Tort claims, tax claims, contract claims, breach of fundamental rights, claims for damages, injunctive relief or writ of mandamus arising from the alleged unconstitutionality or improper administration of Pohnpei statutes or regulations, any other civil action or claim against the state founded upon any law or any regulation, or upon any express or implied contract with the Pohnpei government or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort, and actions for collection of judgments based on claims allowed against the State of Pohnpei can be sued upon within two years of the date on which they accrue. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 226-27 (Pon. 2005).

     A claim against Pohnpei has accrued when all of the facts comprising said claim exist, regardless of whether said facts are known or have been discovered by the claimant. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 227 (Pon. 2005).

     Applying the Pohnpei Government Liability Act statue of limitations, as well as its test for determining when a claim accrues, Mobil’s cause of action for contract reformation accrued on September 30, 1997 when it signed the lease agreement underlying this lawsuit since all facts comprising its cause of action for reformation existed at that time whether Mobil knew it or not. Accordingly, Mobil was required to file its claim for reformation by no later than September 30, 1999. Because it did not do so, the claim will be dismissed. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 227 (Pon. 2005).

     Since, by its own terms, the Pohnpei Government Liability Act statute of limitations is applicable only to those claims identified in Section 4 of that Act, which identifies a number of different claims, including claims based on violation of Pohnpei state law such as the Pohnpei Constitution, but does not expressly identify claims that are based upon national law or the National Constitution, the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment based on violation of the National Constitution and its claim for damages for civil rights violations under 11 F.S.M.C. 701(3) are not subject to the Act’s statute of limitations and will not be dismissed on the ground that they are time barred by that statute of limitations. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 227-28 (Pon. 2005).

     Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Thus, the plaintiff is not required to plead and prove that it has exhausted its remedies. Rather, the burden to plead and prove the defense falls upon the defendant. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 228 (Pon. 2005).

     Because the allegations of the plaintiff’s own complaint demonstrate that certain of its claims are subject to the defense of statute of limitations, the court may chose to dismiss those claims on the statute of limitations, although it is an affirmative defense. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 228 (Pon. 2005).

     When the plaintiff’s claims all derive from the common allegation that its facility will be taken from it at the end of the parties’ lease, when the parties have signed a lease agreement that purports to confer ownership of the facility on the defendant at a specified time, and when the parties have a good faith dispute as to the validity of this result under the National Constitution, this renders the case ripe for adjudication. Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. v. Pohnpei Port Auth., 13 FSM Intrm. 223, 229 (Pon. 2005).

* * * *

ANDON L. AMARAICH, Chief Justice:

     This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Pohnpei Port Authority ("PPA"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion in part.

     At some unspecified time prior to September of 1997, Plaintiff Mobil Oil Micronesia, Inc. ("Mobil") constructed a bulk petroleum facility (the "Facility") on certain land located in the commercial port area of Pohnpei (the "Port Land") and owned by PPA. The value of the Facility constructed by Mobil presently exceeds $1 million. It is not clear from the complaint whether, at the time Mobil constructed the Facility, it held a valid lease on the Port Land from PPA.

     In September of 1997, PPA and Mobil entered a formal lease agreement for the Port Land. The term of the lease was 25 years. Subparts (A) and (D) of Paragraph XXI of the lease provided that on the expiration of the lease’s 25-year term, the Facility would become the property of PPA. Mobil refers to Subparts (A) and (D) of Paragraph XXI as the "Expropriation Provisions" of the lease. For ease of reference, the Court will do so as well.

     Mobil did not receive a discounted rental rate on the Port Land in exchange for signing a lease agreement containing the Expropriation Provisions. The lease agreement also did not obligate PPA to pay Mobil any amount, let alone a reasonable one, in exchange for receiving the Facility at the end of the parties’ lease.

     According to Mobil, PPA mistakenly or fraudulently represented to Mobil that the Pohnpei Development Leasehold Act of 1996, Pon. S.L. No. 4L-21-96, required the parties to include the Expropriation Provisions in their lease agreement. Mobil attempted to persuade PPA that the law in this area was otherwise, but was unsuccessful. Mobil ultimately signed the lease agreement containing the Expropriation Provisions on September 30, 1997. Mobil did so "under duress, written protest and mistake."

     After the lease agreement was executed, Mobil repeatedly asked PPA to amend the lease to delete the Expropriation Provisions. PPA refused to do so. Mobil filed its complaint against PPA with this Court on September 5, 2003.

     In its complaint, Mobil asserts three distinct claims against PPA. In its first claim for declaratory judgment, Mobil alleges that the Expropriation Provisions of the parties’ lease agreement are an unconstitutional taking of Mobil’s Facility without just compensation under both the FSM and Pohnpei Constitutions. In its second claim for Violation of Civil Rights under 11 F.S.M.C. 701(3), Mobil alleges that the Expropriation Provisions "constitute a taking of private property without compensation in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Federated States of Micronesia including the Constitution and laws of the State of Pohnpei." In its third claim for reformation of the lease agreement, Mobil alleges: (1) that Mobil and PPA intended to include the Expropriation Provisions only if required by the Pohnpei Development Leasehold Act; (2) that the Expropriation Provisions are not required under the Act; and (3) that therefore the Expropriation Provisions should be deleted to conform the lease agreement to the parties’ intentions.

