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DENNIS YAMASE, Associate Justice:

     On June 6, 2005, the plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. The plaintiffs contend that there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the availability of punitive damages; whether the plaintiffs are entitled by law to hazardous duty pay; and whether the statute of limitations, as affirmatively pled by the defendants, bars any or all of the plaintiffs’ claims and whether the plaintiffs are prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to raise the issue by motion by August 16, 2004 as per the court’s July 21, 2004 order, and they ask for partial summary judgment.

     No opposition to the motion has been filed. Failure to oppose a motion is generally deemed a consent to the motion. Naoro v. Walter, 11 FSM Intrm. 619, 621 (Chk. 2003); FSM Civ. R. 6(d). But even if there is no opposition, the court still needs good grounds before it can grant the motion, Senda v. Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 6 FSM Intrm. 440, 442 (App. 1994), and the motion must be well grounded in law and fact, In re Parcel No. 046-A-01, 6 FSM Intrm. 149, 153 (Pon. 1993).

     The plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Additionally, the defendants are granted summary judgment on the issues of punitive damages and statute of limitations. The court’s reasons follow.

     This case involves the hazardous duty pay claims of fifty-eight port operators and seamen employed by the defendants on Federated States of Micronesia Class III vessels for the years 1994 through 2000. It comes before the court on the court’s exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases. FSM Const. art. XI, § 6(a); see also Lonno v. Trust Territory (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 68-71 (Kos. 1982) (a seaman’s contract claim against the owner of the vessel upon which he served falls within the FSM Supreme Court’s exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); Robert v. Sonis, 11 FSM Intrm. 31, 33 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2002) (cases involving seamen’s wage claims are maritime cases; jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases resides exclusively with the FSM Supreme Court trial division).

     The court must deny a summary judgment motion unless it finds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Adams v. Etscheit, 6 FSM Intrm. 580, 582 (App. 1994). The court must view the facts presented and inferences made in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden of showing a lack of triable issues of fact. Id. In order to succeed on a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must also overcome all affirmative defenses that the defendant has raised. Lee v. Lee, 13 FSM Intrm. 68, 71 (Chk. 2004); FSM Dev. Bank v. Arthur, 10 FSM Intrm. 293, 294 (Pon. 2001).

     However, when a party’s summary judgment motion has been denied as a matter of law and it appears the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court may grant summary judgment to the nonmoving party in the absence of a cross motion for summary judgment if the original movant has had an adequate opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue and that his nonmoving opponent is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Truk Continental Hotel, Inc. v. Chuuk, 6 FSM Intrm. 310, 311 (Chk. 1994).

     The plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on three issues: 1) that they are entitled to hazardous duty pay, 2) that they are entitled to punitive damages, and 3) that the defendants’ affirmative defense of the statute of limitations does not apply.

A.  Hazardous Duty Pay

     The plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to hazardous duty pay because state law provides that "[a]n employee who performs work which entails unusual and extreme hazards to his health or safety shall be paid a differential of twenty-five percent of the adjusted base salary for all hours in which hazardous work is performed." Truk S.L. No. 3-43, § 17(5)(c). They assert that they were paid the hazardous duty differential before 1994 and that, since they continued to perform the same work thereafter, it is proven that they are entitled to the hazardous duty pay.

     While the asserted previous practice, if true (and it has not been proven), is some evidence that the plaintiffs’ duties were hazardous, it is not sufficient to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that their duties, for all hours worked, entailed unusual and extreme hazards entitling them to the hazardous pay differential. It remains a factual issue for trial whether each plaintiff’s duties entailed unusual and extreme hazards and whether those hazards involved part or all of that plaintiff’s hours worked. Summary judgment is denied on the issue of hazardous pay differential.

B.  Punitive Damages

     The plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to punitive damages because "punitive or exemplary damages are awarded as punishment for the willfulness, wantonness, malice, or other aggravation of the defendant’s wrong to the plaintiff, over and above full compensation for the injuries directly or indirectly resulting from that wrong." For this proposition they cite Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).

     Punitive damages are not an independent cause of action, but must rest upon some other, underlying cause of action since they are merely an element of damages in that cause of action. Semwen v. Seaward Holdings, Micronesia, 7 FSM Intrm. 111, 113 (Chk. 1995). In this case, that cause of action is contract. But punitive damages are not a contract remedy since only compensatory damages are allowed for breach. Kelly v. Lee, 11 FSM Intrm. 116, 117 (Chk. 2002) (no punitive damages awardrable in maritime employment contract case); see also Amayo v. MJ Co., 10 FSM Intrm. 244, 249 (Pon. 2001) (punitive damages not a contract remedy); cf. 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-17 (1994) (punitive damages may be available in personal injury and property damage cases; but generally unavailable to seamen).

     Furthermore, a plaintiff may not as a matter of law recover punitive damages from the State of Chuuk. 6 TTC 253; Atesom v. Kukkun, 10 FSM Intrm. 19, 24 (Chk. 2001); Kaminaga v. Chuuk, 7 FSM Intrm. 272, 274 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995). Although this principle has been modified somewhat by the enactment section 6 of the Chuuk State Sovereign Immunity Act of 2000, Chk. S.L. No. 5-01-39, that Act did not become law until January 25, 2001, which is after the time periods for which the plaintiffs claim damages and thus cannot apply to this case. Herman v. Municipality of Patta, 12 FSM Intrm. 130, 138 (Chk. 2003).

     The moving plaintiffs are therefore denied summary judgment as a matter of law. The non-moving defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to summary judgment that they are not liable to the plaintiffs for punitive damages even if they are liable for the underlying cause of action. Since the plaintiffs have had an adequate opportunity to show that the defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the defendants are granted summary judgment that they are not liable for punitive damages.

C.  Statute of Limitations

     The plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations does not apply to their case and that they are prejudiced because, although the defendants pled the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in their answer, they did not file a motion, as directed by the court, to raise and resolve the issue at an early stage. They contend that by the defendants’ failure to raise the issue by motion and their failure to comply with the court’s discovery rules and orders the defendants have acquiesced that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

     In order to prevail on a summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs must overcome any affirmative defenses pled by the defendants. The defendants pled the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. The statute of limitations on contract or unpaid wage claims is six years. 6 TTC 305. The plaintiffs have not put forward any grounds that could toll the running of the statute of limitations although they have had an adequate opportunity to do so since the defendants’ answer put them on notice that the statute of limitations defense would be asserted. The plaintiffs are thus not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to bring a separate motion asserting the defense. They have been on notice that they would be required to show why or which of their claims would not be barred by the statute of limitations.

     This case was filed on July 8, 2004. Therefore, applying the six-year statute of limitations, any of the plaintiffs’ claims that are for wages that they assert were due and payable and unpaid before July 8, 1998 (in other words, that accrued by July 8, 1998) are barred by the statute of limitations as a matter of law.

     According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the following plaintiffs’ claims end before fiscal year 1998: Pat Kisan, Lifang Pulusou, Minoru Kuka, Elias Andon, Simion Simina, Nachuo Francis, and Asaki Boone. Plaintiffs Sichimichy Kichiro, Simiron Aritos, Sanres Cheipot, and Stevenson Kichiro have claims that end some time in fiscal year 1998, but whether they have any claims that accrued after July 8, 1998 is unclear. The court will entertain a motion to dismiss those plaintiffs whose claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The rest of the plaintiffs appear either to have claims that accrued both before and after July 8, 1998 or that only accrued after that date.

     The plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on the issues of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to hazardous duty pay, to punitive damages, and that their claims are not barred by the statute of limitations is denied. The defendants are granted summary judgment that they are not liable for punitive damages and that claims for hazardous duty pay that accrued before July 8, 1998 are barred by the statute of limitations.

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