KOSRAE STATE COURT TRIAL DIVISION
Cite as Kinere v. Sigrah,13 FSM Intrm. 562 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005)
NELLIE KUN KINERE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOAB P. SIGRAH and HEIRS OF
PAUL J. SIGRAH,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 118-04
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Aliksa B. Aliksa
Associate Justice
Hearing: July 26, 2005
Decided: December 20, 2005
APPEARANCES:
For the
Plaintiff: Snyder H. Simon, trial counselor
P.O. Box 1017
Tofol, Kosrae FM 96944
For the Defendants: Robinson Timothy, trial counselor
P.O. Box 261
Tofol, Kosrae FM 96944
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Summary judgment must be granted if the pleading, discovery responses under oath, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In considering a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts and inferences in a light that is most favorable to the party opposing the motion. The burden of showing a lack of triable issues of fact belongs to the moving party. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 566 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 567 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
A party challenging a certificate of title bears the burden of proving that the certificate of title is not valid or authentic, and when the party has failed to show that the relevant certificate of title is invalid, their argument does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 567 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
Rule 9(b) requires that in allegations of fraud, the circumstances constituting the fraud be stated with particularity. The extent of particularity requires a short and plain statement of the claim. When pleading fraud, the pleader must state the time, place, and content of the false misrepresentation, the fact misrepresented, and what was obtained as a consequence of the fraud. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 567 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
When the plaintiff has not satisfied the procedural requirements for pleading fraud because she has failed to state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentation made by the defendants, the fraud cause of action must fail due to the lack of pleading with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 567 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
The elements of the tort of fraud are: 1) misrepresentation by the defendant, 2) defendant's knowledge that the statements were untrue, 3) intent to cause the plaintiff to rely upon the misrepresentations, 4) actual reliance by the plaintiff, 5) justifiable reliance, and 6) damages. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 567 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
When the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the defendant knew his statements were untrue and when the defendant's statements were presented to the Kosrae State Land Commission for their consideration of evidence and determination of ownership for the subject parcels, there was no actual or justifiable reliance by the plaintiff upon those statements and if there was any reliance, it was by the Land Commission in their consideration of the claims and evidence pertaining to ownership of the subject parcels. The plaintiff has thus failed to submit competent evidence in support of her fraud cause of action. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 568 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
The tort of "fraud-act of mistake" has not been recognized in Kosrae, but since this cause of
action appears to sound in negligent misrepresentation, therefore an analysis of the action as the tort of negligence is appropriate. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 568 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
Negligence consists of four essential elements: 1) legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, 2) breach of that duty, 3) injury to the plaintiff, and 4) showing that the breach was the proximate cause of the injury. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 568 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
When there is no competent evidence that a defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff since his duty was to represent his late father's interests before the Land Commission, summary judgment will be awarded the defendant on the plaintiff's "fraud-act of mistake" ─ negligent misrepresentation cause of action. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 568-69 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
Accurate citations to legal authority are required by Rule 11. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 569 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
The FSM Constitution's due process provision protects persons from governments, and those acting under them, and does not create causes of action against private parties. The Kosrae Constitution due process provision functions in the same manner. A party alleging a due process violation has the burden of showing that the defendant is a state actor and that the conduct in question was a state action. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 569 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
When the defendants are individuals and private parties and not governments, and the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendants are state actors and that the conduct in question was a state action, the plaintiff has failed to provide any authority in support of her cause of action based upon due process violation. Accordingly, the Kosrae Constitution due process provision does not create a cause of action against these defendants. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 569 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
The protection afforded by the Kosrae Constitution equal protection provision can only be asserted when the denial of such rights are based on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language or social status. The constitutional provisions providing equal protection of law apply similarly to laws and government actions. A party alleging an equal protection violation has the burden of showing that the defendant is a state actor and that the conduct in question was a state action or a law. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 569 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
When the plaintiff has failed to show that she was denied her rights based on account of her sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language or social status, and that the conduct in question was either based upon a law or upon a state action, she has failed to provide any authority whatsoever in support of her cause of action based upon violation of equal protection. Accordingly, the Kosrae Constitution equal protection provision does not create a cause of action against these defendants. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 569-70 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
Generally, Kosrae State Code, Title 11, former Chapter 6 (repealed) specified the former Kosrae
State Land Commission's duties and responsibilities, and the procedures for determination and registration of interests in land. It did not specify any duties of private party claimants, or govern the conduct of private party claimants. When the defendants are individuals and private parties, Kosrae State Code, Title 11, including former Chapter 6, does not create a cause of action against the defendants. Kinere v. Sigrah, 13 FSM Intrm. 562, 570 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2005).
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ALIKSA B. ALIKSA, Associate Justice:
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 30, 2005. Plaintiff's Opposition was filed on June 23, 2005. Defendant's Motion was heard on July 26, 2005. Snyder Simon appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Defendants were represented by Robinson Timothy.
This matter involves two related parcels of land known as Laas, located in Tafunsak Municipality: parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07. In March 1993, the Kosrae State Land Commission determined Plaintiff to be the owner of parcel 042-T-01, which is also located in Laas, Tafunsak Municipality. No appeal was taken, and in February 1998, the Certificate of Title for parcel 042-T-01 was issued to Plaintiff. In May 1997, the Kosrae State Land Commission determined Defendant Heirs of Paul Sigrah to be the owners of Laas parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07. No appeals were taken and the Certificates of the Title for these two parcels were issued to Heirs of Paul Sigrah in May 2000.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states three causes of action: fraud, mistake, violation of constitution and violation of statute. Plaintiff requests that the Certificates of Title issued for parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07 be set aside as null and void, and that these two Certificates of Title be issued in her name individually. Defendants Kosrae State Land Commission and Kosrae State Government were dismissed from this matter by Order of Dismissal entered on December 13, 2004. [Kinere v. Kosrae Land Comm'n, 13 FSM Intrm. 78 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2004).]
Defendants Joab P. Sigrah and Heirs of Paul Sigrah seek summary judgment on all three causes of action stated in the Amended Complaint. Defendants argue that ownership of parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07 were properly determined for the Heirs of Paul Sigrah. Plaintiff is an child and heir of Paul Sigrah. Defendants further argue that through the Power to Represent, Joab P. Sigrah is the administrator for these two parcels, and that Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the authority granted to Joab P. Sigrah by the late Paul Sigrah.
After hearing from the parties, I took the matter under advisement. This Order sets forth my ruling and reasoning.
The standard for the granting of summary judgment is established by the KRCP, Rule 56(c) as follows:
Rule 56(c) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon
. . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .
Summary judgment must be granted if the pleading, discovery responses under oath, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In considering a summary judgment motion, this Court must view the facts and inferences in a light that is most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Sigrah v. Kosrae State Land Comm'n, 11 FSM Intrm 169 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2002).
The burden of showing a lack of triable issues of fact belongs to the moving party. Kihara Real Estate, Inc. v. Estate of Nanpei (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 48 (Pon. 1993). Based upon the submissions of the parties and the competent evidence present in the record of this matter, I find the following undisputed facts.
During the reign of King John Sigrah, and before his death, King John gave to his fourth oldest son, Paul J. Sigrah, his land in Laas, Tafunsak Municipality. This land was initially designated as Lot 202, and was later subdivided into three separate parcels: 075-T-01, 075-T-06 and 075-T-07. Paul J. Sigrah is the natural father of Plaintiff and of Defendant Joab P. Sigrah. Both Plaintiff and Defendant Joab P. Sigrah are children of Paul Sigrah and therefore members of the Heirs of Paul Sigrah. The Plaintiff is the only child of Paul Sigrah who has spent most of her life in Tafunsak Municipality.
Paul Sigrah, on September 24, 1979, executed a document entitled "Power to Represent" in both the Kosraean and English languages. Through the Power to Represent document, Paul's son, Joab P. Sigrah, was appointed to represent the interests of Paul Sigrah, as his true and lawful attorney, before the Kosrae State Land Commission. The Power to Represent applied to parcel 012-K-15, also known as Yat, located in Lelu Municipality, and "also all the uncompleted parcels." At the time of execution of the Power to Represent in 1979, the Kosrae State Land Commission had not completed the determination process for the Laas parcels. The Power to Represent was executed by Paul Sigrah on the standard government form and witnessed by Tolenna K, Chairman of the Land Registration Team, and stamped with the official seal of the Kosrae District Land Commission. The authenticity of this document is undisputed. Paul J. Sigrah passed away during the 1980s, before any hearings were held on the Laas parcels by the Kosrae State Land Commission.
The Kosrae Land Commission held a preliminary inquiry in March 1988 on all three Laas parcels. The Plaintiff appeared at the preliminary inquiry and stated her claim that her father, Paul J. Sigrah, had given all three Laas parcels to her through "usru." Aliksa P. Sigrah, another child of Paul J. Sigrah and also brother of Plaintiff and Defendant Joab P. Sigrah, also appeared at the inquiry and acknowledged Plaintiff's claims to the three Laas parcels. Aliksa P. Sigrah has also passed away.
On October 11, 1990, Harold Edmond, Associate Land Commissioner, issued memorandum to the Heirs of Paul Sigrah, which stated the following:
To all heirs of Paul Sigrah. This Office would like to inform all of children of Paul Sigrah, that this Office has in its possession a document designating Joab Paul to represent him regarding all his land. This document is in this office, there hasn't been any change to it that we know of. This Office informs you about this so it helps present problems during the hearings of the parcels. Paul Sigrah has designated Joab P. Sigrah to represent him on parcel known as Yat, Parcel 012-K-15 and all other parcels. (translated from Kosraean).
Plaintiff, as an Heir of Paul Sigrah, was provided a copy of this memorandum and had notice of Paul Sigrah's designation of Defendant Joab Sigrah to represent him in Land Commission proceedings for all his land in Kosrae State.
In August 1988, the Kosrae State Land Commission issued a Determination of Ownership for parcel 042-T-01, in favor of Plaintiff. The Determination of Ownership was not timely appealed. In May 1997, the Land Commission issued two Determinations of Ownership, for parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07, in favor of the Heirs of Paul Sigrah. The Certificate of Title for parcel 042-T-01 was issued to Plaintiff in February 1998. The Certificates of Title for parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07 were issued to the Heirs of Paul Sigrah in May 2000. Plaintiff, a child of Paul J. Sigrah, is also an Heir of Paul J. Sigrah, named as Defendants in this matter.
This action was filed in August 2004, more than seven years following issuance of the Determinations of Ownership for the two subject parcels 042-T-06 and 042-T-07.
Defendants move for summary judgment on three causes of action stated in the Amended Complaint: fraud, fraud-mistake, and violation of constitution and statute. Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kosrae v. Skilling, 11 FSM Intrm. 311 (App. 2003).
A party challenging a Certificate of Title bears the burden of proving that the Certificate of Title is not valid or authentic, and where the party has failed to show that the relevant Certificate of Title is invalid, their argument does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Carlos Etscheit Soap Co. v. Gilmete, 11 FSM Intrm. 94 (Pon. 2002). Only where the opposing parties submit affidavits that set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial will summary judgment be barred. Suldan v. Mobil Oil Micronesia, 10 FSM Intrm 574 (Pon. 2002).
Each of Plaintiff's three causes of action is addressed in turn.
A. First Cause of Action: Fraud
In her Amended Complaint, first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants committed fraud. KRCP, Rule 9(b) requires that in allegations of fraud, the circumstances constituting the fraud be stated with particularity. The extent of particularity requires a short and plain statement of the claim. Pohnpei v. Kailis, 8 FSM Intrm 460 (Pon. 1994). When pleading fraud, the pleader must state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentation, the fact misrepresented, and what was obtained as a consequence of the fraud. Pacific Agri-Products Inc. v. Kolonia Consumer Coop. Ass'n, 7 FSM Intrm. 291 (Pon. 1995). After careful review of the Amended Complaint, this Court concludes that the procedural requirements for pleading fraud have not been satisfied by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has failed to state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentation made by the Defendants. Paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint alleges the elements of the fraud. However, several essential elements of the fraud have not been pled with particularity as required by KRCP Rule 9(b). This Court concludes that the first cause of action – fraud, must fail due to the lack of pleading with particularity as required by KRCP Rule 9(b).
Even assuming that the allegations pled by the Plaintiff as to Defendants' alleged fraudulent conduct are sufficient procedurally, this Court must reject Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant's alleged statements at the Kosrae State Land Commission proceedings on the Laas parcels constitute actionable fraud. The elements of the tort of fraud are: 1. misrepresentation by the defendant, 2. defendant's
knowledge that the statements were untrue, 3. intent to cause the plaintiff to rely upon the misrepresentations, 4. actual reliance by the plaintiff, 5. justifiable reliance, and 6. damages. Kaminanga v. FSM College of Micronesia, 8 FSM Intrm. 438 (Chk. 1998).
A review of the elements of fraud, as applied to the undisputed facts of this matter, are essential. The first and second elements of fraud require a misrepresentation by the Defendants, and the Defendants' knowledge that the statements were untrue. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed fraud by misrepresenting to the Kosrae State Land Commission that "they were owners or had been given ownership of parcels 6 and 7 . . . ." Amended Complaint para. 26. Defendants' representations as to their ownership of the Laas parcels were based upon the "Power to Represent" document executed by the parties' father, Paul J. Sigrah. The "Power to Represent" appointed Joab P. Sigrah as his attorney, to appear before the Kosrae State Land Commission to represent his claims for Yat and all other uncompleted parcels, which includes Laas. The execution, authenticity and validity of the "Power to Represent" is undisputed.
Therefore, statements made by Defendant Joab P. Sigrah at the hearing, claiming ownership of the Laas parcels on before of all heirs of Paul Sigrah, based upon the Power to Represent, cannot be accepted as misrepresentations. Based upon the authority granted to Joab P. Sigrah through the Power to Represent, the Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Joab P. Sigrah knew his statements to be untrue. Indeed, Defendant Joab P. Sigrah's claim for the Laas parcels included an interest for the Plaintiff, as an heir of Paul Sigrah.
The third, fourth and fifth elements of the tort of fraud are also not satisfied. Defendant Joab P. Sigrah's statements were not intended to cause the Plaintiff to rely upon those representations: those statements were presented to the Kosrae State Land Commission for their consideration of evidence and determination of ownership for the subject parcels. There was no actual or justifiable reliance by the Plaintiff upon Defendant's statements. If there was any reliance, it was by the Kosrae State Land Commission, in their consideration of the claims and evidence pertaining to ownership of the subject parcels. The Plaintiff has failed to submit competent evidence in support of her first cause of action.
Based upon this analysis, this Court concludes that based upon the allegations made in the Amended Complaint, and further evidence submitted through the affidavit of the Plaintiff and other documentary evidence, the Plaintiff's first cause of action is without merit. This Court finds that with respect to the Plaintiff's first cause of action, fraud, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. Second Cause of Action : Fraud – Mistake
Plaintiff designates her second cause of action as fraud – act of mistake. The Plaintiff's claimed tort of "fraud-act of mistake" has not been recognized in this State. However, this cause of action appears to sound in negligent misrepresentation and therefore, an analysis of the Plaintiff's second cause of action as the tort of negligence is appropriate. Negligence consists of four essential elements: 1. legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, 2. breach of that duty, 3. injury to the plaintiff, and 4. showing that the breach was the proximate cause of the injury. Lebehn v. Mobil Oil Micronesia, 10 FSM Intrm. 348 (Pon. 2001).
The legal duty of the Defendant Joab P. Sigrah in the Kosrae State Land Commission proceedings to represent the interests of his late father Paul J. Sigrah, and the Heirs of Paul J. Sigrah, pursuant to the Power to Represent. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Joab P. Sigrah did represent those interests, and those interests are reflected in the Determinations of Ownership issued for the subject
parcels, 075-T-06 and 075-T-07, to the Heirs of Paul J. Sigrah. The interests of the Plaintiff, as a member of the Heirs of Paul J. Sigrah, was also represented.
After careful consideration of Defendant Joab P. Sigrah's actions before the Kosrae State Land Commission proceedings and the subsequent determinations of ownership for parcels 075-T-06 and 075-T-07 to the Heirs of Paul J. Sigrah, I conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to submit any competent evidence of breach of duty by Defendant Joab P. Sigrah or the Heirs of Paul Sigrah. Based upon this analysis, this Court concludes that based upon the allegations made in the Amended Complaint, further evidence submitted through the affidavit of the Plaintiff and other documentary evidence, the Plaintiff's second cause of action is without merit. This Court finds that with respect to the Plaintiff's second cause of action, entitled "fraud – mistake," there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C. Third Cause of Action: Violation of Constitution – Violation of Statute.
On this third cause of action, violation of constitution and violation of statute, Plaintiff makes general sweeping allegations in her Amended Complaint against the Defendants. The violation of constitution is addressed first, the violation of statute second.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' actions with respect to the Land Commission proceeding constitute a violation of the Kosrae State Constitution, Article II, Section 1(b). Plaintiff's reference to Article II(b) is incorrect, this Court assumes Plaintiff's reference is intended to be made to Article II, Section 1(b). Plaintiff is reminded that accurate citations to legal authority are required by KRCP Rule 11. Plaintiff fails to state any specific actions which form the basis for the alleged violation of Article II, Section 1(b), which provides due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
The FSM Constitution's due process provision protects persons from the governments, and those acting under them, and does not create causes of action against private parties. The Kosrae State Constitution due process provision functions in the same manner. See Semwen Seaward Holdings, Micronesia, 7 FSM Intrm. 111 (Chk, 1995); Isaac v. Weilbacher, 8 FSM Intrm. 326 (Pon. 1998); Rosokow v. Bob, 11 FSM Intrm. 210 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2002). A party alleging a due process violation has the burden of showing that the defendant is a state actor and that the conduct in question was a state action. Livaie v. Micronesia Petroleum Co., 10 FSM Intrm. 659 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2002). The Defendants in this matter are individuals and private parties; and not governments. The Plaintiff has failed to show that the Defendants are state actors and that the conduct in question was a state action. The Plaintiff has failed to provide any authority whatsoever in support of her cause of action based upon violation of due process. Accordingly, the Kosrae State Constitution due process provision does not create a cause of action against Defendants.
The protection afforded by the Kosrae State Constitution equal protection provision can only be asserted when the denial of such rights are based on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language or social status. See Christlib v. House of Representatives, 9 FSM Intrm. 503 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2000). The constitutional provisions providing equal protection of law apply similarly to laws and government actions. See FSM v. Wainit, 11 FSM Intrm. 1 (Chk. 2002); Isaac v. Weilbacher, 8 FSM Intrm. 326 (Pon. 1998); FSM Social Security Administration v. Weilbacher, 7 FSM Intrm. 137 (Pon. 1995). A party alleging an equal protection violation has the burden of showing that the defendant is a state actor and that the conduct in question was a state action or a law. See Livaie v. Micronesia Petroleum Co., 10 FSM Intrm. 659 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2002). The Defendants in this matter are individuals and private parties; and not governments. The Plaintiff has failed to show that the Plaintiff was denied her rights based on account of her sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language or social status, and that the conduct in question was either based upon a law or upon a state action. Plaintiff
has failed to provide any authority whatsoever in support of her cause of action based upon violation of equal protection. Accordingly, the Kosrae State Constitution equal protection provision does not create a cause of action against Defendants. Plaintiff's cause of action based upon violation of constitution is without merit and therefore fails.
Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants' actions with respect to the Kosrae State Land Commission proceedings on the subject parcels constitute a violation of Kosrae State Code, Title 11. Plaintiff fails to reference any specific section of Title 11, nor any specific action which would violate a particular section of Kosrae State Code, Title 11.
Kosrae State Code, Title 11 governs Land and the Environment, in more than fifteen chapters entitled: Public Land, Land Use Planning, Land Surveyors, Deed of Trust, Homestead, Determination and Registration of Interests in Land, Marine Life, Rivers and Streams, Protection of Environment, Antiquities, Pig Control, Wildlife and Building Code. Plaintiff's failure to specify a specific section or sections of Title 11 necessarily leaves this Court to guess at which statutory violation Plaintiff has alleged. Plaintiff's affidavit in support of her Opposition to the motion also does not reference Defendants' alleged violation of statute or any specific statute. Plaintiff has failed to state Defendants' actions which were allegedly made in violation of Kosrae State Code, Title 11, and has failed to provide any authority whatsoever in support of this cause of action.
This Court has carefully reviewed Kosrae State Code, Title 11, and in particular Chapter 6, governing Determination and Registration of Interests in Land. As this matter involves the determination of title for the subject parcels, this Court makes a reasoned guess that Plaintiff's cause of action relates to Title 11, Chapter 6.
Generally, Kosrae State Code, Title 11, former Chapter 6 (repealed) specified the duties and responsibilities of the former Kosrae State Land Commission, and the procedures for determination and registration of interests in land. Kosrae State Code, Title 11, former Chapter 6, did not specify any duties of private party claimants, or govern the conduct of private party claimants. Defendants in this matter are individuals and private parties. Defendants were not members of the Kosrae State Land Commission. Plaintiff has failed to provide any authority whatsoever in support of her cause of action based upon violation of statute. Accordingly, the Kosrae State Code, Title 11, including former Chapter 6, does not create a cause of action against Defendants. Plaintiff's cause of action based upon violation of statute is without merit and must fail.
Based upon this review, this Court concludes that based upon the allegations made in the Amended Complaint, and further evidence submitted through the affidavit of the Plaintiff and other documentary evidence, the Plaintiff's third cause of action is without merit. This Court finds that with respect to the Plaintiff's third cause of action, violation of constitution and violation of statute, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I have considered the facts and arguments of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the best light available to the Plaintiff. Based upon the submissions of the parties and the competent evidence in the record of this matter, I conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to produce competent evidence of any genuine issues of material fact. The Defendants have met their burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material facts remaining for trial. Following analysis of the Plaintiff's three causes of action, I have concluded that none of the causes of action are meritorious.
The Defendants, as moving parties, have shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, on all three causes of action listed in the Amended Complaint: fraud, fraud – mistake, violation of constitution and violation of statute.
The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
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