Chuuk Constitution Article 03

Section 1. No law may deny freedom of speech or press, or the right to assemble peaceably, join any association, or petition.

Section 2. No person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, be denied equal protection under the law, be denied the enjoyment of civil rights, or be discriminated against in the exercise of civil rights, on account of race, sex, religion, language, dialect, ancestry, national origin, or social status.

A person's constitutional right to due process of law, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is violated when an officer instead of protecting the person from attack, threw him to the ground, and beat the person in the jail. Meitou v. Uwera, 5 FSM Intrm. 139, 144 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).

Since retrospective application of a constitutional provision barring persons convicted of felonies, even if pardoned, from holding legislative office is not an invalid ex post facto law, retrospective application of then provision is also not invalid as a bill of attainder or a denial of due process. Robert v. Chuuk State House of Representatives, 6 FSM Intrm. 260, 271-72 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1993).

To consider a lease valid when the lessee state government cannot be compelled to honor it would be unconstitutional taking of lessor's property. Billimon v. Chuuk, 5 FSM Intrm. 130, 136 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).

Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. No warrant may be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, specifically describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Case annotations: For a court to order property seized pursuant to a search warrant to be returned, the defendants' burden is to show both that there has been an illegal seizure by the state and that they have a claim of lawful possession to the property. Chuuk v. Mijares, 7 FSM Intrm. 149, 150 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

A party who denies ownership of the seized items has no standing to ask for return of the property. Chuuk v. Mijares, 7 FSM Intrm. 149, 150 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

For a party to have a valid claim of lawful possession of alcohol seized by the state that party must have paid the possession tax on the seized items. Chuuk v. Mijares, 7 FSM Intrm. 149, 150 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

Where a defendant's motion is one for the return of seized property and he has failed to meet his burden to show a right to lawful possession, a court need not reach the issue of the illegal seizure and suppression of the evidence. Chuuk v. Mijares, 7 FSM Intrm. 149, 151 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

The legislative power to investigate is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the legislature, and the right to privacy embodied in Art. III, § 3 of the Chuuk Constitution is a restraint on the investigative power of the legislature. In re Legislative Subpoena, 7 FSM Intrm. 259-261 259, 263 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

It is unreasonable for a public official, required by law to cooperate with legislative investigating committees, to have an expectation of privacy in matters that are linked to his performance in office, and it is unreasonable for a public official, such as the Governor, who is a trustee of the state's finances and who owes a fiduciary duty to the state to expect that his personal finances will be kept private if there is some reason to believe he has violated his trust. In re Legislative Subpoena, 7 FSM Intrm. 261, 267 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

The Chuuk Constitution protects persons from an unreasonable invasion of privacy. The right to privacy depends upon whether a person has a reasonable expectation that the thing, paper or place should remain free from governmental intrusion. A person's right to privacy is strongest when the government is acting in its law enforcement capacity. In re Legislative Subpoena, 7 FSM Intrm. 261, 266 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1995).

Section 4. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to a speedy trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to confront opposing witnesses, to compel attendance of supporting witnesses, and to be assisted by defense counsel.

Section 5. No person may be compelled to give evidence that may be used against such person in a criminal case, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Section 6. Excessive bail may not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

Case annotations: In making an otherwise lawful arrest, a police officer may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to effect the arrest, and no more; he must avoid using unnecessary violence. Meitou v. Uwera, 5 FSM Intrm. 139, 143 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1991).

Section 7. The writ of habeas corpus shall exist in the State of Chuuk. The writ may not be suspended, except by the Governor and only when the public safety requires it in case of war, rebellion, insurrection, or invasion. Consideration of the writ shall take precedence over all other business of the court, and, if the court determines that there is a proper basis, the writ shall be issued without delay.

Section 9. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, may exist in the State of Chuuk.

Section 10. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contract may be enacted.

Case annotations: While every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective not every retrospective law is an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one which imposes punishment for past conduct, lawful at the time it was engaged in. Robert v. Chuuk State House of Representatives, 6 FSM Intrm. 260, 266-67 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1993).

Legislation is not an ex post facto law where the source of the legislative concern can be thought to be the activity or status from which the individual is barred, even though it may bear harshly upon one affected, but the contrary is the case where the statute in question is evidently aimed at the person or class of persons disqualified. Robert v. Chuuk State House of Representatives, 6 FSM Intrm. 260, 268-69 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1993).

A provision barring those convicted of a felony, even if pardoned, from membership in the legislature is concerned with the qualifications of legislative membership, and is not just for the purpose of punishing felons and those pardoned of a felony which would violate the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws. Robert v. Chuuk State House of Representatives, 6 FSM Intrm. 260, 269-71 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1993).

Regulations imposing civil disqualifications for past criminal conduct are not punishment barred by the constitutional ban against ex post facto laws. Robert v. Chuuk State House of Representatives, 6 FSM Intrm. 260, 270-71 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1993).

Since retrospective application of a constitutional provision barring persons convicted of felonies, even if pardoned, from holding legislative office is not an invalid ex post facto law, retrospective application of the provision is also not invalid as a bill of attainder or a denial of due process. Robert v. Chuuk State House of Representatives, 6 FSM Intrm. 260, 271-72 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1993).

Section 11. No law may restrict the freedom of residents of the State of Chuuk to move and migrate within the State.

Section 13. No soldier may, in time of peace or war, be quartered in any house without the owner's consent.