A prematurely filed election appeal must be dismissed. By statute, an aggrieved candidate in an election contest can appeal to the FSM Supreme Court only after the Election Director has denied his petition or after his petition has been effectively denied because the time has run out for the Director to issue a decision on the petition. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 202 (App. 2005).

     An appeal from an administrative agency must be started within the established statutory time period. This has the salutary effect of permitting resolution by the administrative agency, which may either satisfy the aggrieved party or address his concerns, thus conserving scarce judicial resources. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203 (App. 2005).

     An exception to the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies first is if to do so would be futile. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203 n.2 (App. 2005).

     The primary forum in which election contests must run their course is the election administrative machinery created by Congress. Constitutions and statutes provide, as a part of the machinery of elections, a procedure by which election results may be contested. Such contests are regulated wholly by the constitutional or statutory provisions. A strict observance to the steps necessary to give jurisdiction is required, and the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the proceedings. If these steps are not followed, courts are powerless to entertain such proceedings. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203 (App. 2005).

     An election contest appellant has not strictly observed the steps necessary to give the court jurisdiction when he has not filed his appeal within the time frame permitted by statute. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203 (App. 2005).

     The time frame for an aggrieved candidate to seek a revote is the same as that to seek a recount. It must be filed within one week of certification of the election results. The winning candidate has one week to respond to the petition. The National Election Director then has 10 days to decide whether to approve the petition. If he decides not to approve the petition, he must record the reasons for the decision. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203 (App. 2005).

     When election irregularities cannot be corrected by recount, a candidate may petition for an election to be set aside and done over, either in a district as a whole or in the part where the irregularities took place. The procedures for the filing a revote petition, action thereon, and appeal of its denial are the same as those for a recount petition. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203 n.3 (App. 2005).

     The election results certification, the signing of it, and notifying the public and the candidates should all be done at the same time, promptly on the same day. That an intervening day was celebrated as a holiday by many is no excuse. The date of certification is an important starting date in the election contest process. The statutory scheme contemplates that these steps are taken promptly. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 203-04 (App. 2005).

     When there are multiple dates upon which an election result was certified, the date of making the certification public and notifying the candidates would comport best with due process as the certification starting point for election contests. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 204 (App. 2005).

     The court lacks jurisdiction to hear an election appeal filed too soon because the statute does not grant the court jurisdiction over election cases until the administrative steps and time frames in 9 F.S.M.C. 902 have been adhered to. Such an appeal is therefore dismissed as premature (unripe). Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 204 (App. 2005).

     A motion filed pro se in the appellate division can be denied on the basis that it was filed pro se without leave of court. In the appellate court, unlike the trial court, a party does not have an automatic right to appear pro se and must seek permission. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 204 n.4 (App. 2005).

     The five-day time limit to appeal an election to the FSM Supreme Court does not start when the Director certifies the election, but rather when the aggrieved candidate receives the Director’s decision on the candidate’s petition or until the time has run out for the Director to issue a decision on the candidate’s petition. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 204 (App. 2005).

     An election contest appellant’s failure to specify which statutory standard of review he thinks applies to his appeal should not, by itself, be fatal to his appeal. Wiliander v. National Election Dir., 13 FSM Intrm. 199, 204 (App. 2005).

* * * *

PER CURIAM:

     This election appeal was filed on March 29, 2005. On April 5, 2005, the National Election Director filed a motion to dismiss. By court order, the appellant filed a statement of the issues on April 6, 2005. On April 13, 2005, the Director filed his Objections to Appellant’s Statement of Issues, claiming that two of the "issues" were too vague to specify what the appellant deemed was error.

     On April 5, 2005, the National Election Director filed a motion to dismiss. The ground for this motion is that, since, in his view, the appeal seeks either a recount or a revote as a remedy, it is premature as the National Election Director’s decision on Wiliander’s petitions to him had not been issued yet and the deadline for its issuance had not yet passed. Wiliander filed his response to the Director’s motion to dismiss on April 12, 2005. The Director filed his reply to the response on April 13, 2005.

     Also on April 5, 2005, the real party in interest, Twiter Aritos, acting pro se, filed his motion to dismiss. The ground for the motion is that the appeal was filed too late, is untimely, and therefore must be dismissed.

     The Director’s motion to dismiss is granted and the real party in interest’s motion is denied on the ground it relied on. This appeal is dismissed. Our reasoning follows.

     The National Election Director contends that this appeal was filed prematurely and should be dismissed on that ground. He characterizes the relief Wiliander seeks as either a recount or a revote or both. The Director contends that either way, Wiliander cannot appeal to the court until he has issued his decision which, he contends he could not legally have issued before the date on which the notice of appeal was filed. The Director contends that he had until 17 days after he certified the election on March 28, 2005 (that is, until April 14, 2005) to make his decision and that he had not done so even by the time he filed his motion to dismiss.

     Wiliander’s response concedes that his appeal was filed two days too early. He contends that since he does not seek a recount his petition to the Director had to be filed within one week of the March 8, 2005 election (relying on 9 F.S.M.C. 902), his first petitions were filed on March 14 and 15, the other candidate had until March 22 to respond, at which point the Director had ten days (until April 2, 2005) to issue his decision and when he had not, it would be deemed a denial of the petition and Wiliander could appeal. Wiliander contends that since, in his view, he was in "substantial compliance" with the statute and that a premature appeal should not be treated as unfavorably as a late appeal, this appeal should go forward on the merits.

     The Director, in reply, contends that Wiliander ignores the part of section 902 that applies to his appeal and that his (now-issued) April 11, 2005 decision is timely and that it is from that point the time to appeal starts to run.

     A prematurely filed election appeal must be dismissed. By statute, an aggrieved candidate in an election contest can appeal to the FSM Supreme Court only after the election agency has denied his petition, 9 F.S.M.C. 903(1); Kony v. Mori, 6 FSM Intrm. 28, 30 (Chk. 1993), or after his petition has been effectively denied because the time has run out for the Director to issue a decision on the petition, Wiliander v. Mallarme, 7 FSM Intrm. 152, 158 (App. 1995) (when the Director has not rendered his decision within the statutorily-prescribed time limit it must be considered a denial of the petition, and the petitioner can then file his appeal in the Supreme Court).