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    This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendant Ponshy Edgar to erase all evidence of his having been charged with, and convicted of, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and obstruction of justice. The charges were brought in 1976, and the Defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crimes in 1977. He was sentenced to a total of 16 months imprisonment, with 11 months suspended. He served the required five months of the original sentence.

     Defendant apparently seeks to circumvent the prohibitions contained in Article IX, § 9 of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, and 9 F.S.M.C. 201(5), against felons being candidates for the FSM Congress. Defendant has filed to become a candidate in the March, 2003 elections, and has apparently had his candidacy rejected because of the convictions.

      As the granting or denial of this motion lies solely within the Court’s discretion, as limited by law, no appearance is deemed necessary by Chuuk State as successor to the government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The Court finds that it can decide the motion without oral argument.1

     For the reasons stated below, the motion must be denied.

A. Grounds for the Motion.

     Defendant asserts two grounds in support of his motion. First, that CSSC Criminal Rule 32(d) permits the Court to allow the Defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty, after sentencing, to correct "manifest injustice." Second, that Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 1111 permits the Court to vacate the judgment of conviction and to restore the Defendant to the position he was in prior to being charged with the offenses upon which he was convicted. Neither ground finds support in the law.

B. Defendant demonstrates no "manifest injustice."

     Defendant first relies upon CSSC Criminal Rule 32(d):

(emphasis added).

     Ordinarily Rule 32(d) only permits a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to imposition of sentence. Since Defendant was sentenced in 1977, and served his sentence fully, a motion under this rule should under most circumstances be denied.

     However, Defendant relies on the last clause of the rule, which permits the Court, in its discretion, to set aside a judgment of conviction, and thereafter permit a Defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty, after sentencing, upon a showing "manifest injustice." Defendant cannot rely on this clause of Rule 32(d). He has failed to meet the strict burden of showing "manifest injustice" sufficient to warrant setting aside the conviction and permitting withdrawal of the plea of guilty.

      The burden of proof of establishing "manifest injustice" sufficient to warrant the setting aside of a conviction lies with the Defendant. United States v. Mainer, 383 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1967).2 In order to sustain his burden, the Defendant must show that the conviction was obtained through fraud, imposition upon him, or misapprehension of his legal rights, and/or that he is not guilty of the crimes as charged. United States v. Dumorne, 392 F. Supp. 530 (D.P.R. 1975).

     Defendant raises none of these grounds. He asserts only that, given his rehabilitation over time, and his good work in the community and on behalf of his municipality in the years since 1977, it is a "manifest injustice" that he be prohibited from serving in the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia. While such rehabilitation may be grounds for a pardon, it is not a valid ground for setting aside a conviction and permitting withdrawal of a plea of guilty under Rule 32(d).

     Grounds for granting such a motion include, inter alia, failure of the trial court to comply with

Rule 11, United States v. Cody, 438 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1971); failure of the trial court to adduce a factual basis for the plea, United States v. White, 483 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1973); and lack of assistance of counsel coupled with a failure to understand the direct consequences of a guilty plea as regards the sentence to be imposed, Gannon v. United States, 208 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1953).

     A Rule 32(d) motion can be granted if the Defendant failed to understand the direct consequences of his plea with regard to sentencing. However, failure to comprehend the collateral consequences of a plea is not grounds for the granting of a Rule 32(d) motion. Thus, the failure of a corporate firearms dealer) convicted of selling unregistered firearms) to understand that its plea of guilty would result in the revocation of its license to sell firearms, is not grounds for vacating the conviction. Revocation of the license to sell firearms is a collateral, rather than a direct, consequence of the plea of guilty. United States v. Cassanova’s, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Similarly, a Defendant – failing to understand that he could be deported upon pleading guilty to a felony – is not entitled to have his conviction set aside on that ground, deportation being a collateral, not a direct, consequence of his plea. United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.1973).

     Just as revocation of a license, or deportation, is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the fact that the Defendant, upon pleading guilty to a felony, would be precluded from becoming a candidate for public office is equally a collateral consequence of the plea. Felons lose privileges available to those who do not commit crimes. Loss of these privileges of good citizenship is simply not grounds for vacating a judgment of conviction, especially one entered 25 years ago.

C. Defendant’s reliance on Chk. S.L. 6-66, § 1111 is unavailing.

      Defendant contends that Chk. S.L. 6-66, § 1111 permits the Court, after imposition and completion of the sentence, to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence, and return him to the status he held before being charged with the crimes. Defendant fails to understand the statute, and the circumstances of its application.

      Chuuk State Law No. 6-66, § 1111 provides, in pertinent part:

. . . .

(emphasis added)

     Thus, at any time before imposition of sentence, the court may suspend imposition of sentence on conditions. If the conditions are fully satisfied, the court must vacate the judgment of conviction.

     However, this section is only applicable before the imposition of sentence. In this case, the sentence was not only imposed, but was fully served. Section 1111 is inapplicable, and unavailable

as a remedy to the Defendant. Neither of the grounds raised by the Defendant in his motion are sufficient for the Court, at this late date and after completion of the sentence, to exercise its discretion and vacate the judgment of conviction.

D. Qualifications are controlled by Congress.

     Defendant asks this Court to vacate a criminal conviction, based upon a voluntary guilty plea, in order to circumvent the constitutional and statutory proscriptions against felons being candidates for the Congress of the FSM. Defendant does not now complain that he was not guilty of the crimes, or that he was not afforded due process of law when he was accused of, and then pleaded guilty to, two separate felonies. He simply claims it is unfair, given his rehabilitation, to deprive him of his perceived right to be a candidate for the Congress.

     His complaint should be before Congress, not the Court. It is Congress that determines the qualifications for candidates for membership in that legislative body.

Robert v. Mori , 6 FSM Intrm. 394, 401 (App. 1994).

     Roman Robert was pardoned for his crime prior to the formation of the Federated States of Micronesia, and yet the Courts could not assist him in overcoming the constitutional and statutory proscriptions against his being a candidate for the Congress. Defendant, having not even received a pardon, seeks to have this Court strike from the public records all evidence of the charges against him, and his convictions. He seeks a way around the constitutional and statutory proscriptions which is unavailable even to one who has been pardoned for his crimes. The Court has no power to do as the Defendant asks.

     For the reasons stated, and in the interests of justice, the motion of Defendant Edgar to expunge the record of his conviction and to dismiss the criminal complaint against him is due to be, and it hereby is, denied.

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1. No evidentiary proceeding on the motion is necessary, absent credible assertions of grounds, such as lack of competent counsel, innocence of the charges brought, or that the plea was not voluntarily made. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 134, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).

2. There are no reported decisions in the FSM interpreting CSSC Criminal Rule 32(d). Absent such interpretive decisions, the Court may look for guidance to cases addressing the issue from the U.S. Federal Circuits. Senda v. Mid-Pacific Constr. Co., 6 FSM Intrm. 440, 444 (App. 1994).