     PPA moves for dismissal of Mobil’s complaint on three principal grounds. First, PPA argues that Mobil’s complaint should be dismissed because all of Mobil’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations set forth in the Pohnpei Government Liability Act of 1991, Pon. S.L. No. 2L-192-91 (the "PGLA"). Second, PPA argues that Mobil’s complaint should be dismissed because Mobil failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in accordance with the PGLA. Third, PPA argues that Mobil’s complaint should be dismissed because its claims are not yet ripe for adjudication.

     The PGLA is the Pohnpei State Legislature’s declaration of sovereign immunity. The PGLA purports to immunize the State of Pohnpeiand its employees from suit unless the claim underlying the suit is specifically authorized by the PGLA or some other state law. Pon. S.L. No. 2L-192-91, § 4. Further, even with respect to claims that are specifically authorized by the PGLA or some other state law, the PGLA still imposes a variety of restrictions and limitations on the maintenance of those suits. Of particular relevance at the moment is the statute of limitations imposed by the PGLA.

     With some exceptions not relevant here, the PGLA requires that the following types of claims be sued upon within two years of the date on which they accrue:

Pon. S.L. No. 2L-192-91, § 4. See also Pon. S.L. No. 2L-192-91, § 27. For purposes of determining when a particular claim accrues, the PGLA establishes the following test: "[A claim] has [accrued] when all of the facts comprising said [claim] exist, regardless [of] whether said facts are known or have been discovered by the claimant." Pon. S.L. No. 2L-192-91, § 27.

     Applying the statue of limitations established by the PGLA, as well as the test for determining when a claim accrues, the Court concludes that Mobil’s cause of action for reformation (i.e., a claim based on an express or implied contract) accrued on September 30, 1997 when Mobil signed the lease agreement underlying this lawsuit. At that time, all facts comprising Mobil’s cause of action for reformation existed whether Mobil knew it or not. Accordingly, Mobil was required to file its claim for reformation by no later than September 30, 1999. Because it did not do so, the claim will be dismissed.

     Turning to Mobil’s claim for declaratory judgment, the Court concludes that this claim actually breaks down into two claims, not one. That is, Mobil seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the Expropriation Provisions of the parties’ lease agreement violate the National Constitution and (2) a declaratory judgment that the Expropriation Provisions of the lease agreement violate the Pohnpei State Constitution. The Court concludes that both of these claims accrued on September 30, 1997 because, by its own allegations, Mobil was aware of all facts underlying the claims on this date. However, the Court also concludes that only the claim for declaratory judgment based on the Pohnpei State Constitution is subject to dismissal under the PGLA’s two-year statute of limitations. The claim for declaratory judgment based on the National Constitution is not subject to dismissal on this ground.

     By its own terms, the statute of limitations established by the PGLA is applicable only to those claims identified in Section 4 of the PGLA. Section 4 identifies a number of different claims, including claims based on violation of Pohnpei State law such as the Pohnpei State Constitution. See Pon. S.L. No. 2L-192-91, § 4(6). But Section 4 does not expressly identify claims for declaratory judgment that

are based upon National law such as the National Constitution. Accordingly, because Mobil’s claim for declaratory judgment based on violation of the National Constitution does not fall into one of the categories of claims set forth in Section 4, it is also not subject to the PGLA statute of limitations. And the claim will not be dismissed on the ground that it is time barred by that statute of limitations.

     A similar analysis applies to Mobil’s claim for violation of civil rights under 11 F.S.M.C. 701(3). This claim for damages is primarily based on the allegation that the Expropriation Provisions of the parties’ lease constitute an illegal taking of property under the national constitution and the laws of the FSM. This type of claim does not fall within any of the categories of claims identified in Section 4 of the PGLA and therefore is not subject to the PGLA statute of limitations. Accordingly, the claim will not be dismissed on the ground that it is time-barred by that statute of limitations.

     PPA also claims that each of Mobil’s claims should be dismissed because Mobil failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under the PGLA. The Court declines to dismiss any of Mobil’s remaining claims on this ground.

     The exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. See Pohnpei v. Ponape Constr. Co., 7 FSM Intrm. 613, 618-19 (App. 1996). Thus, Mobil is not required to plead and prove that it has exhausted its remedies. Rather, the burden to plead and prove the defense falls upon PPA.

     The Court recognizes that it has chosen to dismiss certain claims on the statute of limitations, which is also an affirmative defense. But that is because the allegations of Mobil’s own complaint demonstrate that its claims are subject to the defense. See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 352-54 (2d ed. 1990). The Court does not believe the same is true with respect to the exhaustion of administrative remedies defense. There is no

allegation in the complaint showing that Mobil failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. And the law does not require Mobil to include an affirmative statement to this effect to state a claim. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss any of Mobil’s claims on the ground that it failed to plead exhaustion of remedies.

     PPA’s final ground for dismissing Mobil’s complaint is that the claims set forth therein are not ripe. In this connection, PPA argues that Mobil’s claims, which all derive from the common allegation that Mobil’s Facility will be taken from it at the end of the parties’ lease, are not ripe until the lease ends. The Court disagrees. The parties have signed a lease agreement that purports to confer ownership of the Facility on PPA at a specified time. The parties also currently have a good faith dispute as to the validity of this result under the national constitution. This renders the case ripe for adjudication.

     For the reasons set forth above, the Court grant PPA’s motion to dismiss to the following extent: