect in the information, other than lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, was waived by defendant's failure to raise the issue before trial. FSM v. Petewon, 14 FSM Intrm. 320, 326 (Chk. 2006); Chk. Crim. R. 12(b)(2).
8 The TA Robert submitted with a voucher in October of 2007 could not have been authorized in the spring of 2006 without obligating FY2007 funds in advance of their appropriation, in violation of the Financial Management Act. See Truk S.L. No. 5-44, § 8 (1)(a) ("No officer or employee of the State, or allottee of a State appropriations shall obligate or authorize or order anyone to obligate funds of the General Fund unless a the same time there are funds appropriated and available for obligation . . ."); see also Truk S.L. No. 5-44, § 9 (1) ("No officer or employee of the State shall make or authorize expenditure of money from the General Fund in advance of the appropriation and availability of funds . . .").
